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Abstract 
‘Kenya is no doubt a special case’: British policy towards Kenya, 1960-1980 
Poppy Cullen 
 
This thesis examines the ways British policy towards Kenya was made from 1960 to 1980 – from the 
last years of British colonial rule and through the first two decades of Kenya’s existence as an 
independent state. Despite the late colonial traumas of Mau Mau, relationships between the British 
government and the new government of Kenya were very close. British officials actively pursued 
influence, and a combination of multiple and overlapping interests and a dense network of 
relationships encouraged British politicians, civil servants and diplomats to place a high value on this 
relationship, coming to describe it as ‘special’.  
The thesis examines how ‘policy’ was made, and argues that this emerged from numerous decisions 
taken by individuals at multiple levels, informed by ‘habits of thought’ as well as a general 
understanding of British interests which was shared – despite some rivalries and tensions between UK 
government departments. British attitudes were also shaped by misunderstandings and prejudices. 
Kenya, by contrast, was emerging as a neo-patrimonial state. This thesis examines how these systems 
interacted with one another and recognises the clear difference: British officials worked within a 
bureaucratic system in a way which gave their decisions a coherence and consistency; Kenya’s elite 
pursued personal and factional interests. Even so, the British reinforced Kenyan neo-patrimonialism 
by working with individuals rather than through official channels.  
The thesis argues that, despite the disparity in structure and form, this was a negotiated relationship. 
Leading Kenyans were often adept at using the British relationship to their particular advantage and 
were able to influence and shape British decisions in ways which complicate any simple neo-colonial 
analysis. The relationship remained close because British interests and those of leading Kenyans came 
to align on crucial issues, ensuring a continued mutual interest in the relationship. 
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Introduction 
 
On the fiftieth anniversary of Kenya’s independence in 2013, UK Minister for Africa Mark Simmonds, 
Britain’s representative at the celebrations, issued a ‘Happy Birthday’ message in The Daily Nation. 
With the German Ambassador to Kenya the only other foreign commentator included, Simmonds was 
keen to highlight the Anglo-Kenyan connection: 
Today the UK/Kenya relationship is a modern one. The colonial era is past. We share the same 
goals: Prosperity, inclusive growth that benefits the poorest, and shared security. We work 
together in partnership, based on mutual respect and shared interests … our partnership is 
broad, deep, and mutually beneficial. I welcome that and I am ambitious for what we can 
achieve together in the future1 
His message was positive and optimistic, designed to highlight the close Anglo-Kenyan relationship 
and make clear the emphasis British politicians and decision-makers still placed on Kenya.  
2013 was also the year in which veterans from the 1952-60 Mau Mau Emergency, who had sued the 
British government, received a settlement in the British High Court of £19.9m. The British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary William Hague announced that ‘The British Government recognises that 
Kenyans were subject to torture and other forms of ill treatment at the hands of the colonial 
administration. The British government sincerely regrets that these abuses took place, and that they 
marred Kenya’s progress towards independence’.2 Historians such as Anderson and Elkins had already 
been exposing the British government’s brutal role in Mau Mau,3 but this was a striking admission of 
                                                          
1 Mark Simmonds, ‘At just 50, Kenya has made remarkable progress and has even more lined up’, Daily Nation, 
13 December 2013, p. 13. 
2 William Hague, ‘Statement to Parliament on settlement of Mau Mau claims’, 6 June 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-to-parliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims, accessed 
23 June 2014. 
3 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London, 2006); 
Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York, 2005); Huw Bennett, 
Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency (Cambridge, 2013). 
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colonial abuses from the British government, which at independence had sought to conceal evidence 
of this.4 Part of Hague’s speech was replicated almost word-for-word in Simmonds’ editorial:  
Although we should never forget our history and indeed must always seek to learn from it, we 
should also look to the future, strengthening a relationship that will promote the security and 
prosperity of both our nations. The ability to recognise error in the past but also to build the 
strongest possible foundation for cooperation and friendship over the next 50 years are both 
hallmarks of our democracy5  
Yet what is striking is that, despite the brutality of the struggle for independence, this colonial past 
had in many senses already been overlooked as a close relationship long outlasted colonialism.  
This thesis studies the emergence of this close relationship in the years around independence through 
to 1980 when the relationship was reaffirmed in the wake of Daniel arap Moi’s succession as Kenyan 
President; in 1979 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told Moi that ‘[t]he United Kingdom 
regarded Kenya in a very special light’.6 It will examine the detail of what became viewed as a ‘special’ 
relationship. In considering British policy towards Kenya, the thesis asks a wider question: what is 
‘policy’ and how is it made? How did British diplomats, civil servants, and ministers decide what British 
interests were and how to pursue them? It will argue that policy is a nebulous concept and emerged 
from a series of decisions taken by various groups. A key argument this thesis will make is that policy 
was constructed through engagement with Kenyans in a process of negotiation. In the UK, there was 
‘policy’ in the sense of a relatively consistent and coherent approach which transcended individuals; 
but this thesis also shows that ‘policy’ was made not solely by grand position papers, and explicit 
discussions about what ‘policy’ should be were infrequent. Rather, a combination of ‘habits of 
thought’ and patterns of relationship informed multiple decisions across government – and those 
decisions were policy, and in turn reproduced the relationships which made them. The British 
                                                          
4 See David M. Anderson, ‘Mau Mau in the High Court and the ‘Lost’ British Empire Archives: Colonial Conspiracy 
or Bureaucratic Bungle?’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 39, No. 5 (2011), pp. 699-716. 
5 Simmonds, ‘At just 50’; Hague, ‘Statement to Parliament’. Hague had said ‘in the future’ rather than ‘over the 
next 50 years’ and included an additional line: ‘I trust that this settlement will support that process.’ 
6 Note of a Tête-à-Tête discussion between the Prime Minister and President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya at 10 
Downing Street, 13 June 1979, The National Archives, Kew, (TNA) FCO 31/2587/49. 
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relationship with Kenya was shaped by a dense network of relationships which produced a ‘policy’ 
more consistently and effectively than any position paper could have done.  
 
Decolonisation 
Kenya, particularly because of Mau Mau, has featured prominently in histories of decolonisation as 
‘one of the classic cases of African decolonization’.7 The term decolonisation itself is problematic as it 
‘eliminates contradictions and smuggles a plan – God’s or empire’s, it does not matter ... [to] the 
“granting” of independence’.8 Although we know the outcome, this was, as Cooper reminds us, a time 
of ‘multiple possibilities’ and unknown futures.9 Post-war colonial policy was ‘colonialism at its most 
reformist, its most interventionist, its most arrogantly assertive’.10 The pledge made in 1943 by 
Colonial Secretary Oliver Stanley that Britain’s aim was ‘to guide Colonial people along the road to 
self-government within the framework of the British Empire’ envisaged a long process.11 Ending 
empire was certainly not as planned and consistent a process as Hilton Poynton, Permanent Under-
Secretary at the Colonial Office (CO) 1959-66, cast it in 1979, as ‘the culmination of an evolutionary 
process … consistently, and on the whole logically, carried out, at varying tempo, over a period of 
nearly 200 years’.12 In fact, British officials ‘were never more than a step ahead’.13  As Berman has 
                                                          
7 David Birmingham, The Decolonization of Africa (London, 1995), p. 43. See also John D. Hargreaves, 
Decolonization in Africa, Second edition (London, 1996), pp. 201-10. 
8 E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo, ‘The formative years, 1945-55’, in B. A. Ogot and W. R. Ochieng (eds.), Decolonization 
and Independence in Kenya, 1940-93 (London, 1995), p. 26. For a debate on how far this was planned see John 
Flint, ‘Planned Decolonization and its Failure in British Africa’, African Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 328 (1983), pp. 389-
411; Robert Pearce, ‘The Colonial Office and planned decolonization in Africa’, African Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 330 
(1984), pp. 77-93. 
9 Frederick Cooper, ‘Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective’, Journal of African 
History, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2008), p. 196. 
10 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa 
(Cambridge, 1996), p. 451. 
11 Oliver Stanley, HC Deb 13 July 1943 vol 391 c48. See John Darwin, Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of 
Britain (London, 2012), pp. 357-8. 
12 Hilton Poynton, ‘The View from the Colonial Office’, in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), Africa in the Colonial Period. 
3 The Transfer of Power: The Colonial Administrator in the Age of Decolonisation. Proceedings of a Symposium 
held at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford 15-16 March 1978 (Oxford, 1979), p. 15.  
13 David A. Percox, ‘Internal Security and Decolonization in Kenya, 1956–63’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2001), p. 93. 
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convincingly argued, this was ‘neither a great victory for African nationalism nor a subtle behind-the-
scenes triumph for a British neo-colonial plot’.14 Rather than a process dictated by either side, this 
thesis will highlight the negotiated nature of Kenyan decolonisation, with groups on both sides aiming 
for the most beneficial outcome for themselves and engaged in a process of compromise. 
During the 1950s, British policy towards Kenya focused on counter-insurgency. But as Furedi has 
argued, ‘somewhere along the way the aim of counterinsurgency changed from restoring the 
authority of the colonial state to preparing the way for the process of controlled decolonization’.15 
Two new constitutions were introduced, named for successive Colonial Secretaries – Lyttelton in 1954 
and Lennox-Boyd in 1957 – with the first Africans directly elected to Legislative Council in 1957. Still, 
colonial officials took a long view: at a meeting at Chequers in 1959, independence for Kenya was 
suggested for perhaps 1975.16 And yet, as Lonsdale has argued, ‘Britain could not continue to remake 
Kenya by force when other European powers were abandoning attempts to remodel colonial rule for 
the moral high ground of informal empire’.17 
By the starting point to this thesis, 1960, the transition noted by Furedi was well underway. In January, 
Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod accepted at the first Lancaster House conference that Kenya would 
achieve majority rule. Previous government policy, despite the Devonshire Declaration of African 
paramountcy in 1923,18 had promoted European settlement and Kenya as a ‘white man’s country’, 
before embracing Kenya within the broader 1950s policy of multiracialism and ‘partnership’.19 In 
accepting majority rule, Macleod changed the trajectory of British government planning for Kenya. 
This was a ‘watershed’ year for the British Empire.20 In February, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
                                                          
14 Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination (London, 1990), p. 415.  
15 Frank Furedi, ‘Kenya: Decolonization through Counterinsurgency’, in Anthony Gorst, Lewis Johnman and W. 
Scott Lucas (eds.), Contemporary British History 1931-1961 (London, 1991), p. 163. 
16 Keith Kyle, The Politics of the Independence of Kenya (Basingstoke, 1999), pp. 89-90. 
17 John Lonsdale, ‘Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya’, Journal of African History, 
Vol. 31, No. 3 (1990), p. 416. 
18 Duke of Devonshire, ‘Indians in Kenya’, July 1923, TNA CAB 24/161/34. 
19 L. J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London, 2002), p. 93.  
20 John Darwin, ‘Diplomacy and decolonization’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 28, No. 3 
(2000), p. 19. 
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made his famous ‘wind of change’ speech in South Africa, viewed subsequently and by contemporaries 
as a sign of changed British attitudes; although as Stockwell and Butler have recently argued, this was 
‘not simply an articulation of a closing chapter in British imperialism, but an intervention designed to 
shape and reorientate a dynamic process of adjustment’.21 In November, ‘the epoch-making 
Resolution 1514’ was passed in the United Nations (UN), calling upon European powers to hasten 
independence for their remaining colonies.22 1960 was also the formal end of the Kenyan Emergency; 
with effective military victory over Mau Mau having been achieved by 1956. Two Kenyan nationalist 
parties were formed in 1960, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and Kenya African National 
Union (KANU), and it was with these that the British government worked in making future plans. Over 
the next three years there were two further Lancaster House conferences; elections were held in 1961 
and 1963; and Jomo Kenyatta was released from detention and became prime minister.23 Kenya 
became internally self-governing in June 1963 and independent on 12 December 1963, the last of 
Britain’s East African colonies following Tanganyika in December 1961 and Uganda in October 1962. 
A year after independence, Kenya became a republic with Kenyatta as president.  
It has frequently been suggested that metropolitan officials hoped – perhaps even expected – to 
maintain the benefits of empire after independence while avoiding its costs.24 Darwin has argued that 
independence was to lead ‘into the sunny uplands – as they hoped – of diplomatic partnership, 
economic collaboration and informal influence’.25 The ‘audit of empire’ Macmillan commissioned 
                                                          
21 Sarah Stockwell and L. J. Butler, ‘Introduction’, in L. J. Butler and Sarah Stockwell (eds.), The Wind of Change: 
Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization (Basingstoke, 2013), p. 11. On the intentions of, and reactions to, 
the ‘wind of change’ speech see: Ritchie Ovendale, ‘Macmillan and the Wind of Change in Africa, 1957-1960’, 
The Historical Journal, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1995), pp. 455-477. 
22 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968 (Cambridge, 2006), p. 304.  
23 For analysis of the elections see: George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg, The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961 
(London, 1961); Clyde Sanger and John Nottingham, ‘The Kenya General Election of 1963’, Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1964), pp. 1-40.  
24 See A. N. Porter and A. J. Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and Decolonization 1938-64. Volume 2: 1951-64 
(Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 37-8; David Percox, Britain, Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security 
and Decolonisation (London, 2004), p. 154.  
25 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World (Basingstoke, 1988), 
p. 269. 
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upon becoming prime minister in 1957 concluded that advantages were fairly balanced and, as 
Hopkins argued, ‘What mattered was that … [the British government] took steps to make friends and 
influence the people who would shape policies in the new states, when they came into being’.26 
Making friends and thereby retaining influence was crucial to British decolonisation policies in their 
hope to secure continuing benefits, but this thesis will argue that these ideas continued to characterise 
Britain’s relationship with Kenya after independence.  
 
Britain and Post-Colonial Kenya 
In histories of post-colonial Kenya, the continuing importance of Britain has been widely recognised.27 
In the immediate decades after independence, this tended to be framed as neo-colonialism. Ghana’s 
President Kwame Nkrumah argued in 1965 that  
the neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its most 
dangerous stage ... the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the 
outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its 
political policy is directed from outside28  
Arguments have been premised on the idea that the European colonisers ‘traded positions of political 
power with positions of influence’, and thus the interests of Kenya remained subservient to those of 
Britain.29  For example, Mamdani argued in 1984 that Kenya was ‘not an independent national 
economy, but a neo-colonial economy in which Britain was the leading imperialist’.30 This critical view 
was often coupled with ideas of underdevelopment and dependency, inspired by a world-systems 
approach.31 The debate on Kenya was strongest in the 1970s-80s and focused upon the role of foreign 
                                                          
26 Tony Hopkins, ‘Macmillan’s Audit of Empire, 1957’, in Peter Clarke and Clive Trebilcock (eds.), Understanding 
Decline: Perceptions and Realities of British Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 239-50. 
27 See Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011 (New Haven and London, 2011), pp.39-40; 
Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence (London, 2013), pp. 103-4. 
28 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London, 1965), p. ix. 
29 Charles O. Chikeka, Britain, France, and the New African States: A Study of Post Independence Relationships 
1960-1985 (Lewiston, N.Y, 1990), p. 2.  
30 Mahmood Mamdani, Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda (Trenton, 1984), p. 95. 
31 See for example: Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London, 1972), p. 36.  
Introduction 
 
14 
 
ownership, and especially multinational corporations, as opposed to the growth of an African middle 
class.32 In Leys’ 1975 study of underdevelopment, he argued that foreign ownership remained 
prevalent and ‘direct rule by the metropolitan power [became] unnecessary [as] society has been 
“locked into” its subordinate role in the international capitalist system by new means’.33  
The critical weakness of this dependency literature was its limited discussion of how dependency 
worked in practice, focusing as it typically has on the abstract with little direct evidence to support its 
claims.34 Another key critique is neatly summarised by Berman: these theories are guilty of ‘treating 
Africans as a relatively undifferentiated mass who were exploited, impoverished and impotent victims; 
dominated classes rather than agents of their own history’.35 African agency is thus removed.36 As 
Orwa argues, ‘it is unrealistic to assume that Kenya is led by naïve leaders who have no perception of 
national interests except those of the multinational corporations and of a national elite’.37 Leys later 
revised his original position to take into account an African capitalist class, and even suggested 
scholars should ‘finally rid ourselves of the ideological handicap of dependency theory’.38 Recent 
                                                          
32 Nicola Swainson, ‘State and Economy in Post-Colonial Kenya, 1963-1978’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 
/ Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1978), p. 360. Nicola Swainson, ‘The Rise of a National 
Bourgeoisie in Kenya’, Review of African Political Economy, No. 8 (1977), pp. 39-55; York W. Bradshaw, 
‘Reassessing Economic Dependency and Uneven Development: The Kenyan Experience’, American Sociological 
Review, Vol. 53, No. 5 (1988), pp. 693-708; York W. Bradshaw, ‘Perpetuating Underdevelopment in Kenya: The 
Link between Agriculture, Class, and State’ African Studies Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1990), pp. 1-28; and on 
multinational corporations: Alice Hoffenberg Amsden, International Firms and Labour in Kenya: 1945-79 
(London, 1971); Raphael Kaplinsky (ed.), Readings on the Multinational Corporation in Kenya (Nairobi; Oxford, 
1978). 
33 Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism 1964-1971 (London, 1975), 
pp. 9, 18.  
34 For a recent critique see: Ichiro Maekawa, ‘Neo-Colonialism Reconsidered: A Case Study of East Africa in the 
1960s and 1970s’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, (2014), pp. 1-25. 
35 Bruce Berman, ‘Up from Structuralism’, in Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya 
and Africa. Book One: State and Class (London, 1992), p. 180. For further critique see: John Darwin, ‘Africa and 
World Politics since 1945: Theories of Decolonization’, in Ngaire Woods (ed.), Explaining International Relations 
since 1945 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 208-9. 
36 See John Lonsdale, ‘Editorial: Agency in Tight Corners: Narrative and Initiative in African History’, Journal of 
African Cultural Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2000), p. 12. 
37 Katete Orwa, ‘Foreign policy, 1963-1986’, in William R. Ochieng’ (ed.), A Modern History of Kenya 1895-1980 
(London, 1989), p. 220. 
38 Colin Leys, ‘Kenya: What Does ‘Dependency’ Explain?’, Review of African Political Economy, No. 17 (1980), p. 
109. His revised views also sparked debate: Rafael Kaplinsky, ‘Capitalist Accumulation in the Periphery: The 
Kenyan Case Re-Examined, Review of African Political Economy, No. 17 (1980), pp. 83-105; J. S. Henley, ‘Capitalist 
Accumulation in Kenya: Straw Men Rule OK?’, Review of African Political Economy, No. 17 (1980), pp. 105-108. 
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scholarship has typically done so; referring to post-colonial French-African relations, Chafer has 
argued that although ‘this relationship was in many ways a dependent one, it was not one of 
straightforward dependency’.39  
However, moving away from the dependency thesis does not mean denying continuities. These form 
part of a wider debate in which scholars of Africa have increasingly questioned a simple division 
between the colonial and post-colonial, highlighting continuities and colonial legacies.40 As Ellis has 
suggested, independence, ‘while significant, did not always mark the radical break with the past that 
many observers once took for granted’.41 Independent states were the ‘successors to the colonial 
regime’;42 and, as Burton and Jennings have argued, continuities are ‘hardly surprising, nor should 
they be blithely condemned’.43 African economies, built up under colonial rule, were Western export-
oriented. They still relied on foreign investment and development aid during the decades after 
independence and so continued policies of extraversion.44 Cooper has characterised these as 
‘gatekeeper states’.45  
In Kenya, there were many similarities between the colonial and independent state.46 Branch and 
Cheeseman have argued that the post-colonial state should ‘be conceptualised as a representation of 
                                                          
39 Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization? (Oxford; New York, 
2002), pp. 234-5.  
40 See Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford, 1999); J. L. 
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the interests promoted during the latter years of colonial rule’.47 In particular, structures and systems 
of authority remained remarkably similar.48 As Branch has argued, the interests of ‘loyalists’ were 
encouraged and privileged by the late colonial state, and ‘loyalists’ continued to dominate as ‘elite 
loyalists later became gatekeepers to the postcolonial state’.49 Kenya’s post-colonial state downplayed 
Mau Mau and its veterans were not favoured as some had previously anticipated. A self-consciously 
nationalist reading of history might question the continuing ‘relations with the once “enemy” 
military’.50 However, the military had long been used by the colonial state against Africans,51 and more 
significantly, for those who inherited the state, it was Mau Mau rather than the King’s African Rifles 
who were the enemy: ‘The administration was, therefore, by definition, anti-“Mau Mau”’.52 The 
nationalist movements which sought independence did so within the colonial system and using its 
discourses, seeking to appropriate rather than challenge it. In nationalist struggles for independence, 
colonial ideas were turned against the colonial state by ‘deploying the rhetoric on which colonial rulers 
depended for their legitimacy and self-image’.53 Contesting and winning elections provided a stamp 
of legitimacy to the process for both the nationalist victors and metropole.54 Colonially-imposed state 
borders were accepted, as was the primacy of development as a legitimating rhetoric and mission of 
the state.55 Nationalists co-opted colonial models and ‘[q]uestions of transforming the colonial system 
were neither answered nor posed’.56  
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In Kenya, a process of land transfer was a key element in this continuity – indeed, in many ways this 
underwrote the emergence of the post-colonial relationship. In the early 1960s, the British 
government and others provided finance for Kenyans to buy European-owned land in a series of land 
settlement programmes. Concern about Europeans deserting or ruining their estates if not sold for 
inflated prices, or of landless Africans claiming them, drove fears of a widespread land grab at 
independence.57 Land transfer was not a way of radically altering ownership, but a means of 
preserving stability.58 Wasserman has argued that land had the potential to be ‘the major hindrance 
to a smooth transition ensuring the stability of the nationalist regime’;59 particularly as many Kenyans 
equated independence with access to land ownership, expecting wide scale redistribution.60 Instead, 
settlement schemes and the principle of respect for private property were accepted by Kenya’s 
incoming leadership, with additional schemes implemented after independence.61 This decision was 
part of a broader choice by the elite – which will be highlighted in different contexts throughout this 
thesis – to continue to look towards Britain and to maintain systems and structures from the colonial 
era. For Britain too, the decision to aid land transfer was an important one. This was a long-term 
financial commitment and these contributions made up a large part of Britain’s aid to Kenya into the 
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1970s.62 As Wasserman’s comprehensive study has shown, this was a key part of a process of 
‘consensual decolonization’.63 With the importance of land settlement widely recognised, this thesis 
focuses on other aspects of the developing relationship.  
There has been limited academic study of the nature or conduct of Kenya’s foreign relations.64 Kenya 
was not a foreign policy leader within Africa, focusing more on regional politics.65 Kenya supported 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), particularly because of the 1963 charter which accepted the 
‘territorial integrity’ of colonial borders and was thus helpful in Kenya’s border dispute with Somalia; 
Ethiopia remained an ally for the same reason.66 Kenya’s stated and public foreign policy was one of 
non-alignment, a policy adopted by many African and Asian states after independence, focused on 
neutrality within the Cold War.67 Non-alignment did not preclude involvement with economic and 
militarily partners and donors, but offered African states the opportunity to bargain for support.68 
However, the prominence of Britain within Kenya’s foreign relations has been widely acknowledged; 
as Kyle has argued, ‘the policies of Kenyatta’s Government, officially non-aligned, possessed a quite 
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definite tilt towards the west’.69 Even within this, as Hornsby has recognised, relationships with Britain 
were ‘the cornerstone of Kenya’s foreign policy’.70  
 
Kenya and Post-Colonial Britain 
Neither neo-colonialism nor dependency theory have been used as theoretical tools for the study of 
British foreign policy. By contrast to scholars of decolonisation and scholars of Kenya who have 
highlighted continuities, the extensive literature on British foreign policy has rarely focused on these 
continuities and has largely ignored relationships with former colonies after independence.71 
Hemming has even argued that ‘The process of shedding Empire was an attempt to swap dwindling 
tangible assets for increased intangibles, thereby maintaining British global power. In this respect, 
Macmillan failed’, suggesting that Britain did not sustain associations or benefits.72 This is a very 
different interpretation from those who have argued for neo-colonialism or that Britain maintained a 
substantial influence in former colonial possessions. For Britain, decolonisation has tended to be 
portrayed as a moment of change; and although always recognising its importance, in most studies of 
British decolonisation and foreign policy independence marks a country’s departure from the 
narrative. A clear articulation of this comes from Northedge, who in 1974 viewed the end of empire 
as decisive: ‘colonial policy disappeared with the passing of the colonial empire. Relations between 
Britain and the now independent states of the Commonwealth were then conducted ... in the same 
way as relations with any other state’.73 The question this raises is why historians of British foreign 
policy have so rarely explored continuities through independence or the detail of post-colonial 
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relationships with former colonies, and indeed why contemporary policy-makers accorded them less 
significance. 
One explanation might simply be that British interests had moved on; in what has sometimes 
appeared a direct transition ‘away from Africa and towards Brussels’.74 Rather than continuing 
relationships with former colonies, the study of British foreign policy has typically focused on Europe 
and America. Following Churchill’s categorisation of British foreign policy based on three interlinked 
‘circles’ – the empire-Commonwealth, American ‘special relationship’, and Europe – the two beyond 
empire seemed more significant.75 The British government applied to join the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1961 and 1967, both attempts vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle, 
before succeeding in a third application and joining in 1973.76 The idea of an independent nuclear 
deterrent was a leading concern for reasons of status, strategy, and the American relationship,77 and 
‘it was simply assumed’ that Britain would acquire these weapons.78 In 1963, in what appeared a 
testament to the ‘special relationship’ with America, the US agreed to supply Polaris missiles to Britain, 
jeopardising the ‘independence’ of the nuclear deterrent, but allowing Britain to remain a nuclear 
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power.79 More widely, the American relationship and Cold War were central to British conceptions of 
their foreign policy.80 
British foreign policy was affected by two seemingly contradictory attitudes: one, a sense of decline, 
the other, the determination to remain a world power. Historiographical and contemporary debate 
on British foreign policy has tended to incorporate a narrative of decline.81 This has not been without 
its challengers,82 but although the realities of decline may have been overstated, contemporaries did 
have a sense of this. In 1966, an internal minute in the Commonwealth Office argued that ‘[h]aving 
reached the end, almost, of our colonial era, we seem also to have arrived at a stage of indecision in 
which we have no clear idea as to the course our overseas policies should follow’.83 Blank has argued 
that Britain was in an ‘extraordinarily vulnerable international financial position’ which constrained 
policy options, with devaluation in 1967 the key symbol of this.84  The decision to leave the military 
presence east of Suez, announced in 1967, was a signal of restricted ability and apparent evidence of 
decline.85 Part of an explanation for Britain’s post-colonial disengagement could thus be due to a lack 
of ability to sustain involvement.  
                                                          
79 C. J. Bartlett, ‘The Special Relationship’: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 
1992), pp. 98-100; Alan Dobson, ‘The Years of Transition: Anglo-American Relations 1961-1967’, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1990), pp. 247-9. 
80 Michael David Kandiah and Gillian Staerck, ‘‘Reliable Allies’: Anglo-American Relations’, in Wolfram Kaiser and 
Gillian Staerck (eds.), British Foreign Policy, 1955-64: Contracting Options (London, 2000), pp. 135-170; Richard 
Bevins and Gregory Quinn, ‘Blowing Hot and Cold: Anglo-Soviet Relations’, in Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck 
(eds.), British Foreign Policy, 1955-64: Contracting Options (London, 2000), pp. 209-238. 
81 See Northedge, Descent from Power; Bernard Porter, Britain, Europe and the World 1850-1982: Delusions of 
Grandeur (London, 1983); David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth 
Century (New York, 1991); Ellison, ‘Accepting the Inevitable’, pp. 171-189. 
82 Jim Tomlinson, ‘The Decline of the Empire and the Economic ‘Decline’ of Britain’, Twentieth Century British 
History, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2003), pp. 201-221; George L. Bernstein, The Myth of Decline: The Rise of Britain Since 
1945 (London, 2004); Jim Tomlinson, ‘Thrice Denied: ‘Declinism’ as a Recurrent Theme in British History in the 
Long Twentieth Century’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2009), pp. 227–251. 
83 A.H. Read, ‘The Idea of a Commonwealth Office Planning Staff’, [1966], TNA FCO 49/136/11. 
84 Stephen Blank, ‘Britain: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy, the Domestic Economy, and the Problem of 
Pluralistic Stagnation’, International Organization, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1977), p. 674. 
85 See Andrea Benvenuti, ‘The Heath Government and British Defence Policy in Southeast Asia at the End of 
Empire (1970–71)’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2009), pp. 53–73; Matthew Jones, ‘A 
Decision Delayed: Britain’s Withdrawal from South East Asia Reconsidered, 1961-68’, English Historical Review, 
Vol. 117, No. 472 (2002), pp. 569-595; Helen Parr, ‘Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC: Finding a Role in 
British Foreign Policy, 1964–67’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2006), pp. 403-421. 
Introduction 
 
22 
 
Yet British foreign policy aimed at a global role, evidencing what Sanders has described as ‘great power 
syndrome’, and there was no desire to leave all commitments.86 Diplomats rarely ‘articulate[d] 
precisely why Britain should have a significant world role. Instead, they reflected that it did’.87 A 1964 
government report stated that: ‘It is in the general interest that Britain’s voice should continue to be 
heard and to carry weight in the world’.88 A sense of confidence and self-belief thus remained and the 
desire to sustain this ‘lay at the core of decision-making’.89 But although Africa formed part of Cold 
War policies to maintain influence as a counter to Soviet or Chinese competition, the continent played 
limited part in Britain’s global ambitions.90 The Duncan report in 1969 divided the world into an ‘Area 
of Concentration’ of Western Europe, America and Japan, and an ‘Outer Area’ which comprised the 
rest of the world.91 Although this report was widely criticised, it clearly conveyed a sense that the 
world was divided into places where core British interests were engaged, and those where they were 
not. In this categorisation, the British government would have had limited interest or ability to 
maintain involvement in Kenya. 
Part of the reason for the lack of bilateral studies is also that the Commonwealth has been the main 
means of studying post-colonial relations. The Commonwealth provided a focus for British foreign 
policy beyond Europe and America and was in itself a sign of continuing post-colonial relationships. 
This was partly why the British government was able to feel they had decolonised successfully, and 
was to offer the informal influence hoped for in decolonisation.92 Srinivasan argues that it ‘served as 
a bridge between the Empire and the postcolonial period and afforded the British leadership the 
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conviction that they held great power status’.93 Quickly, however, many Commonwealth members 
became increasingly critical of Britain. The 1956 Suez crisis revealed Commonwealth opposition to 
metropolitan policies and this expanded in the 1960s-70s, particularly concerning Rhodesia’s 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 November 1965, and arms sales to South Africa.94 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings became uncomfortable experiences for British 
leaders.95 The OAU called for members to break diplomatic relations with Britain and although few 
followed this, some Commonwealth members did.96 Criticism from Africa and the Commonwealth 
encouraged the limited positive attention scholarship has given to post-colonial relationships.   
Perhaps another reason for this relative scholarly neglect has been that Britain was seen to disengage 
more completely at independence than France.97 Connections between France and her former 
colonies were extensive and multiple, with bilateral cooperation agreements signed at independence 
which formalised defence and economic connections.98 The importance of continuities is so well 
established in historiography that Chafer could write in 1992 that ‘reference to continuity has become 
almost a cliché of surveys of French African policy’.99 French post-colonial foreign policy overtly 
focused much more than the British on a continuing role in Africa.100 Rouvez has argued that Britain’s 
‘detached pragmatism’ was because ‘Britain did not need, or chose not to need, a post-colonial sub-
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Saharan zone of influence the way France did’.101 For France, Africa was intended ‘to ensure major-
power status’.102 This is certainly not something that could be said of Britain in the same period, with 
Africa playing a much smaller role in ideas of British great power status and foreign policy goals. 
Comparison with France might suggest that Britain had no particular policy towards former colonies.  
A further significant explanation for the limited historiographical engagement is that British policy-
making towards Kenya occurred mostly at the level of civil servants rather than politicians. Smith, 
Marsh and Richards have highlighted that ‘government departments are the key policy-making 
institutions in British politics’ yet have received limited scholarly attention, which has tended to focus 
on issues which engaged ministers.103 This was again in direct contrast with French policy, where there 
were distinct forms of relating to Africa which did not have a parallel within Britain: a Ministry of 
Cooperation which ‘became effectively a ministry for francophone Black Africa’, and a personal 
advisor on Africa to the president.104 French presidents were also more involved than British prime 
ministers, and between 1960 and 1978, ‘French and African presidents held 280 meetings, and 
Presidents de Gaulle, [Georges] Pompidou, and [Valéry] Giscard d'Estaing made 32 state visits to 
Africa’.105 These formal connections were more obvious than Britain’s comparatively limited and 
lower-level focus on Africa.  
However, despite the validity of these arguments, they do not mean that relationships with former 
colonies did not continue or were insignificant. As Jackson argues, there has been  
an artificial division of the post-Second World War years into a period of “declining empire” 
and one of “post-empire”, in which the links between the two have been very poorly 
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conceptualised. This ... has deflected attention from the many continuities in Britain’s 
relations with the wider world106  
This thesis will argue that continuities were important and that Kenya continued to have a role in 
British foreign policy. Certainly these relationships were not as high profile as those with Europe or 
America and attracted less prime ministerial or foreign ministerial attention – which is what studies 
of foreign policy tend to focus on. The sense of decline and Britain’s more limited financial capabilities 
did manifest themselves in how relations with Kenya were pursued, particularly in consideration in 
the 1970s of how much development aid the UK government was prepared to invest; but there was 
no managed policy of reducing involvement. The Commonwealth could encourage cooperation 
between Britain and Kenya: as one example, in 1967 both countries were involved in a Commonwealth 
committee to consider sanctions on Rhodesia.107 But this was not the only forum in which relations 
were conducted, and bilateral connections were more significant than the Commonwealth.108 The 
British relationship with Kenya reveals the diffuse way in which ‘policy’ was made through a dense 
network of relationships – economic, military and political.  
While relatively sparse, the scholarship on continuing British relations with Africa and Kenya from the 
British perspective does offer useful insights. One such study is Badenoch’s MPhil thesis on British 
relations with Malawi, which argues that ‘The paucity of British interests in Malawi meant that her 
continued dependence on Britain was a burden. Britain wished to extricate herself as soon as possible. 
This could only be achieved through a massive injection of aid’.109 Another study is Clapham’s 1977 
work on the relationships between Britain and both Ghana and Ethiopia.110 He argued that for Britain, 
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‘colonialism created interests and linkages with Ghana which, while not of the first importance, are 
none the less well worth maintaining’, highlighting cultural connections based on British language, 
education and institutions.111  Ethiopia was not a former British colony but ‘even though Britain had 
no real direct stake in the country, Ethiopia impinged on British interests at several points’, especially 
Addis Ababa as an ‘African diplomatic centre’ and a broader interest in the Horn.112 Clapham’s brief 
consideration hints at aspects of continued relationships but offers minimal detail, partly because it 
was written before the release of British government documents. Considering Kenya, some scholars 
have examined the Anglo-Kenyan relationship past 1963, but they have not tended to extend much 
beyond independence, certainly not into the 1970s. A key work which highlights the potential of the 
sources is Parsons’ study of the 1964 East African mutinies in which he compares Kenyan, Tanganyikan 
and Ugandan military policies, including British connections.113 Percox has also highlighted continuities 
in the military sphere, though only until 1965.114 In a recent MA dissertation, Cooley has focused on 
the Cold War in this relationship, but his study is limited in scope and has taken at face value certain 
contemporary ideas.115 Hilton, in an MPhil thesis examining the early part of this relationship, correctly 
recognised that British support ‘played an important part in the creation of the “Kenyatta State”’,  and 
focuses on one particularly significant relationship, but misses much of the detail which made up the 
relationship.116 All of these have tended to focus on one aspect of the relationship, such as the military, 
rather than recognising the constant interplay between different interests. This thesis will argue that 
there was no single dominant British interest in Kenya, but the combination of different aims and 
opportunities combined to make Kenya particularly significant. Britain’s post-colonial relationship 
with Kenya offered direct benefits for British interests and ‘policy’ was made at multiple levels by civil 
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servants, diplomats and soldiers as well as politicians, pursuing and valuing multiple aspects of the 
relationship.  
 
Defining ‘Policy’ 
This thesis will study British governmental policy, but in doing so it will raise the question of what 
‘policy’ means and how it was made. It is very easy to discuss British policy as a singular defined 
concept, simply made and implemented, but this was in fact a much more complex process. Policy 
was made from a series of multiple decisions taken at varying times on different issues by various 
people. As Lindblom argues, policy ‘is not made once and for all; it is made and re-made endlessly’.117 
Policy-making was not necessarily a result of considered discussions of strategy or based on clear long-
term goals, with the national interest ‘not something which can be objectively determined but what 
the decision-makers perceive it to be’.118 Policy was made through a series of decisions based on 
precedent, ideas of national interest, circumstances, and pragmatism. Influences merged and varied 
to encourage certain recommendations and decisions.119 As Schmidt has argued, ‘governments are 
not sentient beings with desires, will, and the capacity to act. Yet the need for shorthand sometimes 
leads to the personification of political structures’.120 This thesis will attempt not to discuss states as 
singular and autonomous entities – ‘Kenya’ and ‘Britain’ – but rather as a series of institutions and 
individuals pursuing their own agendas; there was ‘not one calculating decision-maker’.121  
A study of foreign policy is by its nature a study of policy-makers, as to understand the ‘policies’ 
followed, it is necessary to understand who was making decisions and how they did so. High 
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Commissions and embassies are key to this process, and ‘who we choose as ambassadors, where we 
send them and what we ask them to do are foreign policy’.122 In 1998 Wolfe argued that ‘the 
ambassador does not have a prominent place in discussion of foreign policy’.123 Recently, however, 
there has been a growing historiographical interest in the work of diplomats, with a series of witness 
seminars and several edited collections on Britain’s overseas embassies.124 Changes to diplomatic 
practice in the twentieth century, such as the increased speed of communications and technology, 
and the growth of summit diplomacy, had meant ambassadors were thought by some increasingly 
moribund.125 Yet resident ambassadors have remained and continued to be valued. As Berridge and 
Young have argued, the key importance of embassies was their permanence as ‘a constant presence 
on the ground’.126 This thesis will examine the role of the Britain’s diplomats in Nairobi and the 
politicians and civil servants in London to address the question of who the policy-makers were.   
Another key question of this thesis, and a crucial influence on how policies were made, were British 
claims to knowledge, the nature of this presumed knowledge and (mis)understanding. The ideas of 
individual Britons about Kenya were shaped by their experiences, by who they talked to within Kenya, 
and by whose views they privileged. Diplomats working on Kenya were expected to provide local 
knowledge and expertise, and when there were explicit discussions over policy claims to knowledge 
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mattered. But this knowledge was often flawed: as Vital has argued, diplomats work on ‘matters over 
which their control is severely restricted, of which their knowledge can never be better than imperfect 
and which they must generally approach without the tactical and intellectual advantages of 
unambiguous and wholly appropriate goals’.127 A belief of knowledge could sometimes encourage 
misreading and inaccurate analysis. British self-confidence was coupled with a lack of self-awareness, 
contributed to by a combination of racism and amnesia, which allowed a succession of British officials 
to believe that they knew best what was in Kenya’s interests, while forgetting the problematic nature 
of Britain’s recent past in Kenya.  
British decision-making was often pragmatic, not always coherent or clearly defined, but there were 
some consistent aims. At the simplest – and in some ways most important – level, British actors 
consistently sought simply to promote and ensure ‘friendly’ relations with Kenya. As Young argues, 
‘promotion of “friendly relations” may seem an idealistic view of the intentions of officials employed 
to protect their country’s interests. But … the promotion of friendliness can be the most effective way 
to achieve general ends’.128 For British diplomats, soldiers and politicians this was certainly true 
regarding Kenya. Prior to independence they hoped to make ‘friends’ among emerging nationalists. 
When it became apparent that with Kenyatta they had, to at least some degree, succeeded, ensuring 
Kenyatta remained a ‘friend’ of Britain was their overriding aim. British decision-makers hoped for a 
positive relationship in which Kenya would remain favourable and beneficial to Britain. The comments 
of one diplomat on relationships with the United States seem equally applicable to Kenya: ‘the general 
theory was that goodwill created goodwill. And maintaining goodwill with a country that can at some 
stage be of help to you is worthwhile, even if you can’t see the way in which that is going to be 
supplied’.129 A general positive atmosphere was more significant than any single tangible outcome.  
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The broad objectives shaped by these multiple relationships were also fairly consistent, although the 
detail of what was pursued shifted. Simmonds’ fiftieth anniversary ‘Happy Birthday’ message 
highlighted some of the key aspects of the Anglo-Kenyan relationship, and the similarity with 1960s-
70s ideas of British interests is striking.130 These included a significant military relationship; economic 
connections in aid, trade and investment; tourism and education; a stake in Kenyan security; and for 
Kenya to remain a partner – in 2013 in the ‘war on terror’, previously in the Cold War.131 Making policy 
involved constant decisions about how to balance and pursue these various interests. Kenya came to 
be ‘seen as one of the post-colonial success stories’;132 particularly economically, with a growth rate 
of 5.4 per cent across 1963-78 and ‘a reputation for stability and order’.133 Kenya was a strategically 
significant colony for Britain, and 1950s British planning included Kenya as a necessary staging post.134 
The army inherited by independent Kenya was British trained and led.135 These military connections 
were sustained as African states by necessity had to look to outside suppliers to build up their 
militaries, with no local arms industry.136 Clayton in 1986 described training and military connections 
as ‘arrangements of minimal political and military significance’.137 But in fact, military links were crucial 
to British thinking about Kenya and, as will be argued, a significant benefit Britain received from 
Kenya.138 They also shaped how influential Kenyans understood the possibilities of their relationship 
with Britain. 
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This thesis examines the nature of the Anglo-Kenyan relationship and argues that this constant ‘policy-
making’ involved equally constant negotiation. Historians have not always recognised this. Chikeka 
argued that ‘Foreign economic assistance to African states is often concentrated on one European 
source and thus allows manipulation, management, and decision-making from the outside’.139 Cooley 
speculated upon ‘a deal between the British Government and Kenyatta: that Britain would keep 
Kenyatta in power as long as they could keep direct control over the central government machine’;140 
whilst Okoth argued that American policy ‘left Kenya with virtually no right to determine its own form 
of government and economy’.141 In fact, these views give too much power to outside influences to 
determine Kenyan policies. Rouvez has argued that when interests ‘clashed’, former colonial powers 
‘had to interact by cajoling or coercing’;142 but more often in Kenya the British reacted by negotiating. 
British officials were concerned about being seen to be, or indeed actually, directing Kenyan decisions, 
and thereby losing Kenyan goodwill – which was ultimately their most important asset. Yet nor is it 
true, as Clayton argued in 1980, that ‘Kenyatta has seen benefits without constraints upon his military 
and foreign policy as a result of the British alliance’.143 British policy-makers did not dictate, but neither 
were they disinterested or without a sense of their own interests. British diplomats, politicians and 
soldiers offered a lot to Kenya, but they did so because they gained much in return, and, as will be 
highlighted throughout this thesis, the balance of advantages was something decision-makers in both 
countries sought to influence to their advantage. Simmonds’ description of the relationship as 
‘mutually beneficial’ is particularly significant.144 Negotiation is a key part of diplomacy and ‘an 
indispensable mechanism for states’,145 but the term in this context has a broader application than 
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purely formal diplomatic negotiations; rather, it is intended to convey the atmosphere of exchange 
and willingness to talk which characterised relations at multiple levels. Policy-making was a two way 
process between British and Kenyan politicians, diplomats and civil servants, and interaction between 
‘policy-makers’ from both countries formed the relationship.  
This thesis will highlight the ability of leading Kenyans to shape this relationship to their advantage. In 
many instances, British involvement stemmed from Kenyan requests. Okumu in 1977 argued that 
‘Kenya continues to cultivate Britain as her major source of economic and technical assistance’;146 
whilst Cheeseman has suggested ‘continuity can only be understood as stemming from the conscious 
choice of the KANU executive to reinstitute the structures of colonial rule’.147 The role of Kenyan 
agency in this relationship was crucial. As Pinkney argues, though focusing on a later period, these 
were ‘relationships which are clearly unequal, yet do not imply complete subordination’ – a crucial 
distinction.148  Factions within Kenya, as well as institutional interests in Britain, sought to gain the 
greatest possible benefit for themselves from each other. This relationship could only be pursued by 
British actors through contact with Kenyans, and was only successful because a Kenyan elite around 
Kenyatta decided it was in their interests to foster this.  
Personal relations were crucial to these negotiations. These have typically been associated with 
French post-colonial relations with Africa, which were characterised by personal networks between 
leaders. Particularly significant was Jacques Foccart who ‘became the embodiment of a special 
personalized style of Francophone relationship’, establishing extensive networks with leading 
Africans.149 France’s personal networks were symbolic of the strength of their post-colonial 
relationships. But these personal relationships were not only significant to France; as Clapham has 
argued, ‘Politics everywhere comes down to a set of personal interactions between individual human 
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beings’.150 British relationships with certain Kenyan individuals greatly affected their actions. 
Relationships existed at multiple levels: governmental and extra-governmental, formal and informal, 
personal and institutional. Individual ties were extensive, particularly involving the European and 
Asian populations in Kenya, as well as with Kenyans who had travelled or studied in Britain. These 
connections were clearly significant, but this thesis will focus on governmental contact at formal and 
informal levels; in Cooper’s terms, those who controlled the ‘gate’.151 By the nature of this kind of 
personal connections not everything is known; private conversations which were not recorded were 
no doubt significant but untraceable, and ‘formal structures that leave the clearest archival traces are 
not necessarily the ones that count for the most’.152 Nonetheless, this thesis tries to reconstruct a 
sense of these relationships. 
Crucial to an understanding of the Anglo-Kenyan relationship is an awareness of the differences 
between the British and Kenyan states. The British system of government was bureaucratic and 
institutional, ‘best characterised as emphasising consensus’.153 This did not mean that those within 
the British bureaucracy always agreed on the emphasis of priorities; a series of different departments 
made up the British government and there could be disputes between these. But notwithstanding 
these differences, the culture of Whitehall fostered a collective identity and ‘civil service cohesion’ 
which encouraged a broad sense of the nature of British interests.154  British diplomats and politicians 
approached their negotiations with this understanding, as individuals’ careers and personal interests 
were understood in institutional and national terms, which shaped their behaviours and ideas. British 
‘policy’ on any particular issue was the product of negotiation, shaped by relationships, but always – 
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on the British side – informed by that broad sense of their interests and the parameters of their 
possible action.  
By contrast, the Kenyan state was neo-patrimonial, based on personal ties and client networks.155 
Dimier has described that 
from outside, those states resembled any bureaucracy, with its procedural kind of control, its 
hierarchies, transparency and impersonal rules. From inside, they were taken over by … a 
patrimonial kind of authority and legitimacy which rested on bonds of trust, loyalty, mutual 
dependence and permanent exception to the rules. In that system, characterised by opacity 
and personal relationships, the distribution of resources to “clients”, usually restricted to a 
specific clan, was the basis of power156  
Branch and Cheeseman have characterised the Kenyan state as bureaucratic-executive: ‘a particularly 
strong combination of administrative and executive power underpinned by an alliance of elites’.157  
Institutions were less sites of policy-making than individuals, and formal procedures were often 
bypassed, with people more important as individuals than for their official position. Jackson and 
Rosberg argued in 1982 that in much of Africa ‘persons take precedence over rules’.158 This was the 
key difference to the British model. The Kenyans who were involved in decision-making and 
interacting with the British were seeking their own advantage as different factions competed over 
priorities, policies and contacts. Rather than working to a general sense of national interest – as British 
policy-makers did – Kenyans sought personal and factional advantage from their contact with Britain 
and from the foreign policies they pursued.  
This thesis therefore focuses upon the interaction between a bureaucratic and a neo-patrimonial 
state. In seeking Cold War allies, and in the French pursuing close post-colonial personal connections, 
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external actors have often encouraged African neo-patrimonial systems by focusing on leaders and 
engaging with them on an individual basis. Dimier has argued that parts of the European Commission 
‘fuelled neo-patrimonial practices’;159 whilst Cooper has argued that ‘It took two sides to foster 
patrimonialism on the international level … [with] the internationalization of clientage – cultivated 
from both side’.160 The British were no exception to this regarding Kenya. They worked with Kenyans 
individually, privileging certain contacts, and focused on those they viewed as their ‘friends’, 
particularly the elite around Kenyatta. Despite their own institutional bureaucracy, in their interaction 
with the Kenyans, British actors reinforced Kenyan neo-patrimonialism.  
 
Sources and Structure 
Focusing on British government policy, this thesis will make extensive use of British government 
documents from the National Archives, Kew. It uses documents from the CO, Commonwealth 
Relations Office (CRO), Foreign Office (FO), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of 
Defence (MOD), and Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM), as well as the newly migrated 
Hanslope archive. It also uses British parliamentary debates recorded in Hansard. This will enable 
comparison of the views of different parts of the British government and the ways policy was decided 
upon. These sources will also be used to reveal communications between British and Kenyan 
individuals. Sources from the Kenyan National Archives, Nairobi, will reveal Kenyan policies and 
communications. The questions of who made policy will also be addressed using the Malcolm 
MacDonald collection in Durham, autobiographies of both Kenyan and British policy-makers, and 
interviews with British diplomats conducted as part of this research, as well as those from the British 
Diplomatic Oral History Programme. This will nuance the institutional focus and allow an exploration 
of personal views and opinions. The first chapter employs the Diplomatic Service Lists, Colonial Office 
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and Foreign Office Lists, Who’s Who, Who Was Who, and Oxford Dictionary of National Biography to 
analyse the backgrounds and careers of the British civil servants and diplomats engaged with Kenya. 
These sources complement one another by bringing out the personal nature of policy-making and the 
role of individuals within both the Kenyan and British systems, as well as the more institutional side 
of policy-making; they also enable comparison of the Kenyan and British sides in the negotiation of 
this relationship.  
Chapter One is a study of the British institutions and individuals involved in making policy towards 
Kenya from 1960 to 1980. Within the British government, different departments pursued their own 
priorities in potentially contradictory ways, and this chapter will introduce the theme of how 
knowledge was passed between and within departments and how potential contradictions were – 
usually – contained and managed. This chapter examines the mergers of the different overseas offices 
in the 1960s: the CO, CRO and FO to become the FCO in 1968. This also considers the policy-makers 
as individuals, analysing the backgrounds and careers of the people working in the departments which 
focused on Kenya. This chapter argues that there was a broad institutional identity, with many having 
similar backgrounds and sharing the same assessments of British interests. It thus highlights the 
bureaucratic nature of the British government. The themes emerging from this chapter about how 
policy was made, departmental divergence, and institutional mind-sets, will reoccur in later chapters.  
Chapter Two considers the Kenyan individuals involved in the relationship, assessing who were the 
most prominent from the British perspective and how British figures related to them. It argues that 
Kenyatta was the crucial figure, with long-standing British concern over his eventual succession. He 
was viewed as the protector of British interests and source of stability in Kenya, particularly due to his 
decisions to continue British models and practices and the close relationship with Britain. 
Relationships were formed at high level meetings between the British and Kenyans, which gave certain 
Kenyans privileged access to British officials. This chapter argues that cultural similarities and 
accessibility encouraged British policy-makers to work closely with certain individuals. Meanwhile, 
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other Kenyans were often viewed by Britons through a series of categorical labels which sometimes 
obscured realities, with British diplomats thinking they understood Kenyan politics more accurately 
than they did. Yet while British ‘knowledge’ was often mistaken, and their sense of superiority 
evidently misplaced, this relative institutional coherence generally gave the UK government 
collectively a real advantage in negotiations.  
The thesis then takes a chronological approach, examining how British ‘policy’ adapted during this 
twenty year period beginning in 1960. The period begins and ends with transitions: firstly 
independence and secondly the succession to Kenyatta. Both had the potential to substantially alter 
Kenyan politics and British relations with Kenya and were the two main British fixations as they 
struggled to preserve the relationship with Kenya they wanted. Much of this concerns plans and 
discussions about contingencies which never came to pass, such as chaos after Kenyatta’s death. But 
these ideas were nonetheless significant as issues civil servants spent time working on and planning 
for, and which shaped their thinking and assumptions.  
Chapter Three covers 1960-64, a period of uncertainty for British observers as they struggled to guide, 
or even predict, the process of decolonisation and any future relationship. Yet very quickly the 
interests of British and Kenyan officials came to align, and it was this which meant the relationship 
continued to be close and beneficial. The final colonial years show the continuities in policy and 
relationships which underpinned British ideas after independence, and the set of negotiations around 
decolonisation encouraged a symbiosis of interests between the Kenyan elite and British government. 
Chapter Four covers 1965-69, a period which involved explicit contest in Kenya between ‘moderates’ 
and ‘radicals’. Stability was a key consideration, and the British government was – unusually – 
prepared to offer military guarantees to ensure this. During these years, Kenya was increasingly seen 
as a ‘special’ British relationship, with particular benefits and problems. 
The 1970s are covered by three chapters. Chapter Five, 1970-73, focuses on the negotiated nature of 
the British-Kenyan relationship. The period was characterised by multiple negotiations over aid, 
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military agreements and personal relationships which clearly show that Britain was not in control of 
this relationship and could not dictate its terms. It highlights the role of Kenyans in shaping policies 
and what both sides hoped to achieve. The mid-1970s were a more pessimistic period in British ideas 
about Kenya, as all waited for Kenyatta’s death and were uncertain exactly how to approach the 
future. This is covered in Chapter Six, 1974-July 1978, which ends with Kenyatta’s death. Chapter 
Seven, August 1978-1980, covers the succession of President Moi. British policy-makers had long 
feared the aftermath of Kenyatta’s death, but in his initial years as president, Moi sought to maintain 
the British relationship and use it to his advantage, pursuing this through a series of visits to Britain. 
These re-injected a greater sense of optimism into British ideas about the Kenyan relationship as they 
realised that this would continue under a new president, and that British interests remained 
protected. 
Chapter One: Making ‘Policy’ (1): British Institutions and Actors 
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Chapter One: Making ‘Policy’ (1): British Institutions and Actors 
 
‘We are monitoring carefully the activities of other Whitehall Departments … to ensure that 
the importance of preserving good Anglo-Kenyan relations is well understood in the 
formulation of their policies’ 
M.K. Ewans to Norman Aspin, 2 November 19761 
 
Externally, the British government could appear a bureaucratic, institutional system creating a single, 
defined policy. Internally, however, this was a much less coherent process. As Young argues, ‘The 
Whitehall system sounds rational and tidy, but it does not prevent overlap, confusion and 
disagreement’.2 The British government was actually several interlocking institutions of different 
departments which could have differing, sometimes competing, priorities, and did not always work in 
harmony; and as well as formal departmental structures, personal and individual ties also mattered. 
This necessitated internal bargaining and negotiation before reaching decisions which became 
‘government policy’. The British ideal of a distinction between politicians who made decisions and civil 
servants who supplied information and then followed policy may not have entirely represented reality, 
but despite these differences between individuals and departments, this was a bureaucratic system. 
General attitudes and assumptions were framed consensually – although ‘policy’ in the sense of 
decisions on particular issues could still be subject to negotiation. Thus, while the British government 
was not quite the smooth bureaucratic machine which people liked to pretend it was, it was a 
bureaucracy, and British officials all worked within the limits of the system and a set of defined rules. 
The dynamics of decision-taking (and therefore of ‘policy’) were fundamentally different to those in 
Kenya. 
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Institutions were made up of individuals and the characteristics and experience of these individuals 
could influence decisions and planning. A 1978 report expressed the ideal of diplomacy: ‘the defence 
of our interests is mainly a matter of patient persuasion and skilful negotiation … it is precisely because 
our power as an individual nation is diminished, while our interests remain global, that Britain’s future 
is more dependent than ever on the skills of those who represent us abroad’.3 This chapter will analyse 
the civil servants who worked on Kenya, particularly noting the disputed importance attached to ideas 
of local knowledge and experience. Those making ‘policy’ towards Kenya were most commonly civil 
servants rather than ministers, and they tended to share similar backgrounds. Heclo and Wildavsky 
have argued that civil servants had a sense of joint community, describing this as Whitehall ‘Village 
Life’, so that ‘despite department allegiances, all officials are part of a greater civil service society’.4 
These people owed their loyalty to the organisation of the civil service, and this encouraged a shared 
understanding of the British government and its interests. Reflecting on witness seminars conducted 
with former diplomats and policy-makers, Kandiah and Staerck highlight ‘a remarkable unanimity of 
views, despite certain areas of divergence and dispute on the details’.5 This chapter will explore the 
government departments which focused on Kenya, recognising that departmental interests were 
complicated by structural change, with the creation and reforming of departments. During Harold 
Wilson’s premiership, reorganisation of government departments was particularly frequent: in 1964 
there were twenty-two departments, Wilson introduced five, then reduced these to twenty-one by 
1969.6  This too complicates a simplistic reading of government policy. 
 
                                                          
3 Cmnd. 7308, The United Kingdom’s Overseas Representation (London, 1978), p. 11. 
4 Heclo and Wildavsky, Public Money, p. 80.  
5 Kandiah and Staerck, ‘At the Top Table’, p. 195.  
6 Richard Clarke, ‘The Machinery of Government’, in William Thornhill (ed.), The Modernization of British 
Government (London, 1975), pp. 63-8. 
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Politicians and Civil Servants 
Multiple groups within Britain had a potential influence on foreign policy, including the prime minister, 
cabinet, political parties, ministers, pressure groups, parliament, public opinion, government 
departments and civil servants.7 Regarding Kenya there was ministerial and prime ministerial 
involvement at certain times, as well as parliamentary and public concern over some issues. There 
was a degree of British political interest in Kenya, most pronounced prior to independence when 
colonial policy was under scrutiny. Ministers were most involved in Kenya during the colonial period. 
Macmillan was more directly involved in decisions regarding Kenya than later prime ministers, and 
Colonial Secretaries viewed Kenya as one of their priorities. After independence ministers were less 
involved as Kenya was typically less of a priority. However, on certain key issues ministers did become 
engaged once more. There were some key flashpoints, on Asian immigration particularly, as well as 
on military policy, Europeans and land.8 Ministers were particularly involved in formal meetings to 
determine aid and military agreements, and personal contact with British ministers was valued by 
leading Kenyans. In 1972 one British businessman recommended ‘that the visit of a senior Cabinet 
Minister, if not of the Prime Minister himself, would produce important results very quickly’.9 
Ministerial visits encouraged personal relations, and demonstrated that Britain attached value to 
Kenya.10 
However, the level at which most policy was directed and organised was the civil servants and 
government departments. The roles of civil servants and ministers were understood to be different.11 
                                                          
7 See Kunihiro Wakamatsu, ‘The Role of Civil Servants in the Formulation of Policy: An Analysis of the Policy 
Process on Commonwealth Immigration from 1948 to 1964’, PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 1998, p. 30. 
8 For an example of preparing to answer a parliamentary question see: J.M. Bennett to P. Rosling and E. Clay, 
‘PQ 5136B – Defence Agreement with Kenya’, 1976, TNA FCO 31/2022/6; and for examples of parliamentary 
debates and questions: HC Deb 19 February 1970 vol 796 cc161-2W; HL Deb 11 March 1970 vol 308 cc800-3; HC 
Deb 23 April 1970 vol 800 cc610-1; HC Deb 27 October 1976 vol 918 c264W. 
9 Meeting: Lord Aldington and President Kenyatta, 1 December 1972, TNA FCO 31/1211/90. 
10 Leonard Allinson, interview by Jane Barder, British Diplomatic Oral History Project, Churchill Archives Centre, 
Churchill College, Cambridge (BDOHP), 5 March 1996, p. 28. 
11 Anthony H. Birth, The British System of Government, Ninth edition (London; New York, 1993), p. 141; 
Wakamatsu, ‘Role of Civil Servants’, pp. 46-8. 
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Politicians were to design policy; civil servants, who were apolitical appointments remaining in office 
regardless of government change and thus meant to be impartial, were to implement it.12 Feltham’s 
Diplomatic Handbook – intended ‘to provide a concise but comprehensive source of information’ for 
future diplomats – argued that ‘formulation of foreign policy … is the task of the politician, while the 
management of international relations and the reconciliation of diverse foreign policy priorities is the 
task of the diplomat’.13 Yet in practice, as has often been recognised, civil servants have a role as 
policy-makers rather than simply policy-implementers, active in designing and creating policies.14 This 
was particularly true regarding Kenya, which was rarely a ministerial priority compared to concerns 
such as the European or American relationships. Ministers did not have the same depth or breadth of 
knowledge as civil servants, who built up experience and knowledge of foreign affairs over the course 
of their careers.15 
Recommendations were made at civil service level before being passed up the hierarchy of authority 
to head of department, Under-Secretary or minister when necessary.16 Given the size of government 
ministries, ministers could not be appraised of all the workings of their departments, and thus ‘the 
majority of internal politicizing occurs between civil servants rather than between civil servants and 
ministers’.17 As Birch suggests, ‘there is a well-established hierarchy of decision-making, so that a 
principal knows what he can decide on his own account and what he must refer up’.18 Civil servants 
were aware of how much autonomy they had and when they needed higher approval. They hoped to 
reach consensus, before ministerial level if possible, in a style labelled ‘bureaucratic accommodation’ 
                                                          
12 Birth, British System, p. 141. 
13 R. G. Feltham, Diplomatic Handbook, Second edition (London and New York, 1977), pp. vi, 1. 
14 See for examples: Dowding, Civil Service, p. 2; D. C. Pitt and B. C. Smith, Government Departments: An 
Organizational Perspective (London, 1981), pp. 48-9; Smith, Marsh, and Richards, ‘Central Government 
Departments’, p. 583; Wakamatsu, ‘Role of Civil Servants’, p. 49.  
15 See Wakamatsu, ‘Role of Civil Servants’, pp. 50-1. 
16 Richard Rose, ‘The Political Status of Higher Civil Servants in Britain’, in Erza N. Suleiman (ed.), Bureaucrats 
and Policy Making: A Comparative Overview (New York, 1984), p. 148; James Barber, Who Makes British Foreign 
Policy? (Milton Keynes, 1976), p. 58. 
17 Smith, Marsh, and Richards, ‘Central Government Departments’, p. 581. 
18 Birth, British System, p. 162.  
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by Jordan and Richardson.19 Vital has argued there was ‘a purely intuitive conviction’ that policies 
would be approved.20 Civil servants preferred dealing with one another and sought to avoid involving 
politicians: ‘I really do dislike sending you a series of nagging letters but there is yet another example 
before me of a difference of view between our two Departments which was not discussed at senior 
official level before being put to your Secretary of State’.21 On most concerns around Kenya there was 
substantial autonomy for decisions made at civil service level before, or even without, seeking 
ministerial approval.  
 
Overseas Departments 
The overseas departments were responsible for British relations with Kenya. The 1960s was a time of 
institutional flux in how the British government related to overseas countries. The move from colonial 
empire to Commonwealth, and thereafter ‘the British government’s disillusionment with, and 
scepticism about, the Commonwealth’,22 affected the structure of policy-making. Britain’s empire had 
been such a large and important part of external policy-making that until the 1940s there were three 
offices devoted to it: the India Office, Dominions Office and CO; the FO meanwhile dealt with the rest 
of the world. The Dominions Office became the CRO in July 1947, with the India Office disbanded a 
month later as India and Pakistan became independent and moved from that department to the 
CRO.23 British contact with former colonies moved from the CO to CRO as territories became 
independent. Kenya had been within the remit of the CO since 1905, but at independence in 
December 1963 moved to CRO responsibility.24 The CRO had been intended for the small number of 
                                                          
19 Jordan and Richardson, ‘British Policy Style’, p. 81. 
20 Vital, British Foreign Policy, p. 45.  
21 Richard King to Michael Palliser, 4 February 1976, TNA OD 67/60/17. 
22 Ashton, ‘Perspectives on the Commonwealth’, p. 76. 
23 F. M. G. Willson, The Organization of British Central Government, 1914-1964, Second edition (London, 1968), 
p. 191. 
24 Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Office, (London, 1956), p. 70.  
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Dominions.25 As Joe Garner, Permanent Under-Secretary to the CRO, noted, decolonisation was ‘an 
increased burden on the CRO for which it was not well prepared’.26 
This encouraged the idea of merger between overseas departments. In 1962 Duncan Sandys became 
Secretary of State for both CO and CRO, the first time one person held both positions, although when 
Wilson became Prime Minister in 1964 he reinstituted two separate appointments. A key step towards 
amalgamation, despite its indecisiveness, was the report of the Committee on Representational 
Services Overseas, or Plowden Report, published in 1964. This highlighted the ‘different character’ of 
the Commonwealth connection, but simultaneously argued that ‘division of responsibility is becoming 
an anachronism’.27 It therefore recommended creating a unified Diplomatic Service, bringing together 
the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Trade Commission Services; and this was established on 1 January 
1965.28 In the longer term, Plowden argued, a CRO and FO ‘amalgamation ... must, in our view, be the 
ultimate aim. However, to take such a fundamental step now could be misinterpreted as implying a 
loss of interest in the Commonwealth partnership’; the report thus ‘hesitate[d]’ to actually 
recommend immediate amalgamation.29   
Although it had not been the Plowden Report’s recommendation, Wilson’s government increasingly 
considered merger between CO and CRO. The Private Under-Secretaries of the departments, Garner 
of CRO and Poynton of CO, were the most powerful civil servants involved. Both valued the distinctive 
role of their own departments and were concerned for the careers of their staff. Poynton in particular 
‘fought the Colonial Office corner’.30 Poynton’s attitude influenced the pace of the mergers, an 
                                                          
25 Trevor Clark, ‘Chalk and Cheese? The Colonial and Diplomatic Services’, in John Smith (ed.), Administering 
Empire: The British Colonial Service in Retrospect, Proceedings of a conference jointly sponsored by the University 
of London and the Corona Club held at the Senate House on 27th and 28th May 1999 under the auspices and 
direction of the Institute of Historical Research and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies (London, 1999), p. 
52. 
26 Joe Garner, The Commonwealth Office 1925-68 (London, 1978), p. 347. 
27 Cmnd. 2276, Report of the Committee on Representational Services Overseas, 1962-63 [Plowden Report] 
(London, 1964), pp. 4, 12. 
28 The Diplomatic Service Order 1964, 20 November 1964, TNA DO 197/47/18. 
29 Report of the Committee on Representational Services Overseas, pp. 12-3. 
30 S. R. Ashton, ‘Poynton, Sir (Arthur) Hilton’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/62163, accessed 11 August 2014. 
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interesting example of how a theoretically bureaucratic system could be affected by such personal 
considerations. Poynton recognised in 1964 that the CO ‘is bound to shrink further and has no long-
term future as a separate Department’,31 but wanted this to ‘be described as a “merger” or 
“amalgamation” … not be spoken of in terms of the Colonial Office being absorbed’.32 Poynton hoped 
‘to avoid the impression that the Colonial Office is a piece of carrion which had better be buried as 
quickly as possible’.33 The Colonial Secretary liked the title of ‘Commonwealth Office’ for the new 
department, and Garner liked that its initials would continue with the Colonial Office ‘CO’.34 Decision-
makers were trying to satisfy everyone and ensure a sense of collective civil service solidarity. Merger 
occurred on 1 August 1966, coinciding with Poynton’s retirement, and Garner became Permanent 
Under-Secretary for the new Commonwealth Office.35 
Quickly thereafter, the new department’s amalgamation with the FO was considered. By the mid-
1960s the differentiation of foreign from colonial and Commonwealth policy was being challenged; as 
Garner argued in 1967, ‘no-one would pretend that our relations with Commonwealth countries are 
more friendly than our relations with the United States or, indeed, that our relations with African 
countries are more friendly than our relations with Western Europe’.36 However, this did not mean 
merger was necessarily popular. Colin Imray of the CRO recalls being ‘horrified to learn in 1965 that 
the FO and the CRO were to be merged. My first reaction was to write to the Australian Public Service 
Board to ask if I could transfer to the Australian Government Service’, although he did not do so.37 
Others, however, did not expect merger to ‘be quite such a traumatic experience as some people 
                                                          
31 Hilton Poynton minute, January 1964, TNA DO 197/20/5. 
32 Hilton Poynton to Saville Garner, 20 January 1964, TNA DO 197/20/5. 
33 H. Poynton to Secretary of State, 19 June 1964, TNA DO 197/20/21. 
34 Longford to Prime Minister, ‘Merger of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office’, 1 March 
1966, TNA FO 366/3581; Saville Garner to Secretary of State, 19 June 1964, TNA DO 197/20/19. Here, CO will 
refer only to Colonial Office, not Commonwealth Office.  
35 Press Notice: Merger of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office, 8 June 1966, TNA FO 
366/3582. 
36 Saville Garner, ‘The future of the Commonwealth Office and Foreign Office: A Personal View’, 2 February 1967, 
TNA FCO 77/31/1. 
37 Colin Imray, ‘Memoir’, BDOHP, 2002, p. 4.  
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fear’.38 Plans were made for amalgamation in 1969 or 1970.39 Some joint internal departments were 
created and by March 1968 eighteen of seventy-two were combined.40 But the timing was sped up by 
political events: at the resignation of George Brown as Foreign Secretary in March 1968, the Prime 
Minister announced the merger would occur in October.41 Wilson argued that he had done so ‘to make 
it clear that the decisive option in this matter had then been taken’.42 This made the process quicker 
than had been anticipated and the FCO was created in October 1968.  
One issue arising from the mergers was the number of personnel transferred from CO and CRO. This 
was often seen as an FO absorption: Wallace has argued that the ‘FCO was still, recognizably, the 
Foreign Office, absorbing other Departments and Services without losing its character’.43 Leonard 
Allinson, originally from CRO, recalled that ‘everyone at the Foreign [and Commonwealth] Office is 
Foreign Office based and nobody in the Commonwealth Office sat in a senior position there for very 
long after the merger’.44 That it is still typically referred to as the ‘Foreign Office’ rather than FCO is a 
sign of this primacy. Part of the rationale for the mergers was a reduction in staff numbers. In 1968, 
the merger committee hoped to ‘cut out about ten of the 55 Departments’.45 A CRO civil servant who 
worked on staffing at the time recalled that ‘the pressure was to reduce CRO staff because it was 
believed, and I think it was true, that the CRO had been more lavishly staffed than the Foreign Office, 
certainly in some of the bigger missions’.46 It was explicit policy that CRO rather than FO staff were 
more likely to lose their jobs due to merger. Lloyd notes that ‘thirty who were considered not up to 
                                                          
38 Mark Allen to C. Crowe, ‘The Future of the Commonwealth Office and Foreign Office’, 8 February 1967, TNA 
FCO 77/31/1. 
39 J.M. Heath to Larmour, ‘Merger of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office’, 23 February 1968, TNA 
FCO 77/31/14. 
40 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Merger of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office, 1968 
(London, 1968), pp. 6-7. 
41 Christopher Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine: Changing the Pattern of Ministerial Departments, 1960-83 
(London, 1984), p. 73. 
42 Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, 19 March 1968, TNA FCO 77/31/30. 
43 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 26.  
44 Leonard Allinson, interview, p. 8.  
45 ‘Merger: Agreed Paper by the Merger Committee (Revised)’, 9 May 1968, TNA FCO 77/41/Annex A. 
46 J.K. Hickman, interview by D.M. McBain, BDOHP, 18 December 1995, p. 12.  
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FCO work were given early retirement’.47 As this makes clear, FO staff were thought to be more 
qualified, with the CRO staff those potentially ‘not up to’ it. One diplomat thought ‘most of the more 
capable CRO officers adapted quickly to Foreign Office realism’.48 However, as this makes explicit, it 
was the CRO staff who had to adapt. There were indeed reductions: ‘Over one hundred posts have 
been saved in the first phase of the merger, in addition to the 398 previously saved at home since the 
unified Diplomatic Service was set up’.49 The choice of language that the posts had been ‘saved’ is 
interesting: clearly this was meant to appeal to an external public and government concerned by 
staffing costs rather than those who worked within the departments, who would be unlikely to relish 
their posts being ‘saved’.  
 
Other Departments  
During the later twentieth century diplomacy increasingly involved other departments as the divisions 
between domestic and foreign policy became less clear-cut.50 Policies towards Kenya could affect and 
be influenced by multiple departments. The three most significant were MOD, Treasury, and ODM. 
These departments had different and sometimes conflicting priorities. The Treasury was crucial as it 
controlled the budgets of each department and thus had greatest oversight.51 Britain’s economic 
weakness during these years meant a strict control of budgets. Wallace has described Treasury 
‘involvement [as] the most direct, the most ancient, and the least amenable to Foreign Office 
direction’.52 Different departmental priorities regarding finance were clear, as typically Treasury 
wanted to restrict spending whilst other departments hoped for the maximum possible amount to 
                                                          
47 Lorna Lloyd, Diplomacy with a Difference: The Commonwealth Office of High Commissioner, 1880-2006 
(Leiden, 2007), p. 250. 
48 Colin Imray, ‘Memoir’, p. 4. 
49 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Merger, p. 9. 
50 Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration, 
Second edition (London, 2011), p. 218. 
51 See Birth, British System, p. 156; Smith, Marsh and Richards, ‘Central Government Departments’, p. 573. 
52 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 40.  
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finance their desired outcomes.53 This could lead to conflict, but Thain and Wright have highlighted 
that departments ‘cannot allow relations to break down’ as they needed to keep a good working 
relationship with the Treasury.54 For the Treasury, Kenya was a very small part of the sum of their 
work, but control of the finance allocated to Kenya ensured that their role was crucial to foreign policy-
making.  
MOD had a substantial interest in Kenya. During these two decades, defence finance was cut and 
perceptions of British defence policy shifted. The key decisions were to leave east of Suez and to focus 
on a ‘smaller, professional armed forces, and a potent nuclear strike force’ rather than large 
conventional army.55 MOD was created in 1964 from previous multiple service departments, and 
Denis Healey as Minister of Defence 1964-70 was key to this reshaping.56 There was also some overlap 
between foreign and defence policy-making: FCO had a Defence Department, whilst MOD had ‘its own 
“foreign service” in the 150 or so service attachés and their substantial staffs stationed in overseas 
missions in nearly seventy foreign countries’.57 The role of these attachés was  to ensure military 
relationships ‘by exchanging military information, to do what can be done to sell military equipment 
of British manufacture, [and] to act as the immediate go-between in strategical [sic] planning’.58 
Defence and air attachés were stationed in Kenya, and provided an alternative route of 
communication directly to MOD.59  
                                                          
53 Heclo and Wildavsky, Public Money, p. 87.  
54 Colin Thain and Maurice Wright, The Treasury and Whitehall: The Planning and Control of Public Expenditure, 
1976-1993 (Oxford, 1995), p. 205.  
55 Adrian Smith, ‘Command and Control in Postwar Britain Defence Decision-Making in the United Kingdom, 
1945-1984’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1991), p. 305. See also Michael Dockrill, British 
Defence since 1945 (Oxford, 1988). 
56 William Jackson, Britain’s Defence Dilemma: An Inside View: Rethinking British Defence Policy in the Post 
Imperial Era (London, 1990), p. 101; Peter Nailor, ‘Denis Healey and Rational Decision-Making in Defence’, in Ian 
Beckett and John Gooch (eds.), Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy 1845-
1970 (Manchester, 1981), pp. 154-177. MOD will be used here to refer to all prior defence ministries as well as 
the unified MOD.  
57 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 43. 
58 Geoffrey Moorhouse, The Diplomats: The Foreign Office Today (London, 1977), pp. 335-6. 
59 See for example: P. Rosling to Mellor and Watkins, ‘MOD Assistance to Kenya for President Kenyatta’s Funeral’, 
1 September 1978, TNA FCO 31/2319/194. 
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ODM was the other crucial department relating to Kenya. This department was created by the 
incoming Labour government in 1964, and, as Pollitt argues, was ‘another example of the implicit 
theory that creation of a new, separate department could give a new emphasis and impetus within an 
established policy field’.60 Like the mergers to FCO, this was a source of debate and differing 
departmental attitudes.61 It was described by one of its staff, however, as ‘a very exciting Ministry to 
belong to’.62 The creation of a new department also showed recognition of the increasing prominence 
of aid as ‘a major activity of Government’, a continuation of the idea that Britain had a responsibility 
and interest in development.63 In 1970, the Conservative government merged ODM into FCO as the 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA), before Labour re-established ODM in 1974, though this 
time without a Cabinet Minister.64 Killick has argued that ‘the contrasts between the two situations 
were not in practice as dramatic as might have been expected’, but where the department was placed 
and whether its minister was in Cabinet was a symbolic statement about the primacy attached to the 
government’s aid programme.65  
The key issue, then, was the relationship between departments. Foreign policy-making was ‘a shared 
concern’ and often entailed seeking cooperation between departments to find agreement.66 The role 
of informal and personal communication between civil servants could be vital.67 There were, according 
to one former Permanent Under-Secretary at MOD, ‘major and complex negotiations to hammer out 
policies’.68 In another context, Pieragostini has argued that how ‘departments interact as they seek to 
                                                          
60 Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, p. 72.  
61 D. J. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development, Volume 4: Changes in British Aid Policy, 1951-1970 
(Basingstoke, 1980), p. 19.  
62 John Coates Edwards, interview by Malcolm McBain, BDOHP, 28 June 2007, p. 11.  
63 Morgan, Colonial Development, p. 13. See also Cooper, Africa since 1940. 
64 Morgan, Colonial Development, p. 30.  
65 Tony Killick, ‘Policy Autonomy and the History of British Aid to Africa’, Development Policy Review, Vol. 23, No. 
6 (2005), p. 669. See also Jim Tomlinson, ‘The Commonwealth, the Balance of Payments and the Politics of 
International Poverty: British Aid Policy, 1958-1971’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2003), pp. 
424-9. 
66 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 45. See also Clive Ponting, Whitehall: Tragedy and Farce (London, 1986), p. 
97. 
67 For an example see Thain and Wright, Treasury and Whitehall, p. 203.  
68 Ewen Broadbent, The Military and Government: From Macmillan to Heseltine (Basingstoke, 1988), p. 6.  
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impose their images and protect their interests can be crucial for the nature of the decision that finally 
emerges’.69  
But there could be friction and misunderstanding between departments with competing priorities. 
One concern was inclusion in communications relating to policy areas shared between departments, 
as ODM sometimes struggled to assert its separate role and identity.70 More significant than 
procedural issues, however, was broader dislike and distrust between departments. One revealing 
example was the unhappy relationship between High Commissioner Eric Norris and ODA in 1971. 
Those in ODA ‘were not altogether happy with the way British High Commission, Nairobi were 
handling our affairs’.71 They were internally criticising because they felt their interests in Kenya were 
not being met. Norris in March 1972 also had criticism about having ‘missed important opportunities’ 
– implicitly blaming this on ODA.72 This was quite an opaque critique, but in the FCO there was  
little doubt that his comments were directed mainly at the ODA. Relations between the High 
Commission and the ODA have not been happy recently and there have been some sharp 
exchanges ... In our view Sir E Norris has usually, but not always, had good grounds for his 
complaints and we have supported him as far as possible73  
There was a clear tension between High Commissioner and ODA, with FCO trying to play a moderating 
role. But this also encouraged some further criticism from FCO: ‘ODA have at times been obstinate 
and inflexible, and their processes are long-winded … I find their tendency to dispute our political 
judgements and conclusions (sometimes enlisting Treasury aid against us) very irritating and time-
wasting’.74 The Planning Staff in FCO used Norris’ critique to highlight their own problems with ‘other 
Departments – particularly that Anti-Foreign Office, the Aliens Department of the Home Office – who 
strive perpetually to impress upon distinguished foreigners their equality of insignificance in British 
                                                          
69 Karl Pieragostini, Britain, Aden and South Arabia: Abandoning Empire (Basingstoke, 1991), p. 13.  
70 W.G. Lamarque to R.W. Munro, 27 July 1970, TNA FCO 31/610/100. 
71 A.R. Thomas to King, 28 January 1971, TNA OD 26/277. 
72 Eric Norris to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ‘Valedictory Despatch’, 29 March 
1972, TNA FCO 31/1197/1. 
73 S.Y. Dawbarn to Permanent Under-Secretary, 25 April 1972, TNA FCO 31/1197/5. 
74 His emphasis. S.Y. Dawbarn to J.E. Cable, 8 May 1972, TNA FCO 31/1197/7. 
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eyes’.75 The implication was that FCO should control foreign relations and its staff were guarding their 
departmental responsibility. Yet other departments were engaged as their interests – aid, finance, 
military, immigration – became involved and departments had to negotiate policies and accord 
priorities. Viewed up close, the British government was not a single smoothly-functioning 
organisation, but an assembly of different institutions in which differences of institutional culture or 
personal rivalries could produce considerable frictions. 
 
East Africa Department  
Kenya’s place in Whitehall altered as departments merged (table 1).  Until independence at the end 
of 1963, Kenya was covered by the CO’s East African Department, staffed by a head of department 
and two principal officers. This department was wound up after Kenya, the last of Britain’s East African 
territories, became independent. The years 1964-68 were those of greatest institutional flux and the 
changing departments which covered Kenya reflected this uncertainty about how exactly to organise 
relationships with former colonies. In 1964 responsibility for Kenya was split into two departments in 
CRO, one economic and one political. In 1966 these were united: with the creation of ODM, ‘the 
functional division between the geographical and economic Departments is a false one’.76  Kenya was 
additionally included in the FO for ‘questions affecting the FO’ in the North and East African 
Department, curiously transferred in 1967 to the West and Central Africa Department.77 With the 
creation of the FCO, the East African Department (EAD) was created.78 The mergers thus simplified 
the policy-making process by limiting Kenya to one department and one set of people.  
                                                          
75 J.E. Cable to Dawbarn, 27 April 1972, TNA FCO 31/1197/7. 
76 ‘A Suggested Reorganisation of the Distribution within the C.R.O. of economic and political work on East and 
West Africa’, [January 1966], TNA FO 366/3580. 
77 For all of this information see The Diplomatic Service List (London), (DSL), The Foreign Office List (London), and 
The Colonial Office List (London) for the years covered.  
78 For simplicity, EAD will refer from this point to all of the departments designated with responsibility for Kenya 
in CO, CRO, FO, Commonwealth Office and FCO, unless there is a need to specify which of these is being referred 
to.  
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Table 1: Kenya's Place in the Overseas Offices 
 
EAD was the most important London department where staff focused on Kenya. In 1969 EAD’s 
responsibilities were described as ‘Political and bilateral economic relations with Burundi, Ethiopia, 
French Territory of the Afars and Issas (French Somaliland), Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Tanzania, Uganda. Organisation of African Unity’.79 EAD also took the role of coordinating policy, and 
its staff viewed themselves as most knowledgeable, with some level of oversight. In 1976, ‘We are 
monitoring carefully the activities of other Whitehall Departments … in order to ensure that the 
importance of preserving good Anglo-Kenyan relations is well understood in the formulation of their 
policies’.80 Clearly, EAD policy-makers thought they knew best what policy should be, and were keen 
to ensure that others followed their advice.  
Initially, seven Africa Departments were planned in the new FCO: East, West, North, Southern, Central, 
Rhodesia Political and Rhodesia Economic, with the latter two intended ‘to merge with Southern Africa 
[Department] when [the] situation allows’.81 This compares to plans for nine Middle East, South Asia 
                                                          
79 DSL 1969, p. 8.  
80 M.K. Ewans to Aspin, ‘Anglo-Kenyan Relations’, 2 November 1976, TNA FCO 31/2021/33. 
81 Draft organisation plan for combined Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office, First stage October 1968, edition 
of 9 May, TNA FCO 77/41/1.  
Year Colonial Office Commonwealth 
Relations Office 
Foreign Office 
Up to 1963 East Africa Department   
1964-65  East Africa Economic 
Department; 
East Africa Political 
Department 
North and East African 
Department (for 
questions affecting FO) 
1966 Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department North and East African 
Department (for 
questions affecting FO) 
1967-68 Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department West and Central 
African Department (for 
questions affecting FO) 
1968 onwards Foreign and Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department 
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and General departments, four for dependent territories, five for America and the Far East, six for 
Europe and the UN, as well as the non-geographical departments.82 This indicates a reasonably large 
commitment to Africa, even allowing for the effect of the Rhodesian situation. This remained under 
review by the Post-Merger Committee which aimed to reduce the number of departments. In 1969 
they suggested the ‘ultimate aim should be to cover Africa by two main departments’.83 This suggests 
a reduced priority being accorded to Africa, although this recommendation was not implemented and 
EAD remained separate. 
EAD heads of department were key figures. The FCO prescribed that heads of department ‘remain the 
pivotal officers of the organisation on whom its good functioning essentially depends’.84 One former 
diplomat regarded head of department as ‘one of the best jobs available … senior enough to give 
responsibility for policy and advice to Foreign Office Ministers while junior enough to keep one’s feet 
firmly on the ground’.85 They were the highest authority within the department, and would take 
decisions or pass these upwards. During the years 1960-80 there were twelve heads of EAD: one in 
the final CO years, three within various CRO departments, three within FO, and five in FCO (table 2). 
All those within FCO and several from FO and CRO had experience in Africa prior to this appointment. 
Within those appointed from the FCO, there was a mixture of backgrounds, with two coming from 
CRO with East African experience and three from FO. All were of a similar age at the time of their 
appointment, and most came directly from, and many went onto, overseas postings, often as 
Ambassadors or High Commissioners. Length of tenure varied: the longest was seven years for Fernley 
Webber in CO, followed by five for Martin Ewans in FCO; excluding Webber, the mean was 2.8 years.  
                                                          
82 Draft organisation plan for combined Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office, First stage October 1968, edition 
of 9 May, TNA FCO 77/41/1 
83 Record of meeting of Post Merger Committee, 13 February 1969, TNA FCO 79/104/4. 
84 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Merger, p. 8. 
85 Alan Campbell, Colleagues and Friends (Salisbury, 1988), p. 65. 
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Table 2: Heads of East Africa Department (CO, CRO, FO, and FCO)86 
 Role Start 
Date  
Date of 
Leaving  
Immediately 
Prior Career 
Immediately 
Following 
Career 
Previous 
Office 
Experience 
Previous 
African 
Experience 
Fernley 
Douglas 
Webber 
Head of CO 
East Africa 
Department  
1958 1965 Establishment 
Officer, CO 
Deputy High 
Commissioner 
Kuching 
CO  
Walter 
Geoffrey 
Lamarque 
Head of CRO 
East African 
Economic 
Department  
1964 1965 Deputy High 
Commissioner 
Eastern 
Nigeria 
Seconded as 
Head of ODM 
East Africa 
Department  
Indian Civil 
Service, 
CRO 
Nigeria 
Norman 
Aspin 
Head of CRO 
East African 
Political 
Department  
1963 1966 Deputy High 
Commissioner 
Freetown 
Counsellor 
and Head of 
Chancery, Tel 
Aviv 
CRO, 
Treasury 
Rhodesia, 
Sierra 
Leone 
Michael 
Scott 
Head of CRO 
East and 
Central 
African 
Political 
Department  
1965 1968 Counsellor 
and Director 
of British 
Information 
Services, 
Delhi 
Counsellor, 
Nicosia 
 
CO, CRO  
Ronald 
Stratford 
Scrivener 
Head of FO 
North East 
African 
Department  
1963 1965 FO Counsellor 
and Consul-
General, 
Bangkok 
FO  
Denis 
James 
Speares 
Head of FO 
North 
African 
Department  
1965 1968 Counsellor, 
Nicosia 
Head of North 
African 
Department 
FO  
Charles 
Martin Le 
Quesne 
Head of FO 
West and 
Central 
African 
Department  
1964 1968 Charge 
d’Affaires and 
Consul-
General, 
Bamako 
Ambassador, 
Algiers 
FO Mali, 
Algeria 
Eric 
George 
Le Tocq 
Head of FCO 
East African 
Department  
1968 1972 Head of 
Atlantic 
Department  
High 
Commissioner 
Mbabane 
CRO Ghana, 
Uganda 
                                                          
86 The Colonial Office List 1962 (London, 1962), p. 459; The Foreign Office List 1965 (London, 1965), p. 382; DSL 
1966, pp. 287-8; DSL 1967, pp. 252, 313; DSL 1969, pp. 271, 371; DSL 1970, p. 355; DSL 1972, pp. 229, 329; DSL 
1973, p. 245; DSL 1977, pp. 306, 389; DSL 1978, p. 302; DSL 1979, p. 334; DSL 1980, pp. 110, 165, 181, 283, 316, 
323; DSL 1986, p. 284; Who’s Who 1990 (London, 1990), p. 1078; Who’s Who 1994 (London, 1994), pp. 488, 607, 
1374, 1636, 1703, 1706; Who’s Who 2000 (London, 2000), p. 1214; ‘British High Commissioner to retired to 
Dacre’, Cumberland and Westmorland Herald, 5 August 2011, http://www.cwherald.com/a/archive/british-
high-commissioner-who-retired-to-dacre.375739.html, accessed 7 November 2014; ‘Sir Martin Le Quesne’, 
Telegraph, 10 April 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1458935/Sir-Martin-Le-Quesne.html, 
accessed 7 November 2014. 
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Simon 
Yelverton 
Dawbarn 
Head of FCO 
East African 
Department  
1972 1973 Counsellor, 
Athens 
Consul-
General, 
Montreal 
FO, 
Treasury, 
FCO 
Algeria 
Martin 
Kenneth 
Ewans 
Head of FCO 
East African 
Department  
1973 1978 Counsellor, 
Dar es Salaam 
Deputy High 
Commissioner 
New Delhi 
CRO, FCO 
 
Nigeria, 
Tanzania 
Alan 
Gordon 
Munro 
Head of FCO 
East African 
Department  
1977 1979 Consul-
General, Rio 
de Janeiro 
Head of 
Middle East 
Department 
FO, FCO Libya 
John 
Adam 
Robson 
Head of FCO 
East African 
Department  
1979 1982 Head of 
Chancery and 
Consul-
General, Oslo 
Ambassador, 
Bogota 
FO, FCO Zambia 
 
British High Commission, Nairobi 
The British High Commission in Nairobi (BHC) was the other main site of British interaction and ‘policy-
making’. The High Commission was equivalent to an embassy and ambassador, but a specific form for 
Commonwealth representatives, initially conferring separate advantages, but by the 1960s essentially 
the same.87 BHC was one of the larger British missions in Africa. In 1966, it consisted of thirty-two 
diplomats in Nairobi and one in Mombasa, compared to eighteen in Tanzania, seventeen in Uganda, 
and thirty-eight in Nigeria.88 BHC was also a large mission compared to other foreign missions in Kenya. 
In 1972, BHC was Kenya’s largest foreign mission, with twenty-four diplomats, compared to twenty 
from America, twelve from France, and ten from the Soviet Union, with all other missions having fewer 
than ten.89 This clearly indicates the priority the British Government accorded to their relationship 
with Kenya.  
The staff in BHC included a High Commissioner, Deputy High Commissioner, and Head of Chancery 
who was ‘the main political officer … [and] coordinated the running of the High Commission’, a new 
                                                          
87 Lloyd, Diplomacy with a Difference, pp. 4-5. 
88 DSL 1966. 
89 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, ‘Diplomacy and Diplomats: The Formation of Foreign Service Cadres in Black Africa’, in 
K. Ingham (ed.), Foreign Relations of African States: Proceedings of the Twentyfifth Symposium of the Colston 
Research Society held in the University of Bristol April 4th to 7th, 1973 (London, 1974), p. 291. 
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position for former CO and CRO countries.90 There were also Counsellors and first, second and third 
secretaries, who could have specific focuses such as information, economics, commercial, agriculture, 
capital aid, or administration. There could also be advisors and, depending on what was required, 
these included labour, passport, agricultural, immigration, aid and commercial advisors. The size and 
composition of BHC remained reasonably similar. From 1965 (when the diplomatic service was 
created) to 1980, BHC ranged in size from a high of thirty-two to a low of twenty-two diplomats, with 
an average of twenty-six (table 3). There was also a further staff of lower-ranking civil servants, as well 
as locally employed staff, although it is harder to find accurate numbers of these. In 1976 there were 
a total of 115 locally employed staff, focusing mostly on consular work, immigration, registry, 
secretarial and administrative work.91 There were also clearly members of the Security Services among 
the diplomats, although it is hard to identify them and the absence of intelligence documents means 
it is difficult to write about this part of the relationship.92 These people were ‘always a presence … 
asking [their] own questions, and feeding them into the … policy and strategic picture’.93  Walton has 
recently argued that ‘the secret services helped the British government to establish and then maintain 
close liaisons with former colonies’, including a meeting prior to independence between Kenyatta and 
the head of MI5, establishing an intelligence relationship which continued thereafter.94 
London gained their information about Kenya from BHC and one of the key roles of BHC was to report 
events and their analysis of these. In debates and discussion over policy, BHC diplomats were expected 
to provide local knowledge, and it was this which gave them such influence as they had. BHC reacted 
to events in Kenya, decided what was important to share, who should be spoken to in the Kenyan 
administration, and whose ideas would be valued. This made personal relationships crucial to claims 
                                                          
90 David Goodall, interview by Poppy Cullen, St Chad’s College, Durham, 3 September 2013.  
91 Direction of Diplomatic Effort, Country Assessment Paper: Kenya, 1979, TNA FCO 31/2605/24. 
92 Although some have been identified; for example Frank Steel and Walter Bell: Jonathan Bloch and Patrick 
Fitzgerald, British Intelligence and Covert Action (Dingle, 1983), p. 157; Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British 
Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (London, 2013), p. 271. 
93 Alan Munro, interview. 
94 Walton, Empire of Secrets, pp. 335, 271-2. 
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of knowledge and influence. Studies of diplomacy and former diplomats have widely recognised the 
importance of this; as one diplomat described regarding his time in India: ‘much the most important 
thing I had to do there was to get to know a lot of Indians—the largest number possible—and to get 
to know a certain number of them really rather well’.95 Social connections were significant to this, with 
High Commissioners inviting Kenyan ministers to ‘everything from tennis matches to cocktail 
parties’.96 As one civil servant recalled, ‘If a High Commissioner could demonstrate that he and his 
staff had a good local understanding, and if the host country was not at the top of the political agenda 
in the UK, the recommendations of the post could … carry great influence in London’.97 
The functions of diplomatic missions were ‘the promotion of friendly ties, the negotiation of 
agreements, lobbying, clarifying intentions and promoting trade, as well as propagandising, political 
reporting and providing policy advice to their government’.98 Black aptly described diplomacy as ‘the 
implementation of policy through accredited persuasion’.99 Table 4 shows the division of work BHC 
themselves believed they did during 1979. As this indicates, consular and immigration work, aid and 
exports took most time. Civil servants were ranked according to grades, with ten in total and grade 1 
the highest; and the division amongst grades is also interesting, with the highest grades spending most 
time on political work, and defence handled exclusively by the middle grades.  
There were multiple forms of communication between British civil servants in London and diplomats 
in Nairobi. These included telegrams, tele-letters and letters as well as ‘the regular flow of papers, 
telegrams and files, telephone calls, and informal meetings’.100 Moorhouse estimated that in 1977, 
600,000 telegrams were sent between London and missions abroad.101 Telephone calls between 
                                                          
95 Robert Wade-Gery, in ‘British High Commission in New Delhi’, p. 12. 
96 Hilton, ‘MacDonald, Kenyatta’, p. 27.  
97 Colin Imray, ‘Memoir’, p. 5. 
98 Michael F. Hopkins, Saul Kelly and John W. Young, ‘Introduction’, in Michael F. Hopkins, Saul Kelly and John 
W. Young (eds.), The Washington Embassy: British Ambassadors to the United States, 1939-77 (Basingstoke, 
2009), p. 1.  
99 Black, A History of Diplomacy, p. 13.  
100 Barber, British Foreign Policy, p. 49.  
101 Moorhouse, Diplomats, p. 179. 
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London and Nairobi in the 1960s were infrequent: during Edward Peck’s two years as High 
Commissioner, 1966-68, he received only one phone call ‘to ask the whereabouts of Malcolm 
Macdonald, to which I was able to reply that I had no idea’.102 Communication between policy-makers 
could be both formal and personal, and was never purely institutional. In his first letter to a new 
member of EAD, Timothy Bellers in BHC handwrote a ‘PS’ to his formal letter on ‘East German links 
with Kenya’: ‘Welcome to East Africa Department – I look forward to much active (and I hope from us 
stimulating) correspondence between us’.103 One of the most formalised methods of communication 
was the despatch.104 These were formal communiques sent at the highest level of foreign policy-
making between High Commissioner and Secretary of State. High Commissioners typically wrote an 
introductory despatch, annual reviews, and periodic despatches on important events, and outgoing 
High Commissioners sent a Valedictory ‘parting shot’.105 These were sometimes widely circulated 
within Whitehall as one of the ways that knowledge about Kenya was disseminated. 
 
  
                                                          
102 Edward H. Peck, Recollections 1915-2005 (New Delhi, 2005), pp. 215, 223. 
103 T.J. Bellers to Gordon Wallace, ‘East German links with Kenya’, 8 March 1972, TNA FCO 31/1198/13. 
104 A selection of the subjects thought suitable or necessary for despatches were: Geoffrey De Freitas to the 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, ‘Kenya: Detailed Discussions on Defence and Financial 
Assistance’, 21 April 1964, TNA DO 213/135/109; Malcolm MacDonald to A.G. Bottomley, ‘The Political Situation 
in Kenya: The Present’,  5 May 1965, TNA DO 213/65/32; Eric Norris to Michael Stewart, ‘Kenya: Future British 
Policy’, 13 June 1969, TNA FCO 31/358/1; A.A. Duff to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, ‘Africanisation in Kenya’, 26 February 1973, TNA FCO 31/1507/2; S.J.G. Fingland to Anthony Crosland, 
‘Visit to Kenya by the Secretary of State for Defence’, 19 January 1977, TNA DEFE 13/1252/44. 
105 G. R. Berridge and Lorna Lloyd, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy, Third edition (Basingstoke, 
2012), p. 382. 
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Table 3: Number of Diplomats in BHC106 
 * Includes variously: Agricultural Adviser, Chief Clerk, Passport Officer, Immigration Officer, 
Commercial Officer, Accountant, Archivist, Labour Adviser 
  
                                                          
106 DSL 1966, pp. 27-8; DSL 1967, pp. 30-31; DSL 1968, pp. 31-2; DSL 1969, p. 32; DSL 1970, p. 32; DSL 1971, p. 
32; DSL 1972, pp. 32-3; DSL 1973, pp. 32-3; DSL 1974, p. 33; DSL 1975, p. 33; DSL 1976, pp. 66-7; DSL 1977, p. 
67; DSL 1978, p. 65; DSL 1979, p. 65; DSL 1980, pp. 41-2. 
Year Total 
in BHC 
Counsellors 
and High 
Commissioner 
First 
Secretaries 
Second 
Secretaries 
Third 
Secretaries 
Defence 
Advisors 
Others* 
1965 28 4 11 9 0 2 2 
1966 32 5 10 10 2 2 3 
1967 31 5 11 8 2 2 3 
1968 24 4 11 6 1 2 0 
1969 27 3 14 7 1 2 0 
1970 27 3 12 9 1 2 0 
1971 24 3 12 5 2 2 0 
1972 24 3 9 8 1 2 1 
1973 22 3 8 6 2 2 1 
1974 23 3 8 8 2 2 0 
1975 29 3 10 10 0 2 4 
1976 26 3 8 8 1 2 4 
1977 28 3 10 8 1 2 4 
1978 24 3 10 6 0 2 3 
1979 24 3 6 7 0 2 6 
1980 26 3 8 5 2 2 6 
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Table 4: Functional Analysis of BHC work, compiled by BHC in 1979107 
Function Grades 1-4 
(High 
Commissioner, 
Deputy, 
Counsellors) 
Grades 5-8 
(First and 
Second 
Secretaries) 
Grades 9-10 
(Third 
Secretaries) 
Locally 
Engaged Staff 
Percentage of 
Time 
Consular 8 13 16 14 33.5 
Immigration 2 9 14 9 23.0 
Aid 17 15 14 5 18.0 
Export 
Promotion 
7 12 14 3 12.0 
Political 
(including 
labour affairs) 
21 9  1 5.0 
Defence  15   5.0 
Economic 
(including 
Scientific and 
technical) 
16 3  1 2.5 
Support of UK 
Domestic 
Policies 
1 1  1 0.5 
Culture 1 1  1 0.5 
 
High Commissioners 
The role of the High Commissioner, and until independence the Governor, as the ‘man on the spot’ 
was a crucial one. While the impact of the earlier ‘men on the spot’ on British colonial rule has been 
widely recognised, there has been less attention to the role of these men during decolonisation.108 
Onslow has recently addressed the case of Christopher Soames in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and has argued 
that  
a Governor could make a marked contribution to the process and tone of political transition 
through a combination of political realism, individual quirks, and personal charm which 
proved a vital adjunct to big decisions made in Whitehall on the basis of geo-political 
                                                          
107 Country Assessment Paper: Kenya, 1979, TNA FCO 31/2605/24. 
108 Young, Twentieth-Century Diplomacy, p. 60. 
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imperatives. Old fashioned diplomacy and diplomats therefore should not be airbrushed from 
history as key individuals navigated the rocky terrain of decolonisation109  
The role of High Commissioners was fundamentally different; Governors ran colonies. Yet their 
position as those on the ground reporting from post meant that there were similar expectations of 
expertise and individuals could be influential, while the language of ‘man on the spot’ was still used 
about High Commissioners.110 Young has argued that ‘the days of “the man on the spot” pushing policy 
in a certain direction were not necessarily over … the twentieth-century ambassador was no mere 
“marionette”’.111 The importance of the diplomats ‘on the spot’ will be highlighted throughout this 
thesis, with High Commissioners sometimes able to influence and shape British assessments and 
actions. Most significant in his ability to shape policy in the metropole was Kenya’s last Governor, only 
Governor-General, and first High Commissioner, Malcolm MacDonald.112  
The High Commissioner was the highest ranking British diplomat in Kenya. The Nairobi posting was a 
significant one in the hierarchy of ambassadorial positions. Moorhouse, writing in 1977, argued that 
‘a nation sends its most talented representatives to those places abroad which, for one reason or 
another, are of the most concern to it’.113 At ambassadorial level in mid-1975, fourteen countries had 
grade 1 ambassadors, with Cairo and Lagos the two African posts; in grade 2 were twenty-three 
including Cape Town and Nairobi.114 This offers an indication of the African priorities of the British 
Foreign Service, and of Kenya’s primacy in British relationships with East Africa. Those who became 
High Commissioner in Kenya had progressed to almost the highest grade; aside from MacDonald, 
                                                          
109 Sue Onslow, ‘The Man on the Spot: Christopher Soames and Decolonisation of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia’, Britain 
and the World, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2013), p. 68. 
110 See L. Reid to Campbell, 18 September 1967, TNA FCO 16/117/88. 
111 John W. Young, ‘Conclusion’, in Rogelia Pastor-Castro and John W. Young (eds.), The Paris Embassy: British 
Ambassadors and Anglo-French Relations 1944-79 (Basingstoke, 2013), p. 214. 
112 See Hilton, ‘MacDonald, Kenyatta’. 
113 Moorhouse, Diplomats, p. 41. 
114 Ibid., pp. 41-2. 
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‘whose distinguished political career had already placed him well beyond this’, all seven High 
Commissioners in Nairobi until 1980 received the KCMG.115  
The choice of High Commissioners to Kenya after independence is thus revealing (table 5). Although 
the role of all of them was the same, ‘some do of course carry more weight than others’.116 The first 
two were political appointments, who will be discussed in some detail. These ‘non-professional’ heads 
of mission were fairly rare in British diplomatic practice, but appointed most often to America and 
important missions at key times.117 The following High Commissioners were more conventional career 
diplomats (though Antony Duff later became head of MI5), though there was no single model and they 
came from FO, CRO and CO backgrounds. Three High Commissioners, Peck, Eris Norris, and Duff, were 
appointed in their early fifties, and all three returned to become Deputy Under-Secretary of State in 
FCO. For Stanley Fingland and John Williams, Nairobi was their final posting before retirement, and 
both also had the most African experience. For Peck and Norris it was their first Ambassadorial and 
first Africa posting, whilst the others had experience as High Commissioners or Ambassadors and in 
Africa. They were in position between two and four years, a usual length of posting.  
 
  
                                                          
115 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, ‘Accredited to Africa: British Diplomatic Representation and African Experience, c.1960–
95’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2000), p. 92.  
116 Meerts, ‘Diplomatic Negotiation’, p. 86. 
117 Moorhouse, Diplomats, p. 252.  
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Table 5: High Commissioners in Nairobi118 
 Start 
Date  
Date of 
Leaving 
Immediately 
Prior Career 
Immediately 
Following 
Career 
Previous 
Office 
Experience 
Previous 
African 
Experience 
Previous 
Ambassadorial 
Postings 
Geoffrey 
de Freitas 
1963 1964 High 
Commissioner 
Ghana 
Council of 
Europe 
MP Ghana Ghana 
Malcolm 
MacDonald 
1964 1966 Governor-
General 
Kenya 
Special 
Representative 
in Africa 
MP Kenya  Canada, India 
Edward 
Peck 
1966 1968 Assistant 
Under- 
Secretary of 
State 
Deputy Under- 
Secretary of 
State 
FO   
Eric Norris 1968 1972 Assistant 
Under- 
Secretary of 
State  
Deputy Under-
Secretary of 
State 
CRO   
Anthony 
Duff 
1972 1975 Deputy High 
Commissioner 
Kuala Lumpur 
Deputy Under- 
Secretary of 
State 
FO, FCO Egypt Nepal 
Stanley 
Fingland 
1975 1979 Ambassador 
Havana 
Retired  CRO, FCO Nigeria, 
Rhodesia,  
Sierra 
Leone 
Sierra Leone, 
Cuba 
John 
Williams 
1979 1982 Assistant 
Under-
Secretary of 
State (Africa)  
Retired CO, FCO Nigeria, 
Benin 
Fiji, accredited 
Benin 
 
MacDonald went to Kenya as the final Governor in 1963 and had a crucial role in reshaping perceptions 
in London about Kenya and Kenyatta. MacDonald came from an earlier career as Colonial Secretary 
and roles in Canada, Malaya, Singapore and India, key imperial responsibilities around decolonisation. 
According to his biographer, MacDonald ‘hadn’t wanted to come [to Kenya] at all … [and] told Sandys 
that he really knew nothing about modern Africa and African politics’.119 But his political background 
and experience of decolonisation encouraged his appointment. As independence approached, he was 
asked by Europeans, Kenyan MPs and Kenyatta to remain in Kenya as Governor-General after 
                                                          
118 DSL 1967, p. 285; DSL 1970, p. 320; DSL 1976, p. 222; DSL 1978, pp. 234, 342-3; DSL 1980, p 173; DSL 1982, 
p. 338; Who’s Who 1994 (London, 1994), pp. 547, 1416; Who’s Who 1996 (London, 1996), p. 638, 1502; Who 
Was Who 1981-90 (London, 1990), p. 471. See also and based on: Kirk‐Greene, ‘Accredited to Africa’, pp. 79-
128. 
119 Clyde Sanger, Malcolm MacDonald: Bringing an End to Empire (Liverpool, 1995), p. 4. 
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independence, with Kenya becoming independent as a monarchy.120 According to MacDonald’s report 
of his conversations with Kenyatta: ‘I had quickly won the complete confidence of all the new Ministers 
as Governor, and they wanted me to stay in Kenya to help them through the initial stages of 
Independence, and if possible longer’.121 This makes strikingly clear the support MacDonald had from 
leading Kenyans.  
At independence, a High Commissioner also went to Kenya. Geoffrey de Freitas, a former Labour 
politician, went with the anticipation that he would become High Commissioner to the proposed East 
African Federation.122 He was there briefly and unsuccessfully; as Sanger tactfully put it, ‘he did not 
endear himself to the Kenyans’.123 Correspondence from de Freitas in 1964 indicates his lack of 
understanding of the situation and key players in Kenya.124 In July 1964, MacDonald wrote to 
Commonwealth Secretary Sandys: ‘I am very sorry indeed to say that Geoffrey de Freitas is doing great 
harm to relations … he is now an unfortunate liability’.125 MacDonald advocated that de Freitas leave 
sooner than planned and suggested ways of orchestrating this.126 Garner’s response made clear that 
those at the top in CRO were also concerned by de Freitas’ behaviour.127  
There is some suggestion that de Freitas was finally withdrawn at Kenyatta’s request. Garner in 1965 
wrote that before decolonisation ‘we never had any requests to remove a High Commissioner … and, 
from the East African Governments, we have now had no less than three’, one of which was about de 
Freitas.128 Certainly, rumours later circulated that ‘previous High Commissioners had actually been 
                                                          
120 Malcolm MacDonald to Saville Garner, 3 August 1963, Malcolm MacDonald Archive, Durham (MMA) 45/1/42-
3; Malcolm MacDonald to Duncan Sandys, 18 September 1963, MMA 45/1/44-5. 
121 Malcolm MacDonald to Duncan Sandys, 18 September 1963, MMA 45/1/44-5. 
122 (David) Malcolm McBain, interview by John Hutson, BDOHP, 27 April 2000, p. 14. 
123 Sanger, Malcolm MacDonald, p. 404.  
124 See Geoffrey de Freitas to Malcolm MacDonald, 15 April 1964, MMA 45/1/14. 
125 Malcolm MacDonald to Duncan Sandys, 4 July 1964, MMA 45/1/17-20. 
126 Malcolm MacDonald to Sandys, 6 July 1964, MMA 45/1/21-2. 
127 Joe Garner to Malcolm MacDonald, 27 July 1964, MMA 45/1/25. 
128 Joe Garner to Malcolm MacDonald, 20 July 1965, MMA 53/1/85-90. The others were Neil Pritchard (High 
Commissioner in Tanganyika, 1961-63) and Robert Fowler (High Commissioner in Tanzania, 1964-65). 
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removed from Kenya because the Kenyans had got upset’.129 According to Malcolm McBain, in BHC at 
the time, the withdrawal occurred after Kenyatta visited London in 1964 and ‘a former white settler 
emerged from one of these clubs, rushed up to him and kicked him’; following which ‘angry, slightly 
tipsy, African MPs … demanded to see the High Commissioner’. De Freitas refused ‘and the word got 
round that the High Commissioner was a coward … it led to his withdrawal from Nairobi’.130 The choice 
of the next High Commissioner was therefore a matter of particular concern. CRO needed someone, 
as MacDonald put it, ‘to try to undo the awful damage that Geoffrey has done’.131 Lord Delamere, a 
leading European in Kenya, Sandys, and some Kenyan ministers favoured MacDonald.132 The decision 
that MacDonald would become High Commissioner was indeed supported by Kenyan leaders.133 
Kenyatta publicly welcomed this and described MacDonald as ‘a warm friend to me personally’.134 In 
1965, however, Garner wrote to MacDonald that ‘in some ways, Kenya is too small for you … when 
there is a bigger job to be done’.135 MacDonald left as High Commissioner in 1966, but remained based 
in Nairobi as Special Representative in Africa until 1969. Thereafter, he continued to be engaged in 
the relationship, visiting Kenya and meeting Kenyatta, invited to events when Kenyan politicians were 
in London, and attending Kenyatta’s funeral.136 
 
                                                          
129 Leonard Allinson, interview p. 25. See also Lloyd, Diplomacy with a Difference, p. 238. 
130 Malcolm McBain, interview, pp. 20-1. 
131 Malcolm MacDonald to Saville Garner, 10 August 1964, MMA 45/1/27-9. 
132 Lord Delamere to Duncan Sandys, 7 September 1964, MMA 43/4/3; Duncan Sandys to Malcolm MacDonald, 
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Diplomatic Personnel 
This section will consider the individuals within EAD and BHC. These were the (almost all) men who 
were making decisions and thus British ‘policy’. The following analysis is drawn from the Diplomatic 
Service Lists, Foreign Office Lists, Colonial Office Lists and Who’s Who. It will take into account those 
working in BHC from 1965, the creation of the diplomatic service, to 1980, including first secretaries 
(grade 6) and above; and those involved at the higher levels of EAD from 1960 as head of department, 
assistant, and Under-Secretaries with oversight of EAD. It is not possible to find information for all of 
those involved, but a total of seventy-nine staff from BHC and thirty-seven from EAD are included in 
this study.137 
Recruitment differed between departments. The key area of colonial experience was the former 
Colonial Service, renamed Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service (HMOCS) in 1954 with the recognition 
that ‘the conception of an all-embracing Colonial Service has lost much of its relevance’.138 HMOCS 
was recruited personally during 1910-48 by Ralph Furse, ‘the father of the colonial service’.139 This was 
distinct from CO, whose staff were home civil servants.140 The FO was seen as the most elite; 
recruitment was tightly controlled, and ‘the Service was regarded as socially exclusive and arrogant. 
This view may not have been entirely justified … But there was undoubtedly something in it’.141 For 
the FO there were two recruitment methods in the 1950s: 
One was Method A, which was a kind of test of your general civility, urbanity, ability to get on 
socially with everybody, and included three compulsory papers. The other was Method B, 
which involved a far wider range of optional written papers plus the other three compulsory 
ones. That’s the method I chose; I knew I’d never survive the house party test142  
As this indicates, the ability to make personal connections was a key indicator of job suitability. One 
diplomat recalled that ‘The Diplomatic Service was held [in] particularly high esteem; thus for the 
                                                          
137 See Appendix 1.  
138 Jeffries, Colonial Office, p. 137.  
139 Robert Heussler, Yesterday’s Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service (Syracuse, 1963), p. 201.  
140 Jeffries, Colonial Office, p. 125.  
141 Campbell, Colleagues and Friends, p. 4.  
142 John Latto Farquharson (Ian) Buist, interview by Malcolm McBain, BDOHP, 8 April 2008, p. 3. 
Chapter One: Making ‘Policy’ (1): British Institutions and Actors 
67 
 
modest salaries which government offered they could command applications from a talented market 
and they took advantage of it’.143 This rigorous process allowed entry to only a select group.  
Many of these men had similar backgrounds, and tended to fit a general mould (tables 6 and 7). A high 
proportion had seen military service, either in the Second World War or through national service. 
Most in EAD were aged between forty-one and fifty-five on starting their position: well established in 
their careers but not at the zenith. In BHC, most were aged between thirty-six and fifty-five, as first 
secretary positions could be reached at an earlier age. The outlier over sixty was MacDonald: usually 
there was compulsory Diplomatic Service retirement at sixty. Those two who were first secretaries in 
BHC aged below thirty were high-fliers: Imray had moved from third secretary in Canberra in 1958 to 
first secretary in 1962, a very quick transition;144 Chris Crabbie joined FCO as second secretary in 1973, 
and went to Nairobi as first secretary on his first overseas posting in 1975.145 Most were in position 
between two and four years. Almost 30 per cent had experience working in other government 
departments, this being more common amongst those in BHC than EAD. They had worked in a range 
of departments including the Post Office, India Office, Cabinet Office and Ministry of Education. This 
experience would have given wider exposure to the priorities of other departments and encouraged 
the sense of institutional belonging and collective identity, with a shared Whitehall culture and sense 
of British interests.  
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Table 6: Age of Civil Servants at Starting Role  
 Number in BHC Number in EAD 
<30 2 1 
31-35 7 1 
36-40 10 4 
41-45 16 9 
46-50 19 12 
51-55 17 8 
56-60 6 2 
60+ 1 0 
 
Table 7: Background of Diplomats and Civil Servants in BHC and EAD 
 Number 
in BHC  
Percentage 
in BHC (%) 
Number 
in EAD  
Percentage 
in EAD (%) 
Number in 
BHC and 
EAD  
Percentage 
of total EAD 
and BHC (%) 
Military Service 47 59.5 24 64.9 71 61.2 
Oxbridge* 19 77.0 24 80.0 43 78.2 
Other 
government 
departments 
28 35.4 6 16.2 34 29.3 
CO background 4 5.1 10 27.0 14 12.1 
CRO 
background 
26 32.9 16 43.2 42 36.2 
FO background 36 45.6 15 40.5 51 44.0 
*University education known for only 30 of those in EAD and 25 in BHC.  
A particularly high proportion had been to university at Oxford or Cambridge; of the group as a whole, 
this proportion was 78.2 per cent. This fits into a widely recognised bias of the overseas service at this 
time.146 As Young has highlighted, civil servants ‘were still predominantly male, upper class and 
Oxbridge educated’.147 In 1965 the proportion of successful entrants to the Diplomatic Service from 
Oxbridge was twenty-eight of forty-three entrants, in 1966, thirty-one out of forty-one. Even more 
notable were the CRO successes, where in the years 1960-64 only one successful candidate of the 
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twenty-eight appointed had not attended Oxbridge.148 A 1967 paper on the image of the Diplomatic 
Service highlighted that  
We should not, however, be too concerned about the present preponderance of Oxbridge 
entrants. We need the best brains and personalities from all walks of life in the country, and 
Oxbridge still seem able to attract the highest proportion of these149  
By 1978 this was changing, so that ‘one in three’ were recruited from other universities.150 This 
Oxbridge recruitment meant, however, that many shared similar backgrounds and would have been 
educated with a similar outlook. As one Treasury official described: ‘The Civil Service is run by a small 
group of people who grew up together’.151 This shared background is significant as many held common 
views and outlooks; what Joll has in another context termed the ‘unspoken assumptions’ of policy-
makers who ‘fall back on their own instinctive reactions, traditions and modes of behaviour … things 
which they take for granted’.152 Part of this seems to have been the underlying sense of superiority 
which was present in the attitudes of many Britons, highlighted through later chapters.  
Issues of personnel management and timing were key to appointments. One example of this is Alan 
Munro who, in his words, ‘was an Arab specialist, not an Africa one,’ and became head of EAD in 1977 
because ‘they wanted me to go, and I did eventually go, to the Middle East department, but it wasn’t 
available’.153 Finding people who were free at the right time was essential in a process of shuffling 
people between roles. Despite the notional premium on local knowledge, experience and training 
were not always priorities; Tallboys recalled being:  
greeted with words along the lines of “Ah, Tallboys, yes, you are to be Desk Officer for Kenya, 
Uganda and the East African Economic Community in East Africa Department – go away and 
do it”. This was I suppose in the best traditions of the Diplomatic Service, that seemed to work 
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then on the principle that if a person was intelligent enough to be appointed to the 
Administrative Grades then he must be intelligent enough to do any job without delay154  
Another recalled that ‘my education in the Foreign Office was reading all the despatches coming from 
all the worldwide posts, which obviously taught you a lot about the countries they were writing on 
but also taught you an awful lot about your colleagues’.155 Training by reading others’ despatches 
meant diplomats were inculcated into the methods and ideas of their predecessors: what had been 
viewed as important was likely to remain unchallenged if this was how new members were educated. 
Those higher up were given more briefing. When Williams was High Commissioner designate, a list of 
briefing calls included the minister and three others from FCO, representatives of the Department of 
Trade, Defence Sales, Export Credits Guarantee Department, and Bank of England, commercial 
contacts at five firms, and contacts at Crown Agents, British Council, and Commonwealth 
Secretariat.156 As this suggests, commercial and economic connections were highly significant, and 
there was a sense of necessary preparation. Prior to leaving London to become High Commissioner, 
Peck additionally took Swahili lessons and read Kenyatta’s Facing Mount Kenya.157 But training was 
typically not extensive, and diplomats were expected to be adaptable. 
A key issue in organising personnel was knowledge and experience. There was an evident tension 
between the imagined emphasis on knowledge and the reality that the FCO wanted generalists who 
would be flexible. Kirk-Greene has highlighted that  
generalists have traditionally been the very foundation and pride of the Diplomatic Service, 
men and women who have successfully built up a professional repertoire of diplomatic 
knowledge and practice by regular (or at least frequent) postings between the FCO in London 
and UK missions around the world, without single country continuity or sustained regional 
clustering158 
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Diplomats needed to be adaptable to different situations and countries. Following the creation of the 
Diplomatic Service, official policy encouraged that diplomats should serve in countries previously 
covered by the other department. This helps to explain the higher proportion of FO rather than CRO 
backgrounds in BHC. By 31 December 1967, 409 former Foreign Service personnel had served in 
Commonwealth Office posts, and 262 vice versa.159 Thus, despite the notional emphasis on 
knowledge, what mattered most was actually a shared set of assumptions, with the sense that 
diplomacy was everywhere performed and practiced in similar ways.  
Prior to the mergers, levels of African experience necessarily differed between departments. Garner 
argued in 1964 that CRO had 
built up a volume of expertise in Commonwealth Relations; we have not only a corpus of 
knowledge but a very wide range of intimate personal contacts and friendships with our 
opposite numbers. In a sense we are a specialist Department, and it would be absurd to 
dissipate this at once and to throw away the experience of a lifetime160  
The FO, for obvious reasons, did not contain much African experience; at the time of the merger to 
FCO, ‘only one of its senior officers had any substantial African experience’.161 Some in CRO valued 
colonial expertise; for example, John Hickman working in EAD 1963-64,  
had very little experience of Zanzibar, having only come on the scene recently. The first thing 
I did [following the 1964 revolution] was to get hold of the two or three people from the 
Colonial Office who had dealt with Zanzibar but who were now no longer responsible for it. I 
could only go to the Colonial Office to tell us who was who and what was what162  
The CO was where greatest expertise about former colonies lay, and it was those who had worked 
within it who had knowledge to pass on.  
However, after a country’s independence, CRO was ‘resolute in its refusal to accept any lateral transfer 
from HMOCS’, and although HMOCS staff could reapply, they had to take the same exams as new 
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recruits.163 CRO preferred not to appoint people from HMOCS to the same country, viewing this as 
implying little had changed, although there is some suggestion that the new rulers of former colonies 
were not necessarily opposed to having continuing personnel.164 This was different from French post-
colonial policy where several former governors remained as ambassadors, and civil servants as 
advisers.165 MacDonald was unusual in doing this in Kenya. This attitude meant, as Garner later 
recognised, the ‘chance therefore was missed of recruiting any considerable body of men with 
experience in depth of life in the new Commonwealth countries’.166 One who moved from CO to CRO 
thought CO staff were:  
very hurt by the outlook of the CRO, who took the view that Colonial Office people couldn’t 
really serve in CRO posts, and there was a lot of feeling about that, because quite a lot of CRO 
people were over-promoted to take jobs as High Commissioners and Deputy High 
Commissioners, which should have gone to some very good Colonial Office people, most of 
whom ended up in Home Civil Service Ministries167  
After the FCO was formed in 1968, only one staff member in EAD had previous experience in the CO. 
This may be because by that time many of those who had been higher up in the CO had retired, but 
also suggests that many within CO and HMOCS left overseas policy-making with the department’s 
end.168  
However, there was also continuity and transfer. Hodge has argued that the careers of these men 
form ‘an important thread of continuity across the seemingly fundamental rupture of decolonization 
and independence’.169 Some members of HMOCS transferred to the FCO: Kirk-Greene suggests that 
by the mid-1970s more than 125 were in FCO, fifty from East Africa.170 As he later argued, this ‘allowed 
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the FCO to introduce a new cadre of African specialists’.171 Of those who worked in EAD and BHC, 
fourteen had worked in HMOCS, of whom eleven in Africa (table 9). Thus, the experience of former 
CO staff was not entirely lost as some individuals moved through the merged offices. Williams, who 
became High Commissioner in Nairobi in 1979, had worked in CO, CRO, Commonwealth Office and 
FCO.172 The two most significant colonial officials who worked on Kenya in the lead up to 
independence were Webber and Leslie Monson. They attended the Lancaster House conferences, met 
Kenyan delegations and visited Kenya.173 Webber’s career moved away from Africa after the CO’s 
closure, but Monson’s did not. He became High Commissioner to Zambia, then Assistant and later 
Deputy Under-Secretary for Africa supervising EAD until 1969, when he oversaw the remaining 
dependent territories.174 He was described as ‘one of the most experienced and able members of the 
former Colonial Office’.175 Some knowledge and institutional memory from the CO was thus 
transferred through the mergers. 
But overall, the FCO valued ‘experience’ within the department and habits of mind over real ‘local 
knowledge’. Table 8 shows that a lack of African experience was not a bar to working in BHC, and a 
larger number of previous postings did not necessarily mean an increased likelihood of African 
experience. Standen, on his eleventh placement in Nairobi, had worked extensively in South East Asia, 
with Nairobi his only African posting.176 Some individuals expressed a sense of difference between 
departments and some suspicion about colonial experience. David Goodall, in BHC in the late 1960s 
and from an FO background, ‘would like to think that maybe I was more objective’; whilst a former CO 
officials in BHC at the time  
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was immensely knowledgeable about Africa. I mean, he was very good, he was very tough and 
so on, but I couldn’t say his view was particularly objective. It was just a different sort of mind-
set. I don’t mean that he was arrogant or imperialistic or anything, but he was used to 
managing and running an African territory. Whereas we were supposed to be observing it and 
negotiating with it where necessary177  
A difference in attitude and mentality was, at least sometimes, perceived to exist, and some diplomats 
seemed to fear that their colleagues who had too much local knowledge might somehow be out of 
line institutionally.  
Table 8: BHC Overseas Postings 
Posting Number Number in BHC Number with African 
experience 
Percentage with 
African experience 
(%) 
First 4 n/a n/a 
Second 10 4 40 
Third 12 6 50 
Forth 16 11 69 
Fifth 15 12 80 
Sixth 10 7 70 
Seventh 6 6 100 
Eighth 2 1 50 
Ninth 2 0 0 
Tenth 1 1 100 
Eleventh 1 0 0 
 
Some of those involved clearly were Africa specialists. In terms of African experience, a total of 57.8 
per cent of the EAD and BHC sample had prior experience (including in HMOCS) of working in Africa. 
This was a majority, but by no means an overwhelming one. Of these, seventeen had experience in 
East Africa and twenty-four had worked in two or more African countries, with Nigeria and South 
Africa the most common. These were countries with larger and highly graded missions and thus 
higher staff numbers. It is also notable that twenty-one had been working elsewhere in Africa prior 
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to their role in Nairobi or EAD. This does suggest that at least some were building up African 
experience. Working in London departments which dealt with Africa could also be a way of gaining 
experience. 
Table 9: African Experience 
 Number in BHC 
(total 79) 
Number in EAD 
(total 37) 
Number from 
both EAD and 
BHC (total 116) 
HMOCS 13 1 14 
HMOCS in Africa 10 1 11 
African experience 48 19 67 
Two or more 
countries of African 
experience 
18 6 24 
East African 
experience 
14 
 
3 17 
Nigeria 12 3 15 
South Africa 8 5 13 
Tanganyika/Tanzania 10 1 11 
Ghana 7 2 9 
Kenya 1 1 2 
Egypt 4 1 5 
Uganda 3 0 3 
Immediately prior 
job in Africa 
13 8 21 
Immediately 
following job in 
Africa* 
7 2 9 
*Known only for 70 from BHC and 31 from EAD 
Former head of EAD Munro argued that to be a specialist, on Africa or elsewhere, ‘you would be 
expected to have 70 or 80 per cent of your time, either from home or abroad, in that area’.178 Many 
did not develop this kind of specialism, but some did spend most of their working lives focused on 
Africa. Some even had a more specifically East African focus. Consular first secretary Winefred White 
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(née Durbin), one of few women to work in BHC, began her career in the Ministries of Labour and 
Food, then moved through CO, CRO, Commonwealth Office and FCO, with overseas postings in 
Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Spain and Kenya.179 She thus had substantial experience in East Africa as 
well as in the different overseas departments in London. Several individuals worked in EAD in several 
capacities or in both EAD and BHC. Norman Aspin, head of the CRO’s East Africa Political Department 
1963-66, became Assistant Under-Secretary of State for EAD, 1974-76, and again in 1980.180 Martin 
Le Quesne was head of the West and Central African Department in the FO, 1964-68, and was later 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State with responsibility over EAD from 1971 to 1974.181 Allinson was 
Head of Chancery in BHC in 1970, became Deputy High Commissioner 1972-74, then Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State with responsibility over EAD in 1980 (he returned to Nairobi as High 
Commissioner in 1982).182 Clearly these men who worked in EAD and then supervised it, or worked 
on Kenya from both London and Nairobi, would have built up a detailed knowledge and awareness 
of Kenyan events, people and places.  
 
Conclusion 
British government attitudes may have appeared coherent and stable from a Kenyan perspective, but 
there was often conflict and negotiation between departments pursuing their own agendas. Different 
departments could have differing priorities and even within FCO the views of its Defence Department, 
EAD, BHC and Economic Department could diverge. Relations between and within these departments 
are crucial to understanding how and why policies emerged. Decisions had to be agreed upon by many 
organs within government, and when these involved politicians there were even more groups 
involved. Plans were the work of multiple sections of government, working sometimes cooperatively 
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and sometimes obstructively, as they pursued the interests of their own department, as well as 
broader UK interests.  
For the policy-makers involved, a key question was how much emphasis to place on local knowledge 
and how far to privilege experience. The FCO favoured both specialists and generalists, and even 
specialists were expected to have wider experience. There was tension over this issue; yet in 
discussions and making decisions, most believed local knowledge mattered, and this was what BHC 
was supposed to provide. Diplomats were expected and required to have some local knowledge, and 
even influence. But, as one former diplomat argued:  
there is a possibility that active and sensitive officials will come to understand too well the 
preoccupations of the foreigners with whom they deal, and give them disproportionate 
weight. They need the counterweight of the endlessly repeated question, “Where do Britain’s 
interests lie?”183 
Local knowledge was essential, but could not be allowed to prejudice British interests. There was also 
some scepticism about CO and HMOCS personnel and the value of their knowledge following the 
empire’s independence. Yet, as this thesis will make clear, the idea of local knowledge itself is also 
problematic, as frequently those British who made claims to this understood less of Kenyan politics 
and society than they believed.  
Staff within BHC and EAD had a reasonable degree of autonomy, and heads of EAD and High 
Commissioners were most able to exercise influence over the decisions which in effect made ‘policy’. 
But all worked within institutional confines. As Allison and Halperin have argued, those involved in 
making policy were ‘individual[s] in a position’.184 It was their position which made them significant in 
this context rather than their individual characteristics. The British involved were primarily 
functionaries, for whom Kenya was one element of a wider career of public service. Thus, changes in 
personnel tended to make marginal difference to the direction and pursuance of British policy. Those 
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coming to the office adapted to the knowledge which had built up in files and people, and to the aims 
and objectives which had been set – or accepted – by their predecessors.185 The culture of the 
departments and civil service in general encouraged cooperation and the pursuance of shared goals. 
Similar backgrounds, outlooks and ideas of British interests meant disagreement tended to be over 
detail rather than the broad scope of policy. There were rivalries, but plans were framed within a 
Whitehall consensus and shared culture of bureaucracy. This was not necessarily because policy and 
aims were clearly defined, but rather because a broader sense of what British politicians, civil servants 
and diplomats wanted to achieve from their relationship persisted. Despite internal departmental and 
individual disputes this was, ultimately, a bureaucratic system.
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Chapter Two: Making ‘Policy’ (2): Kenyan Institutions and Actors 
 
‘This High Commission enjoys a privileged access to members of the ruling inner circle which 
is the envy of other Missions’ 
Eric Norris to Michael Stewart, 13 June 19691 
 
The Anglo-Kenyan relationship was founded on a set of relationships with Kenyan individuals. This 
chapter is about what British diplomats thought of the Kenyan politicians with whom they dealt: how 
they categorised and understood them, how they reported on them to their superiors and politicians 
in London, and how attitudes in London affected what diplomats thought. British policy-makers 
encouraged communications with certain individuals in a continual search for people who would be 
‘friendly’ to perceived British interests, trying to cultivate and influence them. During the late colonial 
period British officials sought to choose who would lead Kenya to independence; when Kenyatta 
emerged as the leader, they focused on him and his elite, whilst simultaneously trying to predict his 
succession, which coloured their assessments until it occurred in 1978.  
Views of individuals mattered because Kenyan politics was very much driven by personalities, as 
people pursued their own interests in a system of neo-patrimonialism. Clapham has defined this as ‘a 
political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines’ but in which 
those with official positions ‘exercise those powers, so far as they can, as a form not of public service 
but of private property’.2 Kenyatta distrusted institutions, and whilst Kenya had an effective and 
functioning civil service, he encouraged a political culture in which decisions were ultimately made by 
an informal elite around him. The High Commissioner in 1966 noted ‘the rather confused demarcation 
of ministerial responsibilities in Kenya’.3 This encouraged a ‘court’ politics of personal rivalries with 
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‘the faction the main tool of political struggle’.4 Tamarkin in the late 1970s argued that ‘[p]olicy-
making and decision-making is the prerogative of the President who brings into the process a small 
group of advisers comprised of Ministers, high-ranking civil servants, relatives and friends’; as a result, 
access to the president was typically the most important way of influencing policy.5 Those in the British 
government recognised that ‘effective power rests with the President and his most immediate 
advisers’.6 This was particularly significant because the Kenyan elite remained in position for an 
extended time; as Goldsworthy has argued, ‘no one in mid-1963 could have predicted how 
extraordinarily stable this élite group would prove to be’.7 British policy-makers certainly did not 
predict this. The 1957 and 1958 elections ‘brought to the fore a generation of politicians who 
dominated the postcolonial landscape’.8 Of those Africans attending the 1960 Lancaster House 
conference (which of course had some major absences, most notably Kenyatta), British diplomats still 
listed six as key figures in 1978 and several others had been important until their deaths.9 British 
diplomats worked with and even reinforced this neo-patrimonial system by engaging with people 
primarily on an individual and personal basis. Indeed, they came to understand and naturalise a focus 
on individuals as something ‘African’; as one head of EAD noted: ‘Africans, though not without a sense 
of protocol, attach a great deal of importance to personal relations’.10  
Who British officials talked to and how they interacted with them greatly shaped their views. 
Diplomats tended to have extensive contacts. They prided themselves on their access and were 
sometimes frustrated when this seemed lacking, such as in April 1976 when increasing detentions of 
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MPs meant ‘MPs are no longer willing to be seen talking to diplomats in public’.11 Difficulties in access 
meant problems gaining information, as it was through individual contacts that British knowledge was 
gathered. If Kenyans would not speak publicly, BHC staff would have to rely increasingly on private 
contacts. Roberts has highlighted, about Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere but appropriate to Kenyatta 
as well, ‘the perception of the presidents as archetypal African “big men”, an image skewed both by 
their own propaganda and the stereotypical assumptions of foreign diplomats’.12 These ‘stereotypical 
assumptions’ will be key to this chapter. The underlying question is how much British diplomats, or 
the politicians in London whom they advised, ever really ‘knew’ about what was happening in Kenyan 
politics. It is clear that they thought they understood this well, believing they were in a position to 
accurately assess Kenyan individuals, politics and interests – often thinking they knew these better 
than the Kenyans themselves. This self-belief and assumed superiority underpinned their views and 
interactions: ‘some new difficulties may arise – as is only to be expected from some of the immature 
and emotional African political leaders’.13 But British judgements were by no means always sound. 
This chapter will first consider the importance of Kenyatta, then discuss two interlocutors whose 
cultural accessibility shaped British views of them, before considering other Kenyans who were 
thought less accessible, and the categorisations which shaped – and skewed – British views of them. 
 
Kenyatta 
Kenyatta was the central figure in independent Kenya until his death in 1978. He was arrested in 1952 
as Mau Mau leader, released in 1961, became prime minister in 1963 and president in 1964 – a post 
he held until his death. These brief details suggest the dramatic nature of his transformation from 
detainee to key ally. Kenyatta had been accused and convicted of being the leader of Mau Mau, and 
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was vilified in Britain and by many of Kenya’s Europeans. A letter from one European in December 
1960 asked: ‘Has Her Majesty’s Government lost all sense of decency that it can be contemplating the 
release of Kenyatta?’.14 When he visited Nairobi in 1961, Colonial Secretary Reginald Maudling 
‘avoided … being photographed shaking his hand’.15 Oliver Lyttelton, Colonial Secretary 1951-54, 
wrote in his 1962 autobiography that Kenyatta was ‘a daemonic figure with extreme left-wing views’.16 
But these ideas about Kenyatta were based on presumption rather than accurate knowledge. When 
MacDonald was appointed Governor, he was told by advisers in London that Kenyatta was ‘a wicked 
old man who was fortunately far past his prime, who was quickly declining in physical and mental 
powers … rapidly boozing himself to death’; although others did admit ‘that few Europeans either 
inside or outside Kenya really knew much about Kenyatta’.17  
Once he was released from detention, Kenyatta quickly came to be viewed more positively, a change 
spearheaded by MacDonald.18 And once he was seen as a ‘friend’, he was a particularly close one. His 
ability to assert his control over KANU was crucial as he ‘cleverly manipulates the factions’.19 Jackson 
and Rosberg described his role as an ‘umpire’ as he ‘presided over this personal-factional struggle … 
but he did not seek to eliminate the competition’, rather using this when it benefitted him.20 In a 
character sketch of Kenyatta in January 1966, MacDonald (by then High Commissioner) wrote that 
‘nothing is more important to an understanding of the situation in Kenya – and to some extent in 
neighbouring regions – during these important times than an appreciation of the quality of that 
extraordinary man’.21 One diplomat in London described in response the ‘almost Churchillian 
performance that Kenyatta has produced in the past few years, and which has won him world-wide 
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respect’.22 Favour towards Kenyatta was strong and continued through the 1960s and early 1970s, 
before diminishing as corruption increased and Kenyatta became less able.23 But until his death, 
Kenyatta was viewed positively by most British observers. 
Like many other nationalists who gained power at independence, Kenyatta was one of Britain’s 
‘enemies-turned-friends’.24 At his death, the British press highlighted this change: ‘the Mau Mau 
leader who turned from Britain’s arch-enemy to close friend’.25 The attitude of the European 
population also changed and Kenyatta was transformed, as Knauss argued, ‘[f]rom Devil to … 
statesman-leader-father figure’.26 British officials thus tried to rationalise their relationship with 
Kenyatta by reinterpreting his past. MacDonald in 1966 denied any Mau Mau involvement: ‘From my 
now intimate knowledge of Jomo Kenyatta’s personality I feel sure that he never approved of the 
atrocities [or] Mau Mau excesses during the Kenyan emergency, and that he had no personal 
responsibility for them’.27 Responses in CRO were less certain. One thought MacDonald ‘a little starry-
eyed’;28 another argued that Kenyatta was ‘undoubtedly a prime instigator of the terrorist 
movement’.29 One official interestingly did ‘not think history will acquit [him] completely of some 
measure of responsibility … I quite see that in the mythology of the post colonial era, history must be 
re-written. But we do not have to accept the re-writing’.30 He clearly recognised that British ideas 
about Kenyatta and Kenya were undergoing a remembering and forgetting in the process of nation-
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building which was occurring in Kenya, and simultaneously in Britain about Kenya.31 Kenyatta’s role in 
Mau Mau was an awkward part of the colonial past which British officials did not want to address too 
deeply. In arguing for the influential role of Kenyatta’s jailor Leslie Whitehouse, Watkins argued that 
Kenyatta was transformed in prison;32 but Savage has argued that Kenyatta ‘has always been a 
conservative. Only the circumstances of the moment ever made it seem otherwise’.33 Kenyatta came 
to be viewed as a reconciler, and after his death the High Commissioner argued that ‘[h]is main legacy 
to Kenya is that he genuinely followed the precept of his book – suffering without bitterness’.34  
Given the importance British officials attached to their relationship with Kenyatta, they were highly 
concerned by his succession, which, especially by the 1970s, came to be the lens through which they 
viewed Kenyan politics. British favour for Kenyatta meant that ‘successors to Mzee [Kenyatta] 
inevitably look a puny lot. It could hardly be otherwise’.35 British politicians, civil servants and 
diplomats feared that Kenya under a future leader would be less favourable to British interests and 
become unstable.36 A draft paper in 1965 entitled ‘After Kenyatta – Who?’ categorically stated that 
‘removal of Kenyatta’s control over the Kenya Government poses dangers to the British and the 
Western position’, speculating upon the possibilities for a ‘break down in law and order’ and the 
potential need for ‘evacuation of British subjects’.37 Uncertainty was a key concern: despite their self-
belief in their own knowledge, British policy-makers were also profoundly uncertain about the future 
after Kenyatta. Significant time was therefore spent on making succession predictions and assessing 
possible candidates as they hoped to recognise a successor, forge connections, and thereby protect 
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British interests. This seemed so important because the date of Kenyatta’s death was uncertain but 
expected to be much sooner than it was, and possibly at any moment. In 1967, as one of multiple 
examples, the High Commissioner wrote to EAD:  ‘the following thoughts, inconclusive as they are, 
represent the total perspicacity of our combined crystal-balls’.38 This level of uncertainty shows that 
British diplomats sometimes recognised the limits to their knowledge.  
 
Njonjo and McKenzie 
Despite Kenyatta’s importance, British contact through most of his presidency was usually not directly 
with him but particularly with two other leading Kenyans: Bruce McKenzie and Charles Njonjo. As High 
Commissioner Peck recalled, these ‘two dominant figures … were invaluable channels to the President 
and meant that I need rarely press to see him personally’.39 McKenzie was born in South Africa, moved 
to Kenya in 1946, and was described by one Briton working in Kenya as ‘the only European in 1959 … 
who saw clearly that Kenya would soon have an African government’.40  McKenzie joined KANU in 
1961 and remained Minister for Agriculture in 1963, a post he had been appointed to in 1959. He was 
the most influential European politician in independent Kenya and his visible ministerial presence 
‘suggested there was a place and a role for Europeans in independent Kenya’.41 He also had extensive 
business interests as ‘Director of over 20 Kenyan registered companies and an unknown number of 
foreign companies’ when he died.42 He retired as a minister in 1970, publicly due to ill-health, to which 
the High Commissioner’s response was that ‘for all his faults, we have lost an influential friend at 
court’.43 Yet this was by no means the end of McKenzie’s influence with either the British or Kenyan 
governments, and until he was killed in 1978, ‘though he no longer holds public office, [he] is still very 
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much in the President’s confidence’.44  McKenzie handled key policy initiatives and negotiations well 
beyond his remit as a minister, described by one British High Commissioner as ‘Minister for Backstage 
affairs’.45 McKenzie had a private brief for defence, and was often sent to Britain to broker defence 
sales rather than anyone from the Kenyan Ministry of Defence.46 McKenzie had close British ties and 
knew how to use his connections, hinting once again at the importance of personal rather than 
ministerial position.  
It has been suggested that McKenzie was a spy for the British government. One of the key allegations 
comes from the journalist Chapman Pincher who, in an article published at McKenzie’s death, 
described McKenzie as an ‘Intelligence agent … with close links with Britain’s SAS [Special Air Service] 
… [who] rendered important Intelligence services to Britain’.47 However, in his 2014 autobiography 
Pincher is less explicit; whilst he still describes McKenzie as having ‘close personal relations with 
British, American, Canadian, Iranian and Israeli intelligence’, he does not refer to him directly as a 
British agent.48 Other evidence which points to McKenzie’s connections with British intelligence is a 
reference by a CRO civil servant that Mackenzie ‘was himself in the [SAS] Regiment’.49 However, even 
this makes no reference to any current contact, and another diplomat had previously speculated that 
McKenzie favoured the SAS ‘I suppose because McKenzie must have served with S.A.S. during the 
War’.50 McKenzie did serve with the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the Second World War. A former 
High Commissioner described that McKenzie ‘maintained a not-so-secret liaison with the UK High 
Commissioner’, but exactly what this means – if he was a spy or merely intermediary – is unclear.51 
                                                          
44 M.P.J. Lynch to Kirkness, 25 July 1974, TNA FCO 31/1718/48. 
45 Edward Peck to M. Scott, 28 August 1967, TNA FCO 38/10/21. 
46 See for examples: Note of meeting with Bruce McKenzie in the CRO, 5 January 1966, TNA DEFE 24/660/2A; 
Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and Bruce McKenzie at 10 Downing Street, 5 August 1974, 
TNA DEFE 11/652/7. 
47 Chapman Pincher, ‘Mid-air Revenge: Crash Riddle of Man who let Amin’s enemies into Entebbe’, Daily Express, 
26 May 1978, pp. 4-5. 
48 Chapman Pincher, Dangerous to Know: A Life (London, 2014), p. 99. 
49 R.M. Tesh minute, 6 January 1965, TNA DO 213/38/31. 
50 W.F. Bell to Walsh Atkins, 21 March 1964, TNA DO 213/38/3/2. 
51 Peck, Recollections, p. 219. 
Chapter Two: Making ‘Policy’ (2): Kenyan Institutions and Actors 
87 
 
Bloch and Fitzgerald in 1983 suggested McKenzie had ‘been an MI6 agent since at least 1963’ and was 
probably recruited during Mau Mau.52 Walton has argued that McKenzie ‘may well have been’ a British 
agent, and was also an Israeli one.53 Dowden described him as ‘head of MI6 in East Africa’,54 and 
Branch as ‘probably a British and Israeli intelligence agent’;55 whilst Hornsby has argued there ‘is 
evidence that such intelligence links existed’.56 According to Bergman, ‘McKenzie was one of the most 
important and long-lasting Mossad contacts in Africa’, code-named ‘The Duke’.57 He claims that 
McKenzie’s second wife had served in the SAS, and McKenzie became ‘best friends’ with Israeli 
Brigadier General Tsvi Zamir, although he ‘was never paid by Israel for his services. According to his 
case officers, he volunteered out of sheer appreciation for the Zionist movement and the Jewish 
people and his friendship with Zamir’.58 McKenzie’s links with Mossad are beyond the scope of this 
thesis; however, it is notable that he was unpaid, and that he used his contacts in a similar manner to 
his British connections: to gain military support from Israel.  
It seems, however, entirely possible that McKenzie was simply an intermediary, who saw in this an 
excellent way of pursuing his own interests. Redactions in documents do sometimes conceal the 
name(s) of people in the Kenyan government who passed information to the British – but it is not clear 
that McKenzie’s name was among those redacted, as many documents do cite him directly as a source 
of information.59 One BHC staff member suggested McKenzie ‘[d]idn’t trust the British government an 
inch – probably rightly’.60 Following a meeting with McKenzie in 1964, one diplomat noted that 
McKenzie ‘is in a peculiar and unique position in the Kenya Government, and even his own senior 
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European officers are uncertain of his motives’.61 If he was a spy, this was not widely known among 
British diplomats and civil servants. McKenzie was not uniformly positive about Britain and ‘tries to be 
genuinely non-aligned when it serves Kenya’s interests’.62 As Hornsby recognised, ‘McKenzie’s dual 
loyalties were well known at Cabinet level and there is no evidence in the High Commission 
correspondence of actions that were to the detriment of Kenya’.63  Unquestionably, McKenzie had 
extensive contacts across countries and within their intelligence services and acted as an intermediary 
passing information; however, as far as it is possible to tell, it seems that McKenzie was acting in his 
own interests, or what he perceived to be Kenya’s interests, rather than directly to benefit any foreign 
government. After his death, the High Commissioner recognised that McKenzie’s ‘influence, although 
substantial, was exercised largely in his own interests and in his own interpretation of Kenya’s 
interests, and this did not always coincide with British interests or British views on Kenyan interests’.64 
British policy-makers viewed McKenzie as working for his own benefit and position – not as a conduit 
for British interests. 
Njonjo had been educated and practiced as a lawyer in Britain before becoming a powerful figure 
within Kenya as Attorney-General and close advisor to the President.65 Njonjo was not always favoured 
by those around him in Kenya,66 but the British believed him ‘almost certainly the most pro-British of 
all the members of the Kenya Cabinet’.67 British diplomats frequently talked to him and generally 
believed him a useful ally. Goodall, first secretary in BHC, recalled that he was ‘very much one of our 
interlocutors’.68 He was not as favoured by the Americans.69 British policy-makers did recognise some 
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of Njonjo’s flaws and a more critical appraisal of him was evident by 1980: ‘He remains our best friend 
here and as such is worthy of support but we should not be under any illusions over [his] popularity 
or political deftness’.70 Nonetheless, British officials knew Njonjo and consistently felt able to work 
with him. Both McKenzie and Njonjo were key supporters of Kenyatta and remained influential 
throughout this period – although British diplomats’ access to them may have led them to an 
overestimation of their actual influence. For McKenzie and Njonjo, portraying themselves to the 
British as particularly significant, and thus ensuring they were treated that way, could prove useful. 
British personnel did occasionally recognise this: in 1975 the High Commissioner reported that Njonjo 
had ‘confessed to being entirely baffled and for once I felt he was not lying nor attempting to cover 
anything up’.71 Pro-British and powerful, these men were acting in their own interests rather than 
Britain’s.  
One reason why McKenzie and Njonjo were so favoured by the British and vice versa was the 
underlying cultural ties. British diplomats still confidently assumed their own superiority, and they had 
closer relations with those most culturally similar – of whom McKenzie and Njonjo were the key 
examples. One very visible sign of this was Njonjo’s choice of dress: pinstripes with a rose in his 
buttonhole. Njonjo was described by High Commissioner Duff as  
“the black Englishman”, outwardly an intelligent man of urbane charm, [he] is often the haven 
of normality and calm good sense to which one turns with relief when the rest of the Kenyan 
political scene appears to be shrouded in impenetrable cotton wool72  
This indicates both preference for Njonjo and how difficult British diplomats could find it to relate to 
others by comparison. Cultural similarities encouraged and facilitated connections to certain 
individuals who appeared comprehensible.  
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The cultural bias towards Britain amongst the Kenyan elite was much wider. High Commissioner Peck 
wrote in 1967 that Kenyan politicians had a ‘preference for the British way of life to the Americans’.73 
The interests of these men had been shaped in the latter colonial years, and many favoured the 
continuation of systems which offered them benefits.74 Of Kenyan MPs in 1963, 30 per cent had 
received educational awards from Britain.75 Kipkorir has also highlighted the importance of the 
Alliance High School as a ‘formative experience both politically and personally’ for many of Kenya’s 
elite, with ten of seventeen of Kenya’s cabinet at independence and nine of fourteen permanent 
secretaries educated there.76 As Good has argued, ‘western values were generally held high, not least 
by the educated African elite’.77 In the 1978 British-compiled ‘Leading Personalities in Kenya’ report, 
twenty-eight of the 106 people included had received some kind of education or training in Britain.78 
The fact that British policy-makers made these reports at all suggests their sense that they knew how 
and who to categorise as ‘important’. This of course reflected their own judgements and potentially 
led them to overlook others: because the British had trained certain people, they knew them and 
thought they were important.  
McKenzie and Njonjo had both formal and informal contact with the British. Formal contact was often 
with ministers and they met multiple British ministers across this period: Commonwealth, Defence, 
Foreign and Commonwealth, Overseas Development, as well as the Prime Minister.79 They often went 
to meetings as a pair and had a considerable level of access in Britain; when they asked for meetings, 
they generally received them. In 1966, anticipating McKenzie and Njonjo coming to Britain, head of 
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EAD Michael Scott minuted that ‘if the Ministers turn up with a mission to deliver a personal letter 
from President Kenyatta to the Prime Minister we should find it difficult to sidetrack them to either 
the Commonwealth Secretary or the Minister of Defence in the first instance’.80 Clearly, Scott thought 
that they could not be denied prime ministerial access. The personal and formal were interlinked, 
however, as Scott also noted that ‘[a]s Mr. McKenzie knows Mr. Healey personally quite well, he may 
very well approach him first’.81 McKenzie also had links to British businessmen.82 Prior to the merger 
to FCO in 1968, McKenzie and Njonjo were informed by the Commonwealth Secretary that:  
Mr. [Michael] Stewart would be in charge of the merged Office and that when representatives 
of the Kenya Government wanted access to the top, they should go to him. He would ensure 
that Mr. Stewart was aware of the sensitive matters which Mr. Njonjo and Mr. McKenzie might 
wish to discuss with him from time to time83  
Clearly these men were expected to have ‘sensitive matters’ to discuss, and were being offered ‘access 
to the top’ as people British ministers were willing to talk to. In 1969 BHC encouraged another meeting 
with the Commonwealth Secretary and noted in favour of this that: 
The Secretary of State may be getting a little tired of talks with McKenzie but there is no doubt 
that McKenzie finds discussing his problems with him of great benefit and a sympathetic 
reception does much to bolster his morale84  
As well as formal meetings and communication, informal exchanges provided a crucial way of passing 
information and knowledge between leading British and Kenyan policy-makers. Personal connections 
were vital in establishing the ‘friendly’ relations which were the British aim. This contact was so 
significant partly because Kenya’s neo-patrimonialism privileged individuals, but it was also in many 
cases the way British diplomats chose to interact; thereby reinforcing this system. There are multiple 
examples of this kind of informal, social contact at which the British could gain an insight into Kenyan 
                                                          
80 M. Scott to Norris, Walsh Atkins, 1 November 1966, TNA DO 213/129. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Note of points made at a private dinner given by Lord Aldington for Bruce MacKenzie, 30 October 1970, TNA 
T 317/1587. 
83 Note of a conversation between the Commonwealth Secretary and Charles Njonjo and Bruce McKenzie, 25 
September 1968, TNA DEFE 24/660/118/2. 
84 Telegram no. 3083, Nairobi to Commonwealth Office, 13 September 1969, TNA FCO 31/227/45. 
Chapter Two: Making ‘Policy’ (2): Kenyan Institutions and Actors 
92 
 
thinking.85 Social events could establish and reinforce relationships; although they could also 
potentially encourage diplomats to focus on those they knew and those who ‘turned up at functions 
when we invited them’.86 When MacDonald was High Commissioner he wrote to Njonjo with the 
number for the ‘direct line to my study … if you ever want to telephone me at 2 Tchui Road without 
someone else picking up the receiver’.87 This suggests the level and discretion of communication 
between them; hinting at personal, private, and potentially frequent conversations. McKenzie was 
also prepared to offer informal advice, and his British contacts to listen to this. On an issue of loans in 
1970 ‘McKenzie has given us useful guidance as to how we should play this at the talks’.88 In 1968 BHC 
was privately approached by McKenzie to help ‘produce a clear internal security plan’ for the 
president’s death, with the intention to ensure stability in the transfer of power. BHC helped create a 
plan which would restrict movement, detain potential opponents, and restrict or expel ‘unfriendly 
diplomatic missions’, working privately with McKenzie.89 Clearly BHC was McKenzie’s first choice of 
partner, and for British policy-makers, he and Njonjo were their key intermediaries, encouraged by 
both their willingness to play this role and their cultural similarities.  
 
‘Moderates’ and ‘Radicals’ 
Beyond these three key individuals, British diplomats, civil servants and politicians viewed Kenyans 
through several different lenses, categorising them to rationalise and explain their relationships. Key 
to this was a distinction drawn between ‘moderates’ and ‘radicals’. Prior to independence, the CO 
tried to make sense of relationships by casting those who would work with them as ‘moderates’. KADU 
was initially seen as the ‘moderate’ party, and it was only when it became apparent that KANU was 
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most likely to win the election that the decision was taken to work with them.90 As Kyle has argued, 
during 1960-63,  
the aim of British policy in Kenya politics was to split Kanu between its “moderates” and its 
“extremists”, with its “moderates” then joining forces with Kadu. What changed from time to 
time was the definition of a Kanu “moderate” and a Kanu “extremist”91  
British conceptions of ‘moderates’ shifted as circumstances changed and people were redefined 
within British ideas. Kenyatta was the key example of this: seen initially as an ‘extremist’ leader of 
Mau Mau, he became a favoured ‘moderate’.  
Combined with these labels were ideas about ethnicity and the presidential succession.92 British 
diplomats came to post-independence politics with views on ethnicity shaped by their colonial past. 
High Commissioner Peck recalled ‘the Wakamba being one of the fighting rather than commercial 
tribes’,93 echoing colonial ideas about so-called ‘martial’ groups.94 Diplomats thought they understood 
Kenya’s ethnic groups and could assess them: ‘There is no other tribe in Africa quite like the Kikuyu’;95 
and they were always keen to note who had ‘support amongst his particular section of the tribe’.96 
This became central to their understanding of the succession, with the idea that the Kikuyu would 
continue to be in control of this, either through finding a successful Kikuyu candidate, or through an 
ethnic compromise.97 Once more this offers a sense of the British thinking they understood Kenyans 
and could accurately assess them. This was part of why the relationship worked as it did, as British 
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policy-makers were self-confident about their understanding, even if often their ideas were not as 
accurate as they believed.  
Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga were the leaders of two factions of KANU explicitly described by 
contemporaries as ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ respectively.98 The rivalry between Mboya and Odinga had 
aspects of both the political and personal and had begun during the 1950s as they sought national 
leadership.99 Attitudes towards them coloured politics fundamentally up to 1969 and Britain’s 
different categorisations were used to assess them. Mboya emerged as a trade union leader in the 
1950s, becoming Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs at independence, then for Economic 
Planning and Development in 1964. British policy-makers recognised his talents in politics and 
MacDonald described him as ‘by far the ablest, most hard working, and in some moods wisest member 
of the Government, not excluding the Prime Minister [Kenyatta]. He would be pre-eminently able by 
any standard in any country’.100 But Mboya lacked parliamentary support and, as MacDonald again 
noted, ‘I fear he has a genius for using his immense ability to rub people up the wrong way’.101 Mboya 
has sometimes been viewed as a non-ethnic leader whose power base was in Nairobi, and he was 
even described as ‘de-tribalised’,102 although Goldsworthy has argued that in fact ‘his attitude was one 
of ethnic tolerance blended with a distinct pride in being Luo’.103 Certain British diplomats and Kenyans 
considered Mboya in terms of the succession, but many Kenyan politicians opposed this,104 leading in 
1968 to ‘Government legislation to avoid the possibility of Mboya becoming the next President’.105 In 
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July 1969 Mboya was assassinated, most likely not by ‘radicals’ but by other ‘moderates’ who wished 
to prevent his succession. These categories shaped British ideas; yet they were far from adequate to 
explain political rivalries.  
Despite categorising him as a ‘moderate’, British officials were uncertain about Mboya, who lacked a 
cultural affinity which could have made him more favoured. Mboya was a prominent figure in the 
West: he published a pamphlet with the Fabian Colonial Bureau in 1956, forwarded by Margery 
Perham, attended Oxford University, and organised an ‘airlift’ of students to the US.106 But, unusually 
among the Kenyan elite at this time, he was closer to America than to Britain as ‘the one Kenyan 
moderate figure who completely dominated American thinking’.107 He did not fit the British style of 
policy-making and was not expected to be pro-British if he did become President. He also did not talk 
to British diplomats very much, with fewer examples of private conversations with BHC, particularly 
after independence.108 His choice not to talk to them extensively surely influenced British 
uncertainties about him. In 1965 Imray in BHC suggested that ‘Kenyatta has never wholly trusted (or 
liked) him’, perhaps signalling as much the British attitude as Kenyatta’s.109 Following discussions 
between BHC and the US Embassy in August 1967, High Commissioner Peck argued that the Americans 
should aim ‘to broaden their outlook and counter their tendency sometimes to see the Kenyan 
situation through Mboya’s eyes’, suggesting that Mboya was having excessive influence upon 
American thinking.110 British observers were far more sceptical about his chances of succession and 
clearly thought they had a more accurate understanding than the Americans.111  
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Odinga, by contrast, was a ‘radical’ Kenyan politician. His background was in business before being 
elected to Legislative Council in 1957. Odinga was the first to call for Kenyatta’s release in June 1958, 
in a move that shocked and scared the British government, as well as many of his African colleagues; 
and – ironically given later British views of Kenyatta – it was this which irredeemably fixed his ‘radical’ 
label for the British.112 The description of ‘radical’ was not just a British language being applied to 
Kenyans; it was also one which certain Kenyans chose to appropriate. In part, this was a way to signal 
opposition, as being ‘radical’ meant being opposed, in differing ways, to Kenyatta’s mainstream 
Kenyan politics. Ochieng describes ‘radicals’ as those ‘who stood for fundamental changes in the 
social, economic and political fields’.113 Odinga supported redistributing land without compensation, 
thus rejecting one of the pillars of continuity which encouraged Anglo-Kenyan cooperation. In other 
ways, too, Odinga was less favourable to the British and their interests. During defence discussions in 
early 1964, Odinga would ‘not agree [to] further discussion now in front of British Service 
Commanders’ even though other Kenyan ministers wanted this discussion.114  
Another sign of Odinga’s ‘radicalism’ was his apparent sympathy for Communism. In 1961 the Kenyan 
government reported that Odinga was ‘convinced that communism is the answer to Kenya’s problems 
and will do all in his power to see that this ideology is adopted after independence’;115 in a 1965 speech 
he described that ‘Communism to him was “just like food”’.116 One British diplomat did give the caveat 
that ‘Odinga for his part remains something of an enigma. He is probably not a Communist, but an 
ambitious opportunist, who is glad to dispense the immense funds provided by the Communists and 
relishes the prospect of buying his way to power’.117 British diplomats did attempt to nuance their 
understandings, but in some ways this was perhaps even more damning: not even a sincere 
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Communist, but an ‘opportunist’, although the suspicion of communism remained. Some British civil 
servants did question this simplistic interpretation. Imray, first secretary in BHC, argued in June 1965 
that: ‘All this speculation tends to cast Odinga and his followers in the role of “baddies” in Kenyatta’s 
eyes, and the “moderates” in the role of “goodies”. This is oversimplification’.118 But although these 
labels could be obstructive rather than revealing, for many the simplified version continued to 
influence thinking.  Odinga’s position changed substantially as the later 1960s saw him lose influence 
and power – a process fully supported and approved by British observers. He resigned the vice-
presidency and formed the opposition Kenya People’s Union (KPU) in 1966, followed by imprisonment 
in 1969. After he was released, Odinga’s support and activities were still commented upon by British 
observers, but he was no longer viewed as having the same importance or influence.119   
Whilst he was vice-president however, British decision-makers had to interact with Odinga, and often 
at the highest level: in February 1965 he met the Prime Minister after attending Winston Churchill’s 
funeral.120 Yet they hoped to avoid having to work too closely with him. In May 1965, with Odinga 
thought to be intriguing against Kenyatta – and against British interests – British policy-makers and 
Kenyatta did not want Odinga to represent Kenya at the upcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
meeting in London. Kenyatta felt unable to personally attend because to do so meant leaving Odinga 
as Acting President and ‘he simply does not trust Odinga to conduct affairs properly’; to ask anyone 
else to lead the delegation ‘would be an almost intolerable public insult to Odinga’.121 MacDonald 
viewed this as ‘extremely regrettable’,122 whilst those in EAD sought a way round this: ‘We have 
consulted our lawyers, who confirm that this [constitution] does not prevent both the President and 
the Vice-President being out of Kenya at the same time ... That is, of course, not to say that Kenyatta 
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might not find it extremely difficult’.123 It is clear that EAD staff were prepared to go to some effort to 
try and prevent Odinga leading the delegation, but it was Kenyan internal opposition to Odinga which 
made this a possibility.124 
Instead, the delegation was led by Joseph Murumbi, Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, 
who had important access to both Kenyatta and British diplomats in the early 1960s. Murumbi was 
described as ‘well-disposed to us and we find him the most reasonable to deal with of all the 
Ministers’.125 Based on his position being sworn in on Independence Day, he was ranked fifth in what 
British policy-makers believed to be ‘the official order of precedence’ in the Kenyan government.126 
British diplomats considered Murumbi a ‘moderate’, close to Kenyatta, who could be trusted with 
exchanging sensitive requests. In preparing for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting in June 
1965, Deputy High Commissioner Henry Stanley of BHC wrote to EAD that  
Ministers can speak quite frankly to Murumbi on any topic; he is intelligent, articulate and 
cultured, and rather more a man of the world than many African politicians … As regards 
tactical handling … I suggest plain speech and maximum exposure of him to the more realistic 
African line127 
British policy-makers were preoccupied by whom they would be talking to, and in finding the best way 
to talk to them. When Odinga was removed from the vice-presidency in 1966, Murumbi was 
appointed, and retained significant British access, before he retired from politics at the end of 1966.128 
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Succession Candidates 
Another key feature of British assessments was potential candidacy for the presidency. Speculation 
on the succession was a major preoccupation, although British decision-makers did not try to directly 
foist a candidate of their choosing – they were too uncertain themselves to attempt this. Diplomats 
and civil servants sometimes struggled to predict the most likely candidates, despite a fascination with 
the subject: Stanley in 1965 thought it ‘pretty well impossible now to identify the future leaders’.129  
British ideas about the succession were by no means static, as was exemplified by James Gichuru. He 
joined Legislative Council in 1961, stood in as KANU president until Kenyatta’s release from detention, 
became Minister of Finance in 1963 and Minister for Defence in 1969.130 Some Kenyans described him 
as Kenyatta’s choice for successor.131 In September 1963, MacDonald assessed him as a future 
‘compromise leader ... a good choice, because he is experienced, moderate and wise, except that his 
is too gentle and unself-assertive a nature to give really potent leadership’.132 In 1964, Stanley wrote 
that he was ‘one of the most reasonable Ministers’, a ‘moderate’, loyal to Kenyatta and a potential 
successor.133 Yet opinions about Gichuru became increasingly critical – ‘a chronic diabetic and 
alcoholic’134 – until by 1968 he was judged ‘a non-starter’ for the succession.135 By 1970, opinion had 
certainly hardened: ‘It is a pity that the Kenya Government continue to give important posts to 
Gichuru, as he makes trouble wherever he is’; although they recognised that much of the work of his 
Ministry was not done by him (often McKenzie was involved).136 Gichuru was no longer in the 1970s 
someone British representatives sought out or whose opinions they valued. It seems that as he lost 
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influence and was ruled out of succession possibilities, he became less useful to the British, and they 
felt less need to talk to him.  
By contrast, someone who became increasingly significant to British policy-makers and whom they 
sought to cultivate was Mwai Kibaki. Kibaki ‘Obtained First Class Honours (London University) in 
Economics, the first Kenya African to do so’, became a junior minister in 1963, Minister of Commerce 
and Industry in 1966 and Minister of Finance in 1969.137 The idea of a Kibaki succession was mooted 
in 1964 and, prophetically, ‘we should regard Kibaki as the next but one’ – though the author probably 
did not anticipate how long it would be until then.138 Diplomats viewed Kibaki positively, and his 
appointment as Minister of Finance in 1969 was ‘likely to be very much to our advantage’.139 EAD 
stated in 1970 that ‘because of his ability and relative youth, he is likely to be an important figure in 
Kenya for an indefinite time to come’.140 Establishing connections was a priority, and when Kibaki 
visited London for aid talks in April 1970 a meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer was 
encouraged ‘for the purpose of getting acquainted, rather than for any substantive discussions’.141 
This highlights the importance British decision-makers placed upon Kenya’s economy being well-
managed and a secure environment for investment, as well as on fostering personal political 
communication with those they thought likely to be influential in future. Kibaki was increasingly 
consulted as one of the key figures of the elite, viewed by 1972 as ‘the most capable, intelligent and 
potentially effective’.142  
The two most likely successors during the 1970s were Moi and Njoroge Mungai and their rivalry 
became a key feature of politics. Neither were categorised as simply ‘moderate’ or ‘radical’, but British 
officials still sometimes struggled to relate or assess them accurately. Moi had been a teacher before 
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being elected to Legislative Council in 1957 alongside Mboya and Odinga. He cofounded KADU then 
joined the government in 1964 as Minister for Home Affairs, becoming vice-president in 1967. Mungai 
was a doctor and claimed great familiarity with Kenyatta as his physician. He had been educated in 
Uganda, South Africa and America; he became Minister for Health and Housing in 1963, Defence 
Minister in 1964, and Foreign Minister in 1969.  
The position of vice-president was a crucial indication of the succession, particularly from 1968 when 
a constitutional change meant that the vice-president would automatically succeed for 90 days after 
the president’s death.143 British policy-makers speculated over the appointment after Odinga and 
Murumbi in 1967. Gichuru, Kibaki, Moi and Mungai were considered along with others, although the 
High Commissioner thought Ronald Ngala, former leader of KADU, most likely.144 Once appointed, 
Moi’s position as vice-president in no way lessoned the speculation among British officials, with others 
considered to varying levels of expectation.145 In a sign of the views of individuals held by British civil 
servants – and the speculation the succession caused amongst them – in 1967 directly after Moi 
became vice-president:  
off-the-course book makers in E. Africa department were offering the following odds: -  
5-1 Arap Moi 
6-1 Gichuru 
100-7 Kibaki 
100-8 Mungai 
20-1 The field 
The superintending Under Secretary was at that time inclined to think that the price for arap 
Moi was on the generous side, but clearly much depends on whether he continues to show 
improvement in training!146 
There was no certainty and a considerable amount of speculation. 
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Much of what was written immediately after Kenyatta’s death was designed to make Moi’s succession 
appear inevitable and unquestioned.147 Khapoya described Moi in 1979 as ‘really the front runner to 
succeed Kenyatta from the very beginning’.148 It is not clear when the ‘very beginning’ to which 
Khapoya refers is – Kenya’s independence? Moi’s appointment as vice-president? – but regardless, it 
is hard to support this assessment given the many others variously considered. In fact, Moi’s 
succession was by no means inevitable, nor always the British choice. Branch has recently described 
Moi as ‘the candidate of British influence’;149 but until the final years of his vice-presidency and initial 
presidency, Moi was not viewed particularly positively in Britain. The High Commissioner in 1967 took 
Moi’s succession ‘under consideration, but I think largely as a front man; his performance so far as 
number two does not suggest that he is of presidential timber’.150 Describing a constitutional debate 
in 1968, Edis remarked that ‘Moi added his clumsy weight to the Government position in a singularly 
ineffective speech’;151 whilst another diplomat noted that ‘[Moi’s] typical reaction seems to be 
clumsily veiled and heavy-handed threats’.152 They rarely viewed him positively. In 1970 he was 
considered ‘the likeliest of the compromise candidates should the President die soon, but it is difficult 
to see him lasting long’, and this was a fairly common British assessment of Moi until the mid-1970s.153 
Mungai too occasioned differing British views. He was dismissed as one of the ‘lightweights’ by Stanley 
in 1964,154 and as ‘shallow and rather unreliable’ by MacDonald in 1966.155 From 1967 Mungai was 
increasingly viewed as a potential successor, although not necessarily positively: Peck wrote that he 
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‘has charm, intelligence and ambition sometimes to the point of arrogance, but is at the same time 
venal, lazy and a light-weight’.156 Yet by August 1970, ‘The best hope for United Kingdom interests 
would seem to be a quick transmission post-Kenyatta to Mungai who appears from many points of 
view to have outstandingly the best presidential credentials’.157 The views of British diplomats 
fluctuated depending on personal preference and events in Kenya. 
Part of the reason why both Moi and Mungai were often viewed negatively by British observers was 
a lack of cultural affinity. Unlike with Njonjo and McKenzie, British policy-makers were not really 
comfortable with either. Perhaps tellingly, neither had been educated in Britain. The pro-British ethos 
of Kenya’s political leadership appeared potentially threatened. Both were described as possibly 
‘damaging to our interests as well as those of Kenya’ – neatly equating British interests in Kenya with 
Kenya’s interests.158 The British judged both through stereotypes and an assumed superiority. 
With Moi, British condescension was intellectual. Moi was viewed as having some serious weaknesses, 
described variously as ‘his precarious hold on the loyalties of his own people (the Kalenjin), his 
incompetence as an administrator, and his intellectual shortcomings’;159 as well as ‘his widely suspect 
judgement. His ineptitude, his apparent craving for popularity at any price, and his habit of acting 
without thinking through the consequence’.160 The Deputy High Commissioner in 1973 wrote that ‘In 
any serious recital of talents and qualifications Moi would scarcely rate a mention … he is very 
unsophisticated by world standards. In some ways he remains a primitive from the outback’.161 The 
condescending racism which permeates this language indicates the importance of cultural 
connections: British diplomats did not feel entirely at ease with Moi. Head of EAD in 1973 viewed Moi 
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as ‘a person with whom we should reckon extremely seriously. He may not be particularly bright, but 
lack of intelligence has hitherto not been much of an impediment for an African leader; it perhaps 
even increases his danger’.162 Despite seeing Moi as a more likely successor, the condescension 
continued, with a sense of African difference. In 1972, the High Commissioner suggested he ‘is perhaps 
shrewder than he appears (he does not appear shrewd at all)’.163 In fact, as his succession made clear, 
British policy-makers consistently underestimated Moi. 
By contrast, Mungai was measured against a series of unfavourable stereotypes of lustful, alcoholic, 
and despotic Africans. One critique was that ‘Mungai is said to have the makings of a dictatorial, 
ruthless and leftist leader’.164 In 1972 he was described as ‘something of a playboy … with a taste for 
beer and blondes’.165 At a meeting with a British diplomat in Brasilia in 1972, Mungai drank heavily 
and was explicitly critical of Britain, particularly over Rhodesia.166 The head of EAD was not that 
surprised, although ‘When he is sober (as he normally is), Mungai usually behaves quite sensibly, even 
helpfully’.167 High Commissioner Duff’s response was that:  
below the comparatively polished surface of the African politician, official and businessman 
there are forces and emotions of a kind which, in the world at large, have long since vanished 
below the horizon … It often takes little to spark off an emotional surge which can carry even 
the most literate East African back to a primitive level of thinking … But in dealing with them, 
in this period between independence and the time when, hopefully, they reach a genuine 
maturity of good sense and experience, what has to be considered is whether an individual is 
capable of checking his irrational impulses effectively enough for us to be able to do business 
with him. Fortunately, the senior Kenyan leaders are capable of disciplining themselves in this 
manner, and Dr Mungai generally does so168  
Coming from a high level civil servant, this overt racism shows that certain colonial attitudes had 
changed remarkably little. Mungai’s public criticism of Britain meant that at times he was especially 
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disfavoured: one member of BHC ‘had the fortune (or misfortune!) of experiencing for myself Dr 
Mungai at his euphoric worst … it was a fairly nauseating performance’.169 The British were very 
sensitive to any criticism of recent or current colonial policy – they had, after all, much to be sensitive 
about. In 1973, McKenzie suggested to Duff that ‘Mungai was mentally unbalanced’.170 This 
assessment was then directly echoed by Duff, clearly showing the importance of McKenzie in directly 
shaping his ideas.171 
Yet as the 1970s progressed and no alternative candidate emerged as British observers had expected, 
it became increasingly apparent that Moi would succeed. There were several key indicators of this. In 
the ‘major upset’ of the 1974 elections, Mungai lost his Dagoretti seat.172 Duff assessed that he lost 
‘because of his personal unpopularity and his arrogance’.173 Moi and Mungai were clearly rivals by this 
time, and Moi was getting better press coverage. This was a key moment in the succession struggle 
between Moi and Mungai, described by Branch as ‘a calamitous blow’ to Mungai’s chances, as 
successors had to be elected MPs to succeed constitutionally.174 Surprisingly, however, Duff thought 
that  
Paradoxically, Moi’s success in securing the defeat of his outstanding rival for the succession, 
Dr. Mungai, has weakened his position. While Mungai was there many leading Kikuyu 
preferred Moi. Now he has gone, at any rate for the time being, they see less need to support 
Moi and are in any case less inclined to do so because of the maladroitness he showed during 
the election175  
Duff’s remarks were seen ‘somewhat unexpectedly’ by EAD, and were not borne out by events, 
showing once again the inability to predict sometimes displayed by British policy-makers.176 This also 
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suggests, however, the unwillingness of British officials in 1974 to accept or back Moi – or indeed 
anyone else – as successor.  
The succession rivalry came to a head with the Change-the-Constitution movement in 1976. The 
constitutional provision for the vice-president to automatically succeed for 90 days meant that Moi 
was the ‘acknowledged front runner in the succession race’, and ‘an open challenge on Moi’s position’ 
aimed to change this.177 As Tamarkin argued, for those in the potential pool of successors, ‘the stakes 
… were so high that it was inconceivable that any group would give up before it was crystal clear that 
the cause was lost’.178 The movement was ended in October 1976 by Njonjo, with a statement ‘that it 
is a criminal offence for any person to compass, imagine, devise, or intend the death or the deposition 
of the president’.179 High Commissioner Fingland, however, thought that ‘it certainly should not be 
taken that we have heard the end of a challenge’ to Moi.180 There was still uncertainty amongst British 
officials, who had not ruled out the possibility of an alternative successor.181  
British commitment to Moi increased through the later 1970s, partly due to Moi’s support from other 
leading Kenyans whom the British had closer relationships with. By 1977: ‘The best hope for a stable 
succession and action to counter corruption and Kenya’s other problems lie with the group now 
associated with the Vice-President’.182 The ‘group’ around him was key, with Njonjo, Kibaki and 
McKenzie its most significant members. These men were already favoured by the British ‘and it was 
to be hoped that the support of these and other Kenyan leaders would guide him into sensible 
paths’.183 Supporting Moi therefore did not necessitate a change in those the British were already 
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talking to. Kibaki and Njonjo were expected to be able to influence a weaker Moi, encouraging the 
view that Moi would be the most beneficial successor for British interests.184 Yet still in 1978, Moi was 
described as ‘Cunning rather than clever, impatient and impulsive. Somewhat inarticulate … But a tall 
and rather imposing man who at least looks like a national leader’.185 That British policy-makers had 
to comment on his physical stature rather than attributes speaks volumes to the limits they still 
believed of him – despite that only months later he would become president. Kibaki and Njonjo’s 
support was crucial in Moi’s installation as president, and power immediately after the succession was 
spoken of as a ‘triumvirate of Moi, Njonjo and Kibaki’.186 
With both Moi and Mungai, the lack of cultural connection shaped British views. Both were described 
as ‘primitive’ – admittedly an extreme opinion – but the views of Moi as unintelligent and Mungai as 
a ‘playboy’ were a means of disassociating. The sense of underlying cultural difference and superiority 
often felt by British policy-makers was combined with their self-belief that they knew and understood 
these men, and also generally disliked them. Neither were favoured to succeed until it became clear 
that Moi would do so and – as they had in working with KANU and Kenyatta before independence – 
British officials then sought to side with and cultivate the emerging victor. 
 
Personal Forms of Policy-Making 
Kenyan politics was based on individuals. It was not institutional partly because the rules were not 
firmly defined. Although Kenya had inherited the structures of the colonial state, it was not quite clear 
how those would work under the very different circumstances of independence. The state was, as 
Hyden has argued, ‘an institution in formation’.187 Orwa in 1989 argued that ‘States are run by people. 
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It is their character which makes up the character of the state’;188 but in fact this was a very Kenyan 
analysis: the character of the British state was institutional. In these circumstances, Kenyan ‘policy-
makers’ were largely individuals pursuing personal advantage and enrichment; they sought power and 
wealth in what was, in retrospect, a remarkable free-for-all. A new elite was emerging, quickly rising 
to be very wealthy as their interests embraced both politics and economics.189 For the well positioned, 
as those discussed within this thesis mostly were, there was a ‘remarkable rise to wealth and 
prominence’.190 The factionalism in Kenyan politics both emerged from and contributed to this 
situation as individuals sought advantage over rivals. Business rivalries played into political contests, 
particularly between the two succession groups of the 1970s, described by Branch as ‘rival investment 
clubs’ as well as competitors for the presidency.191 This personal rather than institutional form of 
policy-making is further highlighted by the limited reference, even in what little literature exists on 
Kenyan foreign policy, to how this was made.192 Foreign policy was not conducted through a 
regularised set of norms and practices, or with unified ideas of a national interest, but rather on the 
basis of personal and factional interests. 
That Kenyatta preferred to work through individuals rather than institutions was clearly displayed in 
Kenyan interaction with British civil servants, diplomats and politicians. Kenya quickly established a 
High Commission in London, one of only eight until 1968.193 The first Kenyan High Commissioner was 
Josephat Karanja, who left the position in 1970 when ‘In length of service he is the senior African High 
Commissioner in London’, with a farewell call on the Prime Minister recommended.194 His successor 
was Ng’ethe Njoroge, brother of Mungai, of whom Counsellor James Arthur in BHC commented that 
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he ‘was friendly enough in his relations with us, although he never cut a very impressive figure, and I 
am afraid my first impression on hearing of the appointment was one of disappointment that the 
Kenyans should not have proposed someone of greater stature’.195 That a more prominent figure was 
not appointed, however, was a sign of how minimally Kenya’s High Commission in London was used. 
Njoroge left in 1979 following the presidential succession, replaced by Shadrack Kimalel who again 
had early meetings with the FCO.196  
However, the Kenyan High Commission in London was not the site of most Anglo-Kenyan interaction. 
Rather, most communication occurred either with BHC or through Kenyan ministers and 
intermediaries being sent to Britain and meeting British ministers – Kenyatta’s favoured route of 
policy-making. This was not always the most direct for the British, but when an alternative method 
was suggested, McKenzie argued: 
this was simply not how President Kenyatta worked. He recognised how laborious the 
procedure would seem to us, but said that the President did not trust the Kenyan diplomatic 
machine or the High Commission in London; that he greatly valued the direct contact with 
British Ministers which he felt was available to him; and that in a matter of this importance, 
given that he could not leave Kenya himself, he would only operate by sending one of his 
senior Ministers with a personal message197  
Of course, in making this argument, McKenzie was reinforcing his own importance as one of those 
sent by Kenyatta to Britain. But it is clear that Kenyatta chose not to work through his High Commission 
in London, and this was shown in the lack of contact between successive Kenyan High Commissioners 
and British ministers – especially when compared to BHC which had extensive contacts with Kenyan 
leaders.198 Kenyatta’s view of his High Commission was made clear before a 1970 prime ministerial 
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meeting, when the High Commission was not informed of the meeting, nor that Njonjo was in the 
UK.199  
Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also not the most significant site of policy-making. High 
Commissioner Peck recalled that ‘any substantial matters between us and the Kenyan government 
passed through other channels’.200 Those appointed as Kenya’s Minister for Foreign Affairs included 
some prominent figures but also several who were less prominent or favoured, such as Clement 
Argwings-Kodhek, a figure well outside Kenya’s inner circle of power who died in a road accident in 
1969 – one of Kenya’s mysterious political deaths.201 That someone outside Kenyatta’s elite was given 
this position highlights that it was not of foremost significance. Unlike on the British side, civil servants 
were not the main ‘policy-makers’ nor route of contact with the British. Despite the continuing 
strength of Kenya’s Provincial Administration,202 most British contact was with politicians rather than 
civil servants. This was not exclusive, and British diplomats did have contact with certain Kenyan civil 
servants. Particularly significant was Jeremiah Kiereini, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
Defence from 1970, who had ‘good relations with the High Commission and seems well disposed 
towards Britain’.203 He had contact with BHC and was often present at ministerial meetings in both 
Britain and Kenya.204 This was no doubt partly because Minister of Defence Gichuru was by this stage 
not providing effective leadership, and so Kiereini was the British choice of contact.205 But whilst the 
British kept track of Permanent Secretaries, who would frequently accompany ministers to formal 
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meetings, they rarely sought them out, and rather worked through individual, personal, political 
contacts.  
Establishing relationships was a key role of British diplomats posted to Nairobi. MacDonald argued 
that ‘friendly and trustful personal relations between the Ministers of different countries are at least 
half the battle in the struggle for peaceful and constructive coexistence’.206 McKenzie in 1970 raised 
the importance of personal connections, stating that this was not always recognised: ‘This is 
particularly true of FCO personnel, many of whom have not yet learned the importance of locating 
and contacting the 5 or 6 people in each country who now really run the show’.207 British policy-makers 
certainly looked to identify these key individuals, and were keen to locate those who might be 
influential in future, looking for ‘ways in which we can cultivate the next generation of leading 
politicians’, with visits to London a key part of this.208 However, High Commissioner Norris’ ‘First 
Impressions’ despatch in May 1969 took note of some of the problems of contact:  
In order to get things done in our day-to-day business we depend to an increasing extent on 
maintaining close relations with the two effective members of the “inner circle”, Njonjo and 
McKenzie, and with the Vice-President. But tensions and jealousies inside the Cabinet are such 
that if we are to preserve our relations with these three then we are seriously inhibited from 
cultivating relations with some other members of the Government who may be important in 
the future, particularly Tom Mboya. And we are virtually unable to make any overt contacts 
with the declared Opposition, the K.P.U., under Odinga. This is a problem which concerns me 
and to which I confess I see no easy answer209 
The implication was that a different approach was necessary, with a degree of implied criticism of 
current methods. However, despite the potential benefits of closer relations with the opposition and 
future leaders, these were not thought worth jeopardising current relationships for.  
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Personal contact was particularly significant because many Kenyans believed Britain to have influence, 
and thus sought to use contact for their benefit. One example was Josiah Mwangi (‘JM’) Kariuki, a 
‘radical’ and vocal critic of Kenyatta’s. Kariuki had been detained during the Emergency, was elected 
in 1963 and had various roles in government, becoming Assistant Minister for Tourism and Wildlife in 
1969.210 In 1964, he was described by one British diplomat as ‘unpleasantly anti-White, although 
perhaps not strongly pro-Communist’.211 He was increasingly critical of Kenyatta during the 1970s as 
the language of ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ was supplanted and mixed with one of loyalty.212 British 
diplomats indicated their disfavour: ‘if Mr. Kariuki ever achieved a position of supreme power, he 
would be a good candidate for the disease so common to African politicians – megalomania’.213 This 
does not mean however that Kariuki did not seek contact. In 1970, a member of BHC had lunch with 
an aid to Kariuki, who told him: 
Kariuki feels that the High Commission is unfriendly towards him and is deliberately ignoring 
him ... He wished however to make it clear that he is not unfriendly towards the British or 
against British business interests (despite his speeches) and that he would like to see more of 
the High Commission214  
Some Kenyan politicians, including those self-described as ‘radical’, saw dialogue with the British as 
potentially beneficial. A member of BHC spoke to Kariuki at a party who ‘said that the British had a 
great deal of influence in Kenya and that we probably had much more influence than we thought we 
had’.215 Robert Purcell in EAD suggested that Kariuki ‘has further to go and is worth doing perhaps 
rather more to cultivate’.216 Despite his ‘radical’ tag, there was a desire to get to know and ‘cultivate’ 
relations from both sides.  
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This was by no means the only occasion when leading Kenyans believed British influence to be 
extensive and beneficial. In 1973, Deputy High Commissioner Allinson met Fitz de Souza (former Asian 
MP until 1969), who argued that any 
future leader of Kenya needed two things: Kikuyu support and the support, tacit or active, of 
HMG [Her Majesty’s Government]. Moi, Mungai and all other potential leaders were aware of 
this. British economic and military support was essential for Kenya and no leader thought he 
could survive without it217 
De Souza clearly indicated the strength of his belief that Britain had a significant role in Kenya. 
Kenyatta too was believed to value this relationship particularly highly, so that ‘[t]hose who know him 
well say that the President will ultimately trust two countries only: Britain and Israel; and that nothing 
will persuade him to take a course of action which will seriously harm Kenya’s relations with either’.218 
These sources may, of course, have been telling the British what they wanted to hear, but it does seem 
that many Kenyans believed Britain to have a significant role in Kenya, and wanted to use this to their 
advantage. Moi’s successful use of this after his succession will be discussed in a later chapter.  
The British were not the only diplomats in Kenya. The Americans, Israelis and Soviet Union in particular 
sought influence. But British diplomats typically viewed their own contacts and knowledge as superior. 
In 1969 the High Commissioner recorded that BHC ‘enjoys a privileged access to members of the ruling 
inner circle which is the envy of other Missions’.219 When in 1967 a US diplomat suggested MacDonald 
should ‘try to persuade’ Kenyatta to resign,220 head of EAD saw ‘so many dangers … certainly in the 
notion that we should intervene actively to this end – that not only should we remain inactive on this 
but should head off our American colleagues from pursuit of it’.221 Clearly, British civil servants viewed 
themselves as more knowledgeable, and with more accurate understanding and contacts, than others. 
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One diplomat recalled that ‘it was very much the Americans who were the big cheeses, except in Kenya 
where I'm happy to say at least up until my time we maintained a strong position’.222 
 
Conclusion 
British relationships with Kenya were shaped by the emerging system of Kenyan neo-patrimonialism 
which favoured individuals and personal policy-making. This involved a small group being brought into 
decisions and an active distrust of formal institutions rather than a wider participatory style of 
governing. British policy-makers encouraged and strengthened this personalisation, relying on 
individual contacts in their pursuit of British interests – in ways which also served the interests of 
Kenya’s emerging elite. British diplomats sought links with those Kenyans they perceived to be 
influential and favoured certain individuals, prepared to collaborate with them in informal exchanges 
and secret deals – as later chapters will detail. Despite Kenya’s more formal institutions – often ones 
established under British colonialism – and that British personnel operated within an institutional 
system at home, they did not focus upon this in Kenya. Private, personal relationships were 
established and privileged. This could lead to misunderstandings or misrepresentations, but it also 
enabled British policy-makers to feel invested in Kenya and able to exert influence. 
Crucially, Kenyatta and his elite came to view their interests as complementary to those of Britain. As 
Lonsdale has argued, Kenyatta ‘believed in order, in stability, as a condition of progress’, and these 
were aims shared by British officials.223 For certain leading Kenyans, such as McKenzie and Njonjo, 
their access to the British appeared useful.  Those who felt excluded from these ties, such as Kariuki, 
regarded them as powerful and worth seeking. Kenyans in a variety of roles – civil servants, soldiers, 
politicians, businessmen – were seeking to maintain these connections. Britain was favoured by many 
within Kenya’s elite as British connections could prove personally beneficial in the uncertain world of 
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Kenyan politics and economics, in which individuals sought their own advantage. British decision-
makers would clearly have tried to maintain relations whatever the successor state, but were able to 
have a close relationship only because those they sought to work with were already committed to 
continuity in terms of the culture and practices of government, which made close relationships with 
Britain seem natural. 
One of the key determinants shaping British assessments was their sense of assumed superiority and, 
at times, openly racist attitudes. The end of colonial rule did not mean a fundamental reshaping of 
these underlying British attitudes, and ideas about ‘Africa’ and ‘Kenyans’ entailed a series of 
stereotypes and naturalisations. British personnel had closest links with those who accepted this sense 
of superiority and shared a cultural affinity. Thus Mboya, who rejected these ideas, was viewed with 
some uncertainty rather than entirely favoured, whilst Njonjo was seen to be more significant than 
Moi because he had assimilated British culture more thoroughly. British policy-makers focused on a 
culturally accessible elite, with Kenyatta, McKenzie and Njonjo central to this. 
It is questionable how much British officials ever really ‘knew’ about Kenya and the Kenyans with 
whom they worked. British diplomats frequently approached Kenyans with a series of labels which 
were not as revealing as they supposed. The language of ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’, ideas about the 
succession, ethnicity, and cultural preferences encouraged contacts with certain Kenyans rather than 
others. It is clear that British diplomats thought they understood the Kenyans and felt able to make 
judgements which accurately assessed them. This British self-belief was a potent diplomatic weapon 
as it gave them confidence in their interactions. But it was also a weakness: their preference for the 
most familiar members of the elite meant that they simply did not know some things about Kenya and 
left them potentially open to manipulation by those they found legible. British diplomats were, by 
necessity, reliant on what they were told, and this depended both on who they talked to and what 
those Kenyans wanted to share. Those Kenyans the British talked most extensively and frankly to were 
those most likely to be listened to and supported, whose views were most likely to be taken into 
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account, and who were most able to make demands. Thus, by affording greater access to some, British 
diplomats were more inclined to talk to them further. But whilst the British had influence, they were 
far from being in control. 
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Chapter Three: 1960-1964  
 
‘even though we may differ about Kenya, we care more about Kenya than any other Colonial 
Territory’ 
Iain Macleod, House of Commons Debate, 25 July 19611 
 
The early 1960s saw rapid change in British visions of Kenya’s future, with policy changing very swiftly 
as a result. There was no consistent British plan, and policies were adapted and altered by 
circumstances and individuals – both British and Kenyan. The negotiations which characterised post-
colonial interaction and influence were already a feature of the independence process. This has not 
always been recognised: Holland argued that ‘late-colonial Kenya is a classical example of how the 
imperial power used “constitutional progress” ruthlessly to bait nationalist leaders into playing the 
decolonization game by western rules’;2 whilst Kirkman argued that the British government were 
‘bludgeoned’ by the Kenyans into setting a date for independence.3 In fact, neither of these 
interpretations is quite accurate. Rather, this was a process of compromise and negotiation, in which 
each party sought to influence the other to their advantage, but neither exercised such control as 
Holland or Kirkman suggested. 
British policy was sustained by a desire to maintain British influence; yet policy-makers’ expectations 
and hopes were repeatedly revised down in recognition that what they had previously hoped for was 
no longer obtainable. These were not ‘far-seeing statesmen’ with a coherent plan, but rather civil 
servants and politicians reacting pragmatically to events.4 Decolonisation occurred as ‘a consequence 
                                                          
1 Iain Macleod, HC Deb 25 July 1961 vol 645 c260. 
2 R. F. Holland, European Decolonization 1918-1981: An Introductory Survey (Basingstoke, 1985), pp. 239-40. 
3 W. P. Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire: A Critique of British Colonial Policy 1956-1966 (London, 1966), p. 67.  
4 Miles Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences of International Relations 
(Princeton, 1984), p. 13.  
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of a new climate of opinion rather than of a comprehensive cardinal plan’.5 In seeking a peaceful, 
successful ‘transfer of power’, decision-makers proved flexible and aware of the need to avoid 
endangering the position of the Kenyans they supported. For the emerging Kenyan elite, there was 
some common cultural ground with the British, but far more importantly, they seized opportunities 
to entrench their own positions, and cooperation with the British became a way to do this. As Branch 
has recently highlighted, Britain ‘was able to exert some sway in the region only because of a 
confluence of interests with the Kenyan Government’.6 Rather than a set of unchanging policy goals, 
the choices of British decision-makers were based on their ideas of the possible, with these ideas 
shaped by negotiation with Kenyans. Crucially, they were prepared to compromise. 
This chapter will focus on the years from 1960 through Kenya’s independence on 12 December 1963 
and the first year of independence, with Kenya becoming a presidential republic at the end of 1964. 
These years were when key decisions were taken, in both Britain and Kenya, about what an 
independent Kenya would look like, and what the relationship between the two countries would be. 
The existing literature on Kenya’s decolonisation is extensive and this chapter will not repeat this, nor 
focus on the Lancaster House conferences in January 1960, February 1962, and September 1963;7  
rather it will focus upon some of the more informal negotiations leading to independence.  
 
Ideas in 1960 
One individual with particular influence on 1950s British government thinking was Michael Blundell. 
Blundell moved to Kenya in 1925, was elected to Legislative Council in 1947, and became Minister for 
Agriculture in 1955. He resigned to form the New Kenya Group (NKG) in 1959 (with McKenzie also 
                                                          
5 Dan Horowitz, ‘Attitudes of British Conservatives towards Decolonization in Africa’, African Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 
274 (1970), p. 18. 
6 Daniel Branch, ‘Violence, decolonisation and the Cold War in Kenya's north-eastern province, 1963–1978’, 
Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2014), p. 2. 
7 On the Lancaster House conferences see Robert M. Maxon, Britain and Kenya’s Constitutions 1950-1960 
(Amherst, 2011), pp. 307-39; Robert M. Maxon, Kenya’s Independence Constitution: Constitution-Making and 
End of Empire (Lanham, 2011). 
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among its members). The group aimed at ‘the progressive extension of democracy in accordance with 
the capacity of the people’.8 This was very much in line with 1950s British thinking on multiracialism, 
and in 1959 NKG argued against a common electoral roll and in favour of continued British control.9 
Blundell had extensive contacts with British officials, and was viewed as significant by all Colonial 
Secretaries.10 Alan Lennox-Boyd described him as ‘the outstanding figure among the Europeans’;11 
whilst Macleod viewed the creation of NKG as ‘in 1959 the most important and hopeful thing that had 
happened in Kenya’.12 Kahler has argued that NKG held ‘a disproportionate influence’ on British policy 
because of its connections with Conservative MPs.13 Many British politicians had business interests 
and personal friendships with Kenya’s Europeans, leading to parliamentary interest in Kenya and 
lobbying by the Europeans.14 Blundell personified hopes of a ‘liberal’ multiracial future and had the 
kind of extensive contacts with British policy-makers that Kenyan nationalists at this time often lacked.  
The position of Blundell and NKG was particularly significant during the 1960 Lancaster House 
conference, at which a common roll was introduced with the idea of majority rule. The Europeans 
were a key British concern, and London would not abandon them – though what this meant shifted 
significantly. Ensuring Blundell’s support for Macleod’s proposals was crucial, and Macleod urged 
Home Secretary Rab Butler and Macmillan to meet Blundell.15 Clearly, Macleod aimed to use high-
level access to bolster Blundell and encourage him towards acceptance of the terms of the conference, 
which he did. Blundell was only ever leader of a certain section of the Europeans, and when he 
                                                          
8 ‘The Challenge of New Kenya: A policy statement for the New Kenya Party’, November 1959, TNA FCO 
141/6661/15. 
9 Statement by New Kenya Group, 1959, TNA FCO 141/6661/12. 
10 Lyttelton, Memoirs, p. 399, Philip Murphy, Alan Lennox-Boyd: A Biography (London, 1999), p. 226-7; Maudling, 
Memoirs, p. 93; Robert Shepherd, Iain Macleod (London, 1994), pp. 179-85; Michael Blundell, So Rough a Wind: 
The Kenya Memoirs of Sir Michael Blundell (London, 1964), pp. 185-7. Blundell also had extensive contact with 
colonial administrators; see Charles Chenevix Trench, Men who Ruled Kenya: The Kenya Administration, 1892-
1963 (London, 1993), p. 225. 
11 Alan Lennox-Boyd to Prime Minister, 1 December 1954, TNA PREM 11/2882/35. 
12 Record of a meeting held in Parliament Buildings at Nairobi, 14 December 1959, TNA FCO 141/6661/21. 
13 Kahler, Domestic Consequences, p. 291. 
14 Murphy, Party Politics, p. 86. 
15 Iain Macleod to R.A. Butler, 15 January 1960, TNA PREM 11/2882/21; Iain Macleod to Prime Minister, 16 
February 1960, TNA PREM 11/3031. 
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returned to Kenya after Lancaster House, thirty pieces of silver were thrown at him.16 Among other 
Europeans in Kenya, the reaction to the 1960 proposals was ‘alarm and despondency’.17 But Blundell’s 
key importance for British policy-makers was that he would deliver some support from Kenya’s 
European population. Later in 1960 NKG had accepted that ‘Independence for Kenya is certain and we 
must plan to make it a success’.18  
 
Kenyatta’s release 
Kenyatta’s release from detention was the crucial issue of Kenyan politics as both KANU and KADU 
pressed for this. British decision-makers were not always united on how to deal with this. The debate 
which led up to Governor Patrick Renison’s notorious description of Kenyatta as a ‘leader to darkness 
and death’ suggests this struggle over policy.19 In December 1960 Renison wrote an ‘appreciation’ of 
Kenyatta, describing that ‘some say [he has] hypnotic powers; likely to dominate all Kenya politicians. 
Arrogant and unrepentant’.20 Responses from the CO varied – including criticism of Renison’s 
approach – but mostly with agreement that Kenyatta should not be released.21 John Martin in CO, 
however, argued that ‘the decision should be taken in the light of the advice of the new Ministers 
following the election and that, if their advice is in favour of immediate release, it should be 
accepted’.22 This minority view was not acted upon. But Renison and Macleod agreed that the best 
interests of the British government had changed: they planned to move Kenyatta from Lodwar to 
                                                          
16 Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization, pp. 67-75; Bennett and Rosberg, Kenyatta Election, p. 3. 
17 Telegram no. 130, Acting Governor to Secretary of State, 2 February 1960, TNA CO 822/2356/11. 
18 The New Kenya Group Newsletter, 17 October 1960, KNA MSS/115/7/1/21. 
19 Statement by His Excellency the Governor, ‘Jomo Kenyatta’, 9 May 1960, TNA FCO 141/6769/66. See also 
telegram no. 427, P. Renison to the Colonial Secretary, 30 April 1960, TNA PREM 11/3413/133; telegram no. 73, 
Colonial Secretary to P. Renison, 29 April 1960, TNA PREM 11/3413/135; telegram no. 75, Colonial Secretary to 
P. Renison, 1 May 1960, TNA PREM 11/3413/134. 
20 Patrick Renison, ‘Jomo Kenyatta. Appreciation of action to be taken’, December 1960, TNA CO 822/1910/139. 
21 F.D. Webber to Monson, 29 December 1960, TNA CO 822/1910; W.B.L. Monson to John Martin, 29 December 
1960, TNA CO 822/1910. 
22 John Martin to Secretary of State, 29 December 1960, TNA CO 822/1910. 
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Maralal where he could be visited ‘so that one may embark on a process of debunking the legend of 
Kenyatta’.23 
The British government lacked an accurate appreciation of what Kenyatta would be like once released.  
Special Branch Nairobi produced a paper on ‘The Kenyatta Cult’, which argued that ‘until the legend 
has been exploded and the shortcomings of the man exposed, the necessary disillusionment cannot 
set in’;24 Renison still viewed him as a ‘security risk’.25 British policy-makers were uncertain as to 
Kenyatta’s intentions: Eric Griffith-Jones in Nairobi ‘felt that he could not be reliably assessed while 
still under restriction and anxious to secure his release by portraying himself as a non-violent 
moderate’.26 He did not believe Kenyatta was a ‘non-violent moderate’ and still anticipated that he 
could potentially encourage further violence. Even the official who had suggested his release believed 
‘It is too much to hope for a Nyerere to emerge from Lodwar’.27 As this makes explicit, at this time the 
CO had high hopes about Tanganyika’s independence and leadership, and much less positive 
expectations about Kenya. Nyerere was described as ‘possess[ing] a degree of common sense unusual 
in an African nationalist’.28 The subsequent close post-colonial relationship with Kenyatta was not 
predicted. 
The issue of Kenyatta’s release was crucial to the negotiations following ‘the Kenyatta election’ of 
February 1961.29 KANU won 67.4 per cent of the vote and nineteen seats to KADU’s 16.4 per cent and 
eleven.30 Both parties resisted forming a government before Kenyatta’s release, and the Governor 
sought to compromise and negotiate. Renison met KADU President Ngala and Vice-President Masinde 
                                                          
23 Iain Macleod to Prime Minister, ‘Jomo Kenyatta’, 9 January 1961, TNA PREM 11/3413/87. 
24 Special Branch Headquarters, Nairobi, ‘The Kenyatta Cult: Its impact on the African Masses’, December 1960, 
TNA FCO 141/5870. 
25 Draft Statement, January 1961, TNA PREM 11/3413/89-91. 
26 Telegram no. 163, Griffith Jones to Colonial Secretary, 15 June 1961, TNA PREM 11/3413/25. 
27 John Martin to Secretary of State, 29 December 1960, TNA CO 822/1910. 
28 Special Branch Headquarters, Nairobi, ‘The Proposal for an East African Federation and Reaction to it in Kenya’, 
25 February 1961, TNA FCO 141/7075/12. 
29 Bennett and Rosberg, Kenyatta Election. 
30 Ibid., p. 185. 
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Muliro and KANU’s Gichuru and Mboya on 4 March and patronisingly reported that ‘They were all in 
a very responsible mood’.31 Renison hoped for a government involving both parties and initially ‘it 
looked possible, even likely, that moderate leaders in KANU and KADU would get together in forming 
[a] Government’.32 The influential idea of ‘moderates’ encouraged hopes of splitting KANU, and 
Mboya and Gichuru were the KANU leaders Renison hoped to attract in ‘a Government of moderates, 
rather than KANU tough boys’.33 Very quickly, however, this idea of compromise broke down and 
KANU refused to join the government whilst Kenyatta remained in detention.34  
Negotiations dragged on over the following month, with KADU increasingly likely to compromise. The 
role of NKG was again significant in ‘acting as very able go-betweens’, and ‘first class allies’; McKenzie 
was already an intermediary.35 Ngala still argued for Kenyatta’s release,36 but British policy-makers 
endeavoured to find a ‘formula’ so that KADU would join a government.37 Ngala met Macleod in 
London, who reported that ‘We seem with luck to be quite near forming a Government with KADU 
participation. This would be a great prize and we must put all effort and pressure into succeeding’.38 
British objectives had shifted and expectations decreased; Macleod now argued that ‘an alliance of 
K.A.D.U. with the moderate Europeans in a new Government is in Kenya’s long term interest’.39 The 
British were not simply in control, and as certain possibilities were ruled out, what was possible 
became seen as most beneficial. A government of KADU and NKG was formed.  
                                                          
31 Telegram no. 6, Renison to Colonial Secretary, 4 March 1961, TNA CO 822/1911/214. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Telegram no. 53, P. Renison to Colonial Secretary, 14 April 1961, TNA PREM 11/3413/52. 
34 Telegram no. 9, Renison to Colonial Secretary, 5 March 1961, TNA CO 822/1911/215. 
35 Telegram no. 6, Renison to Colonial Secretary, 4 March 1961, TNA CO 822/1911/214; telegram no. 53, P. 
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36 See R.G. Ngala, Memorandum to the Secretary of State, ‘Case for the Immediate Release of Mr. Kenyatta’, 11 
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37 Iain Macleod to Prime Minister, 14 April 1961, TNA PREM 11/3413/49. 
38 Colonial Secretary to Coutts, 10 April 1961, TNA CO 822/1911/224. 
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Kenyatta’s release was discussed at the highest level of British government in a way that few later 
Kenyan issues were.40 Many MPs felt strongly and offered vocal support or opposition. In 1961 views 
varied from Fenner Brockway’s insistence that ‘the release of this man is absolutely essential’, to 
Biggs-Davison’s ‘outrageous and utterly degrading’.41 Kenyatta’s release was problematic for Macleod 
himself, subjected to a ‘character assassination’ as ‘too clever by half’ by Lord Salisbury.42 Indeed, Low 
has argued that his actions as Colonial Secretary ‘probably cost Macleod the leadership’.43 Historians 
have been divided over Macleod’s attitude towards Kenyatta’s release. Heinlein argued that Macleod 
would have liked to release Kenyatta in 1960,44 and Goldsworthy suggested that other issues delayed 
his release.45 More convincingly, Murphy argues that ‘Macleod was in no hurry to release Kenyatta’ at 
the start of 1961; and that Kenyatta ‘represented a powerful bargaining counter for the British in their 
negotiations with Kenyan political parties, one which they were not inclined to surrender at too early 
a stage’.46 But whilst Kenyatta’s release did become a useful bargaining tool, it is wrong to think that 
this had always been the British intention: Kirkman wrote of ‘Kenyatta blindness’,47 and as Holland 
makes clear, release was a ‘gamble’.48 British officials came to realise that they could not direct Kenyan 
politics away from Kenyatta as they had hoped, and the goal changed instead to finding means of 
accommodation. Kenyatta’s release was announced on 1 August.49  
                                                          
40 See for examples: HC Deb 8 November 1960 vol 629 cc823-4; HC Deb 8 December 1960 vol 631 cc1429-30; 
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British policy-makers remained uncertain about Kenya’s future. In a House of Commons debate in July 
1961, Macleod argued that ‘even though we may differ about Kenya, we care more about Kenya than 
any other Colonial Territory’ – citing the European population as the reason for this.50 As Lewis has 
argued, ‘Kenya was the most high-profile and controversial of Britain’s African colonies’.51 But in 
January 1962, a draft CO memorandum argued that:  
The best that we can hope to achieve is the orderly transfer of power to a securely-based and 
African-dominated Government which is genuinely anxious to see Kenya develop as a modern 
state, to avoid chaos, civil war and a relapse into tribalism, and genuinely prepared to respect 
the rights of individuals of any race. Nor is it likely that we shall see in Kenya a Government 
which is actively pro-Western in its foreign policy. The most we can expect is one which is not 
committed to either side in the East/West struggle and one which, because it is reasonably 
stable, does not offer too many opportunities for exploitation and penetration by the 
Communist powers52  
A briefing for the prime minister stated that ‘an independent Kenya presents the least hopeful 
prospect of all the Colonial territories to which we have given or contemplated giving independence’.53  
Another problem the British government faced was their own representation in Kenya by Renison. 
KANU members travelled to London in November 1961 for several meetings with Colonial Secretary 
Maudling to argue that they should be brought into government. They argued against KADU and NKG, 
but particularly against Renison, whom they accused of partiality: ‘To the Governor, KANU was rotten 
but KADU consisted of angels whom Britain must protect at any cost’.54 Maudling ‘wished to make it 
clear that the Governor had his full confidence and that he could not accept the criticism of his lack of 
impartiality’.55 However, it does seem that Renison was not quite as impartial as Maudling suggested: 
Renison argued that KANU’s ‘quarrelling, petty corruption and lack of discipline and control together 
with Kikuyu background violence, intimidation, subversed [sic] and Mau Mau association has 
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frightened moderate thinkers’.56 His preference for KADU was apparent and he seemed particularly 
reluctant to reassess Kenyatta. In extensive comments on a draft cabinet paper, Renison argued that 
Mboya felt ‘growing disillusionment as to Kenyatta’s competence and trustworthiness’ and believed 
Kenyatta to be ‘incompetent and indolent’; even going so far as to argue that Mboya and KADU were 
unlikely to want Kenyatta as a minister, but ‘would possibly be prepared, therefore, to accept Kenyatta 
in the nominal position of an elder statesman but with no real substance of power’.57 This surely 
reflected, to at least some degree, Renison’s own views, and offered a serious misreading of the tenor 
of Kenyan politics and Kenyatta. Throughout 1962, other British policy-makers in London and Nairobi 
came to share frustration about Renison; as the head of EAD tactfully put it, he was ‘increasingly afraid 
that Sir Patrick Renison’s qualities do not match up to the needs of this particular Governorship’.58 
Poynton argued more bluntly that ‘he hasn’t really the suppleness of mind to cope with the highly 
charged political situation’.59 Renison was informed of his removal, and countered, clearly hurt, that 
he had ‘very good relationships’ with ‘African leaders’.60 But he had shown himself unable to 
compromise or negotiate. 
Renison’s replacement by MacDonald led to changes in British thinking, clearly showing the 
importance of individuals in shaping ideas. MacDonald made much quicker progress on constitutional 
drafting; and while the British government had previously planned ‘to ensure KANU’s defeat’, he 
favoured KANU success in the May 1963 elections as ‘the best result for Kenya’.61 By September 1963 
MacDonald viewed Kenyatta as ‘the effective leader of the Government, the arbitrator in all official or 
personal Cabinet disagreements, and the supreme maker and pronouncer of policy’.62 As Parsons has 
argued, ‘only Kenyatta had the influence and authority to create the pro-Western post-colonial Kenya 
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that Britain sought’.63 The difference between the two Governors – and the difference Renison’s 
replacement made – was striking.64  Kenyatta and MacDonald could see their mutual interests and 
MacDonald recognised that Kenyatta could provide what British policy-makers desired in a leader: an 
influential partner who could dominate African politics.  
 
Mboya’s June 1963 Visit 
In June 1963 several key issues came together in a clear example of the mutually-beneficial 
negotiation between British and Kenyan decision-makers. Mboya visited London to meet Colonial 
Secretary Sandys to demand that dates be set for Kenya’s final constitutional conference and 
independence. As Butler has argued, the date of independence was ‘a key bargaining counter’, and 
this demand had previously been rejected.65 MacDonald recommended Sandys meet Mboya ‘as 
damage could be done if Kenya Ministers should think they have a grievance on this matter’.66  
Mboya explicitly linked a date for independence to the prospect of an East African Federation. This 
had been suggested multiple times previously, particularly when Nyerere had considered delaying 
Tanganyika’s independence for federation.67 Special Branch Nairobi argued in 1961 that ‘Many 
politicians in Kenya will use the proposal as a lever to secure an earlier transfer of power than had 
hitherto been envisaged’.68 This was indeed the tactic Mboya was now following. Mboya was one of 
the leading proponents of federation in Kenya, perhaps because of ideas reported after his discussions 
with Nyerere in 1961 that they envisaged Kenyatta as a ‘figurehead’ federal president, with Mboya as 
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Kenya’s prime minister.69 On 5 June 1963, East African leaders ‘announced their determination to 
establish an East African Federation before the end of 1963’.70 MacDonald was informed that they 
‘hoped that Federation can come into being either on the day of Kenya’s independence, or else “within 
about a week or so” afterwards’.71 
British policy-makers were positive about the prospect of a federation, which MacDonald described 
as ‘a dream answer to many of our Kenya problems’.72 But they recognised that ‘Open advocacy on 
our part would probably be counter-productive’.73 Sandys asked ‘is this declaration just a device to 
bring pressure upon us to give Kenya early independence?’,74 but MacDonald believed it was genuine: 
‘No doubt there is an element in all this of putting pressure on us to speed up Kenya’s independence; 
but in my judgement African leaders’ zeal to achieve federation at or about the same time is equally 
sincere and serious’.75  
Mboya was accompanied by Murumbi, Mbiyu Koinange (Minister of State for Pan-African Affairs), and 
Njonjo. This was one of the first signs of Njonjo’s influence; not yet appointed Attorney-General, he 
was to be so only weeks later by MacDonald, to the dislike of some in CO.76 The delegation met Sandys, 
who offered an October conference and ‘emphasised that [the] British Government had no wish to 
delay independence any longer than was absolutely necessary to ensure [an] orderly and honourable 
transfer … he would like to work to a 1963 date’.77 Sandys had accepted the arguments in favour of 
Kenyan independence and federation by the end of 1963.  
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As well as using the federation to encourage British officials towards setting a date, Mboya also had 
something to offer the British at these meetings. The British had built the Kahawa base in Kenya in the 
later 1950s and thus, as Nissimi argued, ‘precisely when the prospect of losing Kenya became 
daunting, its strategic importance increased’.78 British planners hoped for continued access – this was 
part of a rationale for supporting KADU – until it became abundantly clear that no Kenyan leaders 
would accept this.79 Military aspirations were downgraded but not forgotten. British officials hoped 
for a yearlong withdrawal, and Mboya in June 1963 thought this feasible, but  
emphasised that the British Government’s agreement to a date for Kenya’s independence had 
a direct bearing on the attitude of the Kenya Government to the period during which facilities 
might continue to be used after independence80  
A draft communique by the CO set out in vague terms what had been discussed: support for a 
federation with Kenya’s independence ‘which it is hoped to effect by the end of the year’, a conference 
in October, and that withdrawal from the base would take some time and ‘be a matter for 
discussion’.81 Mboya and his delegation refused to ‘accept assurance on purely private basis’ of a 
December date,82 and, in another negotiating tactic, argued that not having a set date would ‘put 
them to a great disadvantage in negotiating Federation with Tanganyika and Uganda’.83 Webber and 
Monson, the CO officials who worked most closely on Kenya, went to Mboya to try and resolve this. 
Together, they rewrote the statement, in which, if Mboya’s delegation ‘had this sentence about the 
date, they would be prepared to agree to mentioning the twelve months period for the rundown of 
the base … if a date were not mentioned, they would prefer to represent the talks as having failed to 
reach agreement’.84 Withdrawal from the base was now explicitly linked to setting a date for 
independence, which was already tied to the question of federation. In this way, different benefits 
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and obligations were negotiated together. MOD regarded this as ‘not a bad proposition’, and Monson 
argued that ‘we have got for the Minister of Defence as good an understanding about the base as we 
could have hoped’.85 Civil servants had achieved acceptable terms for the base, which encouraged 
compromise over the date, set for 12 December. A parliamentary paper made these commitments 
and raised the prospect of ‘further discussion’ on possible future defence arrangements.86 This 
provides a clear example of the negotiation process through which policy was made. 
The prospect of federation fell apart – Kyle described it as ‘fool’s gold’87 – but on 12 December 1963 
Kenya became independent. British expectations were more positive than they had been, and 
MacDonald became Governor-General at Kenyatta’s request.88 By this time, the volte face was 
complete, and British concern had come to focus not on the threat of Kenyatta, but on what would 
happen after he was gone, beginning a fascination with the succession. In January 1964, EAD was keen 
to discover BHC’s ‘thinking on the subject of the succession’, questioning whether Kenyatta was likely 
to give up power, whether anyone would challenge him, and the position of potential successors.89 
Deputy High Commissioner Stanley responded that ‘Kenyatta is an eminent all-African figure; the 
father of his country; the creator of independent Kenya; and the only major politician to rise above 
the tribal maelstrom’, unlikely to give up power and hard to challenge.90 British diplomats had come 
to recognise Kenyatta as beneficial for British interests and stability, and to favour his continuing 
leadership.  
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Mutiny 
Only weeks after Kenya’s independence, following revolution in Zanzibar, mutinies occurred in 
Tanganyika, Uganda, and on 24 January 1964, in the Kenyan army at Lanet barracks.91 In a major study 
of the mutinies, Parsons has argued that during the colonial era, the army had been a relatively 
desirable occupation, but that soldiers had expected improvements and Africanisation after 
independence.92 In response, leading Kenyans in Kenyatta’s ‘kitchen cabinet’ signalled their alignment 
with Britain. Independent for only a few weeks, Kenya did not have extensive military connections 
elsewhere, meaning that ‘Britain was the only established military ally on whom she could depend’.93 
Nyerere and Ugandan Prime Minister Milton Obote also turned to Britain. The Kenyan decision was 
taken at a meeting between Kenyatta, Mboya and Murumbi, all of whom were pro-Western in their 
outlook, with the ‘presumably very deliberate’ exclusion of Odinga.94 For the British, receiving a formal 
written request was essential before intervening. Hickman in EAD later recalled:  
Sandys saying “I will not authorise anything until I have, from the High Commissioners, a 
request in writing from the Presidents to do it.” But he was ready to do it and keen to do it 
the moment he got a written request95  
Sandys did not want to face criticism and accusations of neo-colonialism, despite being ‘keen’ to 
intervene. On 24 January (before the mutiny at Lanet), Kenyatta requested that the British military in 
Kenya ‘be authorised to intervene with British forces if these were required to restore law and order 
in Kenya, without prior reference to HMG’.96 British troops had remained in Kenya following 
negotiations with Mboya in June 1963, and ‘Kenyatta also reminded [us] … of the sensitive position of 
British officers in the Kenya Army’.97 Kenyatta recognised the British concern with their own 
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personnel, and their potentially dangerous or embarrassing position, and used this to encourage a 
British reaction.  
Kenyatta announced concessions for the Kenyan army to prevent unrest, but was not seen at Lanet 
announcing this on television as expected, triggering the mutiny.98 The mutiny was quickly suppressed, 
with British assistance given immediately as requested, and by the evening of 25 January this was 
over, with ‘some shooting on both sides but no British casualties’.99 Despite the ease with which this 
had been suppressed, MOD was concerned by the possibility of further unrest. Therefore, 
‘precautionary measures were taken during the night for vigilance on key points … a reliable source 
states that a mutiny is planned for Sunday night 26th January’.100 The Lanet mutiny was expected to 
be only a precursor, and forces in Malta were to be put on twenty-four hour alert.101 But by 28 January, 
there was a more general sense that ‘Kenya remains calm’, although British forces remained 
throughout the country.102 
The mutiny was an immediate threat to British ideas of a ‘successful’ decolonisation and seemed 
particularly to pose the threat of communism, with wider Cold War concerns shaping British 
assessments. The British government was still trying to determine Kenya’s position within the Cold 
War, as well as communism’s place in Kenya. As Cooley rightly argued, ‘it was these first years of self-
rule when they were at their weakest, and thus at their most vulnerable to Communist infiltration’.103 
On 28 January CRO asked the three High Commissions in East Africa to report on the causes in order 
‘to assess more positively than we yet can whether we are faced with a widespread communist plot 
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or simply a chain reaction’. They already had the Joint Intelligence Chiefs’ assessment that these were 
‘a spontaneous reaction’ with ‘no evidence of any communist bloc influence’, but clearly wanted 
confirmation.104 In British uncertainties about the causes, their ‘knowledge’ about Kenya was revealed 
to be more limited than they had supposed. BHC was still uncertain, and although they reported ‘No 
evidence here of Communist plot’, diplomats were concerned by the actions of Odinga and Paul Ngei 
(who had been detained with Kenyatta during Mau Mau, had formed the opposition African People’s 
Party in 1962, then re-joined KANU in 1963), who were ‘thought to have been engaged recently in 
sowing discontent among Kenya Rifles as part of plot to take over Government’.105  
Despite having called upon Britain for assistance, Kenyatta was keen to assert his independence from 
Britain. At a meeting between Kenyatta, Mboya and BHC:  
We had a long and rather chilly talk. It is clear that both Kenyatta and Mboya are frightened 
of the criticisms they are receiving … about the decision to ask for British military help. Against 
this background it is not surprising but unpleasant to have to report that neither of them 
would agree that the Kenya Government “could” go any further in the public profession of 
gratitude to the British Government106 
Clearly British officials were keen to be praised for their actions, but leading Kenyans did not want to 
publicly thank Britain and thereby highlight their own weakness and reliance. Additionally, ‘the 
presence of the British forces here has been at once a source of strength to the Kenya Government 
and the cause of tension between Britain and Kenya’: Kenya had been the centre of military 
operations, so that when British troops moved to Uganda after Obote’s request ‘this was characterised 
as a violation of Kenya’s sovereignty’.107 Indeed, one complaint of the mutineers had been the 
presence of British soldiers: they were ‘very indignant and angry that the British Troops were present 
and stated that the mutineers would not cease their activities until the British Troops were 
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withdrawn’.108 This indicates something of the frictions of the relationship: to have British troops act 
in Kenya without consent could open Kenyatta to accusations of neo-colonialism and British 
interference. All were keen to avoid this. But this also reveals the negotiated nature of the 
relationship: British officials could not dictate Kenyan policies, whilst Kenyatta sought the greatest 
advantage, careful to qualify his request for military assistance with some criticism. 
British involvement in the East African mutinies was their most extensive post-colonial intervention in 
Africa.109 It is debatable how serious a threat these mutinies really posed, whether the mutinying 
troops could have taken power, or indeed if this was their aim.110 But there was a ‘crisis of confidence 
in Great Britain and the new African governments’.111 The British had not predicted the mutinies, 
though they had reacted immediately, and ensured mutiny did not advance further. The mutiny 
cemented British distrust of Odinga, whom they believed to have been involved in agitating within the 
army, even if not directly leading the mutiny as a communist uprising. This also encouraged ‘a sense 
of mutual trust’ between Britain and Kenyatta.112 The conflation of British and elite Kenyan interests 
had already been occurring, but the mutiny made it explicit. It would be a mistake, however, to view 
this, as Mburu does, as ‘a scheme by British praetorians to either bring down Kenyatta’s governance 
or render him so vulnerable that he would have to depend on Britain for post-independence 
security’.113 British policy-makers hoped for stability under Kenyatta and did not seek to ‘bring down’ 
his government, but rather to prop it up. British military action was unplanned, and revealed 
limitations to British ability and knowledge.  
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The Memorandum of Intention and Understanding 
Intervention in the mutiny was only a small part of British military interests in Kenya, which the British 
government acted to secure in 1964. Prior to independence, British politicians, civil servants and 
soldiers hoped to maintain a military relationship, but their ability to do so was dependent upon the 
deals they were able to make with the incoming Kenyan leadership, as had been made explicit in 
bargaining over the base. Military negotiations began prior to independence but were delayed, with 
Kenyatta, Mboya, Odinga and Gichuru insisting that ‘any agreement [must] be one freely concluded 
between the two independent states’, and opposing a ‘package deal of British military facilities in 
return for British aid to [the] Kenya Army’.114  
Within the British government there was debate about the military benefits Britain should aim for, 
clearly shaped both by their sense of the possible and by varying departmental priorities. MOD sought 
to gain as much from Kenya as possible. On 2 December 1963, John Burlace – the key figure in MOD 
working on Kenya as head of Defence Secretariat Division 11 responsible for ‘Overseas defence policy 
and political questions (excluding Europe and North America)’115 – argued that  
the important thing, from our point of view, will be to ensure the negotiation of the long-term 
facilities which we require … takes place before we have surrendered the bargaining counters 
which are our best hope of obtaining what we need116  
As this makes explicit, this was to be a process of ‘bargaining’ and Burlace hoped to negotiate from a 
position of strength. Britain’s position was strongest after the mutiny, and MOD was anxious to 
procure benefits, arguing on 27 January that: ‘we should not be complacent but rather exploit our 
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success to the hilt’.117 Burlace wrote on the day of Kenya’s mutiny that ‘[w]e must give Kenya Ministers 
enough time to get their breath back but not enough to forget which side their bread is buttered’.118  
By contrast, the CO and CRO believed military assistance could serve multiple interests. The Europeans 
remained a key British concern, and plans for their evacuation existed; part of why Kenya remained 
militarily significant as it would be a staging point for evacuations across Africa if necessary.119 Aspin, 
head of EAD, argued to Burlace that: ‘their continued safety and welfare largely depends on the ability 
of the Kenya Government to maintain law and order’.120 Aspin thus argued that ‘There might be a case 
for helping the Kenyans to expand their army … whether or not they were prepared to give us anything 
in return in the way of defence facilities’.121 This was an argument unlikely to find favour in MOD, 
which prioritised their own requirements. But whilst the CO and CRO shared MOD’s desire to gain 
military benefits, they prioritised longer-term, less tangible benefits based upon Kenyan stability. They 
wanted to ensure that Kenyatta’s government was credible and not compromised by a deal which 
could weaken Kenyatta and thus be detrimental to future British interests. 
The key was thus to determine what was ‘essential’. Aspin recognised that they may have to 
compromise in order for the negotiation to be acceptable to the Kenyans. He therefore questioned 
Burlace: ‘How essential are our various requirements? What would we be prepared to throw away, if 
necessary, in the course of negotiations?’.122 British civil servants were uncertain of Kenyan reactions 
to their requests and could not predict how much they might have to bargain and potentially give up. 
The CRO clearly did not feel they could force their demands upon the Kenyan state. To establish British 
priorities, on 10 January 1964 a meeting was held between the CRO, FO, Treasury, and MOD, showing 
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the multiple departments which were involved in planning for, and felt themselves to have a stake in, 
the continuing future military relationship with Kenya. At this meeting, a list was drawn up of British 
defence requirements: overflying and air staging rights; facilities for an aircraft carrier, training and 
leave camp facilities; and a strategic communications centre.123 Percox describes these as ‘minimal, if 
by no means insignificant’.124 This was certainly a more limited list than ideas in 1960.  
Yet whether Britain would achieve even these more limited requests was dependent upon the 
attitudes of Kenya’s leaders. Stanley of BHC saw Gichuru in February 1964 ‘at a party’ (showing the 
significance of informal social connections).125 Stanley described a ‘somewhat disturbing conversation’ 
in which Gichuru suggested that he and Kenyatta ‘would like Britain to help Kenya, to our mutual 
advantage. There were “others” in the Government who would like to get help from, and link Kenya 
with, “other” countries’.126 The Soviet Union was looking to capitalise on its support for decolonisation 
and establish relations with newly independent African states.127 Kenya did receive Soviet and Chinese 
military offers.128 But the conversation with Gichuru shows how Kenyans were able to negotiate: 
Gichuru was shrewd to point to British concerns about communism and Odinga to encourage them 
towards the kind of deal most beneficial for his faction. Stanley described Gichuru in this letter as ‘one 
of the most reasonable Ministers and one of our best friends’; he was thus in a strong bargaining 
position.129 As Westad has argued, it is important to recognise ‘the key role local elites played in 
abetting and facilitating these superpower interventions’.130 Stanley’s response to Gichuru was that 
‘we had far too much diplomatic experience to indulge in the crude arm-twisting of which he seemed 
to suspect us’; to the CRO, it was that ‘The important thing now is to get our tactics in the forthcoming 
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negotiations right, so that our friends among the Kenya Ministers – a majority I think – can conclude 
the bargain which we all know we intend to strike’.131 This revealing statement shows that Stanley 
recognised Gichuru’s comments as a negotiating tactic, but was apprehensive about the reaction of 
leading Kenyans to British proposals, although still confident that the most influential Kenyan 
ministers favoured Britain.  
Sandys visited Kenya in March 1964 for discussions with Kenyatta on future military and financial 
assistance. Although the Kenyans had at first resisted a ‘package deal’ in which ‘nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed’,132 this became one, with financial and military benefits and obligations 
negotiated together. At these high-level discussions, the Kenyans agreed to the British requests, and 
‘it is indeed gratifying that the Government should now so readily have accepted virtually all we asked 
for’.133 High Commissioner de Freitas concluded that as well as achieving direct tangible benefits, 
‘agreement reached with Kenya will preserve Britain’s position as the principal influence here’.134 At 
these talks the Kenyans gave details of their requests, including the current costs of the army, 
equipment and weapons for the military, with the RAF to fly in Kenya’s air force until Kenya had trained 
its own personnel.135 Sandys responded that: ‘In principle, the British Government do not think it 
appropriate that direct budgetary assistance should be given to another independent country. Kenya’s 
special difficulties are, however, appreciated, and will be considered’.136 Already at this early stage in 
the post-colonial relationship Kenya was being described as ‘special’, indicating that the British 
government viewed these military benefits as so important that they were prepared to consider giving 
much assistance in return for them. This would be an expensive commitment for Britain, but de Freitas 
argued that ‘Of course they have asked for much more than they have offered’, and a ‘significant 
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positive response’ was needed to ensure the relationship.137 British officials were cautious to prevent 
the Kenyans rejecting outright their military ‘requirements’, and anxious to prevent the Kenyans 
turning elsewhere. 
A decision with long term consequences was the British reply to the Kenyan request for Hunter 
aircraft. Sandys’ responded that:  
we could not afford to equip Kenya to defend herself against an attack backed by a major 
power nor could Kenya afford to maintain such forces: on the other hand if Kenya was afraid 
of major attack she should bear in mind the possibility of help from the Commonwealth138  
Although the Kenyans asked for written confirmation of the availability of Commonwealth support, 
the British were not prepared to offer this.139 In contrast to French post-colonial African policy, British 
officials wanted ‘to avoid formal written agreements’.140 However, this was a crucial policy choice. 
Sandys’ message that Kenya could not afford to build up a large military – and that Britain would not 
fund this – was coupled with his suggestion of possible British military intervention. For the next 
decade, the idea that Britain was committed to Kenyan stability and may be prepared to militarily 
intervene to underwrite this was a key part of military planning in both countries, further discussed in 
later chapters.  
Issues of training were also significant. In 1959 the first East Africans were sent to Sandhurst and Mons 
Officer Cadet School in Britain for military training.141 Britain faced international competition for 
training: the first pilots in Kenya’s new Air Force had been secretly trained in Israel, although Britain 
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would ‘finalise the training’.142 A British training team was to be set up in Kenya as part of these 
negotiations. Following a request by the High Commissioner,143 Kenyatta confirmed that: 
it is not the present intention of the Kenya Government to seek assistance for training 
the Kenya Armed Forces elsewhere than in Britain so long as this training is given 
effectively. We shall adhere strictly to this undertaking but should our interests 
dictate a different course of action, we shall warn the British Government well in 
advance144  
Although stipulating his own freedom of action, Kenyatta’s preference for working with Britain was 
becoming apparent as he ‘carefully realigned but maintained’ the military connection.145 The 
agreements on training meant that the British would have an extensive role in shaping the Kenyan 
military, offering training, equipment, and leadership. This made it likely that the Kenyans would in 
future continue to pursue a British military connection, used to working with British officers and 
equipment. 
Prior to independence, the CO negotiated a settlement for the 1963-64 financial year totalling ‘up to 
£10.4 million of which £5.1 million is grant and £5.3 million loan’.146 This set the pattern to be followed 
thereafter of dividing British aid between ‘general development’ and land settlement. The additional 
funding to secure British access to military facilities and overflying rights was agreed on 30 May 1964 
and offered ‘provision of British aid for both civil and defence purposes amounting to some £53 
million, of which about £28 million will be in the form of long term loans’.147 This was a substantial 
settlement and hints at the particular quality of the Kenyan relationship British officials were hoping 
to pursue. Securing military benefits and influence in Kenya was something the British government 
was prepared to pay for. 
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The final Memorandum of Intention and Understanding regarding Certain Financial and Defence 
Matters of Mutual Interest to the British and Kenya Governments (MOU) was signed on 3 June by 
Kenyatta and de Freitas. It contained twenty-two obligations of the British government to the Kenyan 
and seven for the Kenyan government towards the British. As its title recognised, this had been formed 
by negotiation and was intended to be in the ‘mutual interests’ of both governments. This offered the 
British what had become their non-negotiable demands, as well as twice yearly training in Kenya.148 
These were significant benefits, and for MOD especially the right to military training became one of 
their key priorities. The British obligations towards Kenya were mostly financial, as well as providing a 
training team in Kenya and courses in Britain, and to advise on creating a navy and air force.149 The 
MOU also stipulated that Britain would ‘make available British troops stationed in Kenya to assist the 
Kenya Government in dealing with internal disturbances’ – clearly a reaction to the mutiny and 
suggesting neither government was certain of stability.150 This gave the Kenyan government an 
interest in ensuring British forces were in the country – although it also potentially gave the British 
government an interest in ensuring they were not. This public agreement laid the basis for the Anglo-
Kenyan military relationship and offered a clear sign of Kenya’s choice of allies. De Freitas summed 
up:  
The direct facilities which we stand to gain may not in themselves seem worth it – although it 
is not easy to evaluate them. But they are not, by a long way, the whole of the credit side ... 
In the defence field in particular we stand to gain a continuing and influential presence which 
will serve to give security to our many other investments and to those who stay behind to 
keep our influence alive in many other fields151 
This was not simply about the direct and tangible military benefits Britain received, nor the influence 
of the money they would give to Kenya’s new rulers, but rather a culture and ethos which would 
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encourage leading Kenyans to look towards Britain – and which this agreement would foster. Despite 
the end of colonial rule, groups on both sides saw the advantages of continuing a formal relationship.  
 
Continuing Expatriates 
Another contribution to the continuing British ethos in Kenya’s structures was British technical 
assistance and the British personnel who continued to serve in Kenya.152 East Africa was a particularly 
significant recipient of technical assistance: of the £25m Britain spent on this in 1962-63, £13m was 
spent in Africa, and almost £11m in East Africa.153 Table 10 shows the significant numbers of British 
personnel financed by the aid programme in these initial years after independence; and table 11 sets 
out the costs of technical assistance from Britain to Kenya. In November 1963, the Department of 
Technical Co-Operation encouraged ‘the use of British knowledge, technique and experience to assist 
Kenya to build up its own resources of expert personnel and to promote the economic and social 
development of the country’.154 The Kenyans chose to use this and requested the provision of various 
‘experts’, such as midwives, experts on co-operatives and from the Bank of England.155 The British 
government recognised the advantages of supplying these personnel, such as potential good 
management, and cementing their own influence and presence whilst denying that of others: ‘It is 
very gratifying that Kenya are looking in the first place to us for this help’.156 One of those who worked 
in BHC recalled being told in 1964: 
“You just get on and get as many Kenyans on courses to London as you possibly can.” So I took 
that on. There were no effective budget limitations. We just went ahead and sent large 
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batches of Kenyans to the UK … The training course in the UK almost became a rite of 
passage157 
Table 10: Publicly Financed British Personnel in Kenya (excluding volunteers), 31 December 1965 to 
1968158 
 1965 
 
1966 1967 1968 
Education 479 415 794 851 
Development 
Planning 
75 62 30 28 
Public 
Administration 
401 343 191 227 
Social Services 31 27 13 15 
Works and 
Communications 
238 202 136 125 
Industry and 
Commerce 
4 5 4 36 
Agriculture 155 134 156 141 
Health 170 144 67 116 
Other 163 136 50 24 
Total  1,716 1,468 1,441 1,563 
 
Table 11: Technical Assistance from Britain to Kenya (£m)159 
 1964 
 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Cost 2.323 
 
4.849 2.604 3.815 4.075 2.733 3.271 2.891 
 
Some of these ‘experts’ were in particularly influential positions. Three key examples will be discussed, 
all of whom were notably Kenyan requests rather than British impositions. The Kenyans requested a 
Foreign Service Administration advisor in February 1964.160 De Freitas wrote personally to the 
Department of Technical Co-Operation ‘in order to stress the need for the speedy provision of a 
suitable man’, arguing that the current staff lacked experience and a good department would 
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encourage stability and economic development.161 As Orwa suggests, ‘How well foreign policy was 
conducted would depend in turn on the new country’s diplomats. Yet in 1963 Kenya did not have 
professional diplomats and was bound to rely on inexperienced diplomats’.162 In 1964, Kenya’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was still establishing its procedures.163 De Freitas felt it was worth investing 
in the Kenyan relationship and hoped to shape interaction with the new Kenyan government to British 
advantage: ‘A Foreign Service trained by a British Adviser in our administrative procedures will 
automatically be understanding of our problems and talk “the same language” as ourselves’.164 If the 
advisor provided the benefits hoped for, those in Kenya’s Foreign Service would become by training 
and instinct more likely to follow British practices, turn to Britain for advice, and remain aligned to 
British foreign policy. Despite initial FO reluctance – and perhaps ironically, given that British diplomats 
were to be complicit in the routine side-lining of the formal Kenyan diplomatic apparatus – they filled 
this post.165 
Another key individual was the only British Permanent Secretary to remain after independence: John 
Butter at the Kenyan Treasury. Butter’s previous career was in the colonial service in India and Pakistan 
before moving to Kenya in 1950, becoming Permanent Secretary of the Treasury 1959-65, then 
Financial Advisor until 1969, paid for by Britain.166 The Acting Governor in 1962 argued that ‘Butter’s 
maximum value will be as the top official in the Treasury, keeping a political Minister of Finance, 
probably African, on the right lines’.167 He clearly believed that the British knew better than the 
Kenyans what ‘the right lines’ for Kenya were. But Kenyatta chose to retain Butter, ‘convinced that 
your deep understanding and extensive experience of Kenya’s financial affairs are great assets to us 
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and are needed here’.168 Butter had an influential role in the Kenyan Treasury, involved in writing 
budget speeches and development plans, and he recalled in his memoirs that, certainly until 1967, 
‘the senior officers in the Treasury continued to take my advice, and most matters of importance were 
referred to me’.169 Butter’s colonial service background, relationships with, and payment by, Britain 
made it likely he would continue to look to Britain for economic assistance. This seemed beneficial to 
British officials in both London and Nairobi as they believed they understood and were equipped to 
work with Butter. After he left, British negotiators found the Kenyans they now had to work with more 
difficult.170  
The British presence was also particularly significant in military leadership. In November 1964 Stanley 
informed CRO that ‘Kenyatta told me in strict confidence that he had decided to appoint Brigadier 
[A.J.] Hardy … as Commander Kenya army temporarily in rank of Brigadier. He would appoint Lt. 
Colonel [Joseph] Ndolo as Deputy Commander … until Ndolo was fit to take over’.171 Despite 
Somerville’s argument that ‘for most Africans, the presence of foreign troops is unwanted’,172 this 
request came directly from Kenyatta rather than from British suggestion. This was very different from 
Uganda and Tanganyika where all British officers were withdrawn, and highlighted Kenya’s particular 
significance to Britain.173 In fact, there was some hesitancy within CRO about having a British 
serviceman in this role.174 MacDonald ‘strongly recommends that we accede to Kenyatta’s request. If 
we reject it we will let down Kenyatta personally, and display lack of confidence in authority of Kenya 
Government’.175 The Commonwealth Secretary also judged it ‘encouraging that his request should 
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have been made’.176 CRO agreed only ‘on understanding that this will be temporary’, and Hardy 
remained until November 1966.177  Hardy would sustain the British presence in the Kenyan military 
and would also be beneficial in cementing relations with Kenyatta. When Kenya’s Air Force and Navy 
were set up, they were also initially commanded by British servicemen.178 
These few examples highlight the British government’s willingness to provide ‘experts’ to strategically 
significant positions in Kenya; but critically they did so on the basis of Kenyan requests. As Branch and 
Cheeseman have argued, those who ‘inherited the colonial state … deliberately ensured institutional 
continuity’.179 Kenyan institutions continued to be shaped by British methods and systems, which were 
not fundamentally altered at independence. As Cowan has argued, the former colonial power ‘is at 
least a known quantity with whom it is easier to negotiate than with an unknown power’.180 Aluko has 
agreed that for former colonies ‘it is rational and easier to mix, and work closely, with people whose 
language, and educational, legal and administrative systems one understands’.181 Kenyatta and his 
elite made a choice to continue this alignment. These ‘expert’ advisors continued to be requested 
through the 1970s.182  
In November 1964, KADU’s members crossed the floor, dissolving their party and joining the 
government, and in December Kenya became a republic with Kenyatta as president. Despite having 
spent so much time working on the constitution and safeguards, British policy-makers did not object 
to KANU removing the regional constitution agreed at Lancaster House, nor to the effective 
establishment of a one-party state. British responses to the single-party state make clear the limited 
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priority they afforded to ideas of democracy, preferring a strong government under Kenyatta’s 
leadership. Maxon has argued about decolonisation that ‘Multiple parties were synonymous with a 
parliamentary democracy; stability and a protection of British interests might be better achieved by 
dealing with a single dominant party’.183 By January, Imray in BHC was ‘convinced of the advantages 
which Kenya’s unforced adoption of a One-Party State can bring her’.184 Several KADU members 
became ministers in December – appointments which had been previously decided between Kenyatta, 
Gichuru, Njonjo and MacDonald.185 MacDonald argued that ‘creation of a new Cabinet in Kenya should 
be done not in the British way by prior consultation among all those concerned, but in the African way 
by a firm, unalterable decision by the head of the Government himself’.186 He had a clear sense that 
strong, decisive leadership under Kenyatta was in Kenyan – and British – interests. Partly, this was due 
to British ideas of African difference and backwardness. MacDonald favoured a one-party state as  
a typically African solution to a native African problem … I felt that perhaps a one-party system 
could help the Kenyan peoples to move away from an earlier, primitive society bedevilled by 
inter-tribal rivalries towards the establishment of a modern, coherent Twentieth Century 
state187  
Stanley also viewed this as ‘accord[ing] more nearly with African traditions than the discarded 
“Westminster model” … Democracy, of an African kind’.188 Both viewed this through a set of 
assumptions about Africans and their ‘traditions’. 
According to his own reporting, MacDonald played a significant role in encouraging Kenyatta and other 
Kenyan politicians towards a single-party state. In his 1972 book – partly about Kenyatta as one of the 
‘distinguished people’ he had met in his career – MacDonald declared that ‘I made no attempt to 
intrude into policy-making, nor to question any of the Ministers’ decisions when they were reported 
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to me’.189 This seems unlikely, and only pages earlier he wrote that ‘Very privately and personally I had 
suggested’ a KANU-KADU merger.190 At the time he recorded having ‘positively suggested’ KADU join 
the KANU government, as well as discussing this with Ngala and Moi.191 MacDonald described 
Kenyatta as having ‘guided events towards our ultimate aim’, and it is notable that he equated his 
own aim with Kenyatta’s.192 MacDonald certainly claimed a large influence for himself and it is difficult 
of course to know how much he did shape Kenyatta’s thinking, and how much he simply persuaded 
himself that he had done so; Maxon has accused MacDonald of ‘seeking to inflate his personal impact 
on Kenyan affairs’.193 But MacDonald’s particularly close personal relationship with Kenyatta means 
he did have influence and may well have made this suggestion.  
 
Conclusion 
By 1964, British ideas about Kenyatta had undergone a dramatic shift and had come to focus on him 
as the guarantor of stability and protector of British interests. Diplomats emphasised Kenyatta’s 
personal role, and stability was argued to depend on his ‘continued exercise of firm and skilful 
leadership’.194 Renison’s replacement by MacDonald had been crucial to this change in opinion, and 
shows the significance of personal relationships in influencing policy; British policy-makers came to 
privilege their connections to Kenyatta and his elite. The choices made by Kenyatta’s inner elite in 
independence negotiations with British officials were crucial in establishing this relationship. Kenyans 
were drawn into this practice of negotiation as the emerging elite saw their interests as linked to 
stability and prosperity and they sought to ensure their position in a system which benefitted them. 
The CO was not in control of the process and had to react to Kenyan demands. These negotiations 
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also established channels of communication. British decision-makers learned who favoured them and 
who would work with them.  
By 1964 the Anglo-Kenyan relationship was not what British policy-makers had predicted or hoped for 
in 1960. Yet what had emerged generally suited British interests; independent Kenya remained aligned 
to Britain, with the continuation of British relationships. Independence was not a moment of complete 
change. Leading Kenyans chose to keep looking to Britain in multiple fields: land transfer and technical 
assistance, personnel, military support and intervention, army leadership and supply, aid and finance; 
British officials made it easy for them to do so by being continually willing to negotiate and 
compromise on terms. A pattern of cooperation and shared interests was thus established and would 
continue to characterise the relationship thereafter. 
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Chapter Four: 1965-1969  
 
‘I am inclined to think that we shall come to look back on the President Kenyatta-era as the 
golden age in Anglo/Kenyan relations’  
M. Scott to Edward Peck, 20 July 19671 
 
In broader British foreign policy, the later 1960s have typically been represented as a time of changing 
abilities and emphasis, with the decision to leave east of Suez and moves away from the 
Commonwealth towards Europe.2 Parr describes this as a period when ‘British interests did shift from 
a global to a European perspective’.3 British decision-makers thus had to decide where to focus their 
extra-European efforts; Kenya generally retained its significance in their ranking of British interests. 
British pessimism about Kenya’s future prior to independence had been reduced by the much more 
successful and pro-British outcome under Kenyatta’s leadership. But a sense of alarm had not 
disappeared and stability did not seem assured. By the start of 1965, key decisions about the direction 
of Kenya’s future politics and relationships with Britain had been negotiated between leading 
members of Kenya’s elite and British politicians and civil servants. Having established what they saw 
as a beneficial relationship which privileged British interests, British policy-makers’ concern was in 
sustaining this through ensuring stability under Kenyatta’s leadership.  
‘If you were asked what should be British policy towards East Africa at the present time, what would 
you say?’.4 This was the question posed by Leonard Walsh Atkins of EAD in December 1964 to the 
three East African High Commissions. His letter suggested that, after the mutinies,  
there were really only two possibilities open to us: one was to continue to do all we reasonably 
could to support the fairly moderate Governments which were available … the other was to 
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pull out. Clearly the latter, abdicating our responsibilities, was not really open to us … I will 
confess that, on various of the more depressing occasions in the last year, my own answer has 
been “to slow down the rate of return of the jungle”. But this cynical observation at the end 
of a long day will not quite do and I hope is not generally right5  
This once more highlights the sense of assumed superiority which at least some British individuals 
retained. Despite his despondency, Walsh Atkins clearly believed in British ‘responsibilities’ and 
retained a sense of colonial tutelage. The response sent in January 1965 from Acting High 
Commissioner Stanley was considerably more positive, with clear ideas on how to maintain the British 
connection: ‘the right course’, he suggested, was ‘to offer an unobtrusive shoulder on which the 
Kenyans can lean if they want to – and I think they will if the shoulder is unobtrusive’.6 Stanley, and 
British policy-makers more widely, believed that supporting Kenyatta offered the best protection of 
British interests.  
The choices of the Kenyan elite remained essential in shaping British aims. British officials could only 
be involved insofar as this was welcomed or encouraged by Kenya’s elite, and they still privileged 
access to a small group of individuals at the heart of the Kenyan government, from which Odinga was 
excluded. Bell has argued that ‘In any alliance … it is the weaker partner which makes the crucial 
choice’.7 Although referring to the British in their ‘special relationship’ with America, this analysis also 
fits the Anglo-Kenyan relationship: the choice of the Kenyan elite to pursue this was the key decision 
without which the relationship could not have been sustained. The first US Ambassador to Kenya 
recalled that Kenyatta ‘welcomed cooperation with the West only so long as we supported what he 
wanted for Kenya’.8 The choices of Kenyatta’s elite on key issues proved to be beneficial for British 
interests. The Kenyan government pursued an economic policy which welcomed foreign investment 
and Britain benefited from Kenya’s non-aligned foreign policy. Atieno-Odhiambo has argued that for 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
6 H.S.H Stanley to L.B. Walsh Atkins, 5 January 1965, TNA DO 213/73/3. 
7 Coral Bell, ‘The ‘Special Relationship’’, in Michael Leifer (ed.), Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign 
Policy (London, 1972), p. 103.  
8 His emphasis. William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure (London, 1967), p. 239. 
Chapter Four: 1965-1969 
151 
 
the Kenyan elite an ‘ideology of order’ was crucial to state power.9 This focus on stability was a goal 
British officials shared. As Evans argued in 1977, ‘On a continent where military coups, civil wars, and 
other forms of violent disorder have been commonplace, Kenya has appeared an anomaly’.10  
With Kenya’s elite looking to Britain, this period makes clear that, from the British perspective, Kenya 
was becoming a ‘special’ case as a place in which British interests in Kenya remained protected. As 
one former diplomat recalled: ‘Kenya was a sort of favoured son among the ex-colonial African 
territories’.11 But Kenya’s government also had the potential to damage the relationship and cause 
problems in Britain. In this sense, too, Kenya was significant, as the threats they held over the British 
were particularly acute. With extensive British investment in Kenya, the removal of stability or a more 
serious and active non-alignment could damage British interests. Most significant, however, was the 
Kenyan Asian population, who became a difficult issue for British politicians as Kenya, unusually, made 
headline British news and prompted domestic immigration legislation.12 Kenya was ‘special’ for 
offering benefits and incentives, but also potentially the possibility of a more difficult future 
relationship. This chapter will also examine the two occasions when Kenyatta chose to call upon British 
support, requesting potential military backing against a possible Odinga-led coup and then against 
potential invasion from Somalia. Their sense of Kenyatta’s importance meant that British officials were 
unusually prepared to offer military reassurance – the ‘unobtrusive shoulder’ Stanley had advocated.  
 
African Socialism and investment 
In 1965 Kenya’s Sessional Paper No. 10, written by Mboya’s department, outlined the policy of African 
Socialism which came to symbolise Kenya’s ideology. The Paper described African Socialism as a 
‘political and economic system that is positively African not being imported from any country or being 
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a blue print of any foreign ideology but capable of incorporating useful and compatible techniques 
from whatever source’.13 It nominally rejected capitalism, but actually advocated a managed capitalist 
economy. Much of the motivation behind this document was internal and political: in debates within 
KANU it aimed to side-line Odinga’s more ‘radical’ ideas in ‘a skilful attempt to present the 
conservatives’ ideology in the radicals’ clothing’.14 As Savage has argued, ‘It was a stroke of semantic 
genius to call this socialism’.15 With clear parallels to Kenya’s non-aligned foreign policy, Kenya’s 
nominally uncommitted domestic economic policy remained pro-Western, and more specifically, pro-
British. African Socialism encouraged foreign investment, stating that Kenya would ‘borrow 
technological knowledge and proven economic methods from any country’.16 Orwa argues that one 
aim was ‘selling Kenya to potential foreign private entrepreneurs’, of whom the British were key 
candidates.17 The British response to African Socialism was fairly positive. In a despatch on the subject, 
Stanley wrote that:  
Its policies are generally sensible and realistic but Kenya’s prosperity and development will 
depend upon the Government’s ability to advance the African masses economically and 
socially without frightening away external capital and expertise18  
He saw foreign – British – capital as essential for Kenya, and it is clear that British observers thought 
they understood Kenya’s problems, with British involvement viewed as part of the solution. 
African Socialism was also partly intended by its authors for consumption abroad as a statement of 
intent to the international community. This domestic economic doctrine was a roundabout way of 
distancing Kenya from radicalism, and therefore from Soviet influence. The choice of the elite around 
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Kenyatta not to foster Soviet connections was more broadly apparent. In a talk to Kenyan students in 
London in June 1965, the Minister for External Affairs very explicitly stated that ‘To us communism is 
as bad as imperialism’.19 Clearly this was partially aimed at a British audience, and offered them 
encouragement. The Soviet Union made financial and military offers, but Kenyatta was reluctant to 
take these, preferring to continue with British assistance. Kenyan factionalism meant British policy-
makers feared that if Odinga gained power, these alternative offers might be taken up. However, the 
threat of these offered a bargaining tool in discussions with the British, as in the MOU negotiations. 
High Commissioner Peck recognised in 1967 that ministers ‘revert to it as a blackmail in the event of 
frustration’ with British offers.20 For example, in 1969:  ‘Kenya Ministers have represented to us that 
there are elements in their Cabinet which would find great difficulty in agreeing to spend money on 
British aircraft when aircraft which though not quite so suitable were being offered free of charge, 
from the Soviet Union’.21 The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary therefore recommended giving 
improved credit terms to ensure the purchase of British aircraft. Kenyan politicians were adept at 
using the threat of accepting alternative offers to encourage the British to greater concessions. 
One of Britain’s major interests in Kenya was investment, and African Socialism encouraged British 
officials and business to feel secure. During the colonial period, Kenya had been a regional economic 
centre and the European population had given confidence to British investors.22 In 1960, there was a 
flight of capital.23 In April 1962, the risk for business in Kenya was reassessed and Kenya downgraded 
from a ‘B’ to ‘C’ risk area, a clear signal that investors lacked confidence in the country’s future 
economic ability.24 Kenya’s leaders thus came to share the British interest in encouraging investment 
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and a sense of economic and political security.25 In 1963 Gichuru pledged ‘firm assurances to the 
overseas investor’.26 Kenya’s pro-Western investment policies were thus already emerging prior to 
African Socialism. The 1964 Foreign Investment Promotion Act had encouraged and given incentives 
to foreign capital by guaranteeing the right to repatriate profits.27 The key issue for investors was the 
safety of their investments, with the prospect of political instability the major concern.28 Kenya’s 
Minister for Commerce and Industry Julius Kiano attended an Overseas Development Institute 
conference in London in 1965 and strongly advocated further investment, arguing that ‘investment 
itself is a great factor in creating stability’.29 Increasingly, Kenya was viewed as less risky than her 
neighbours, and thus became a ‘focal point for foreign investment in Africa’.30  
Kenya’s openness to foreign investment and regional stability were beneficial to British investors. 
British investment in these early post-independence years was particularly significant and in 1965 
‘accounted for 85 per cent of all the externally owned public debt’.31 Part of the colonial legacy was 
the European owned businesses, particularly multinational companies.32 One key example was 
Lonrho, which became heavily involved in Kenya from 1967, with profits returned to Britain.33  Lonrho 
also came to have some political influence in Kenya with the appointment of Kenyatta’s son-in-law 
Udi Gecaga as the ‘first African to be appointed to Lonrho’s main board in London’.34 Business and 
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investment connections between the two countries encouraged the sense of a significant and 
beneficial relationship. By 1970:  
We have one third of Kenya’s market for imported goods and the balance of trade is about 
£30m in our favour. The book value of UK owned companies is some £45m while loans from 
UK parent firms to their subsidiaries are worth about £26m ... The value of Kenya stocks on 
the UK market is £30m35  
Table 12 sets out the increasing British investment from 1967-70, after the introduction of African 
Socialism and with Kenya appearing stable. Britain’s economic and investment portfolio in Kenya was 
substantial and a key part of why the relationship was viewed as ‘special’. This was of wider 
significance as British investors and government sought to protect not only their investments, but also 
the environment of stability which encouraged and made these profitable.  
Table 12: British Investment in Kenya (£m) (excluding banking, insurance and oil)36 
 1967 
 
1968 1969 1970 
Agriculture 17.2 18.0 18.9 19.2 
Manufacturing  14.1 15.5 15.8 16.4 
Distribution 10.5 12.2 13.1 16.0 
Other activities 6.9 6.5 8.2 8.6 
Total  50.2 53.7 58.1 62.4 
 
Operation Binnacle 
Issues of stability were crucial in April 1965 when the British government responded to a request from 
Kenyatta to prepare for a potential coup by Odinga, who had become increasingly isolated as a 
‘radical’. Njonjo, engaged in his role as interlocutor, met MacDonald in April 1965 with ‘reports that 
Mr. Odinga and his associates may attempt some kind of armed or other action to seize power in 
Kenya’.37 The request brought by Njonjo from Kenyatta was:  
                                                          
35 D.A. Truman to Steel, Mackay, Ryrie, 2 April 1970, TNA T 317/1385. 
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a strong hope that it might be convenient for a British ship or ships (such as an aircraft carrier) 
to be in neighbouring waters during this month, as a matter of their routine exercise. If the 
Government were in serious difficulty here, they would wish to ask for the help of British 
troops to maintain law and order until the crisis had passed38  
Njonjo stressed that this was ‘not a formal request’, which it ‘would be politically inexpedient’ to make 
pre-emptively; though should ‘a critical situation’ occur, Kenyatta would make a formal request as he 
had during the mutinies.39 Njonjo also told MacDonald about the ‘Russian offer of an arms gift’ which 
became linked to the possibility of a coup.40 Cold War considerations were particularly prominent in 
Kenya at this time, as Odinga had Soviet support and seemed to pose a threat to Western interests.41 
MacDonald conveyed this message to London and John Chadwick of EAD wrote to MOD that ‘we 
should work on the assumption that we would wish to intervene if necessary … a contingency plan 
should be made as soon as possible’.42 
MOD reacted immediately. The Defence Operations Executive met to consider the requests, setting 
out potential options for military assistance and sending HMS Albion to Mombasa.43 They recognised 
that another intervention would not be so easily accomplished as that during the mutinies, and argued 
that British ‘troops cannot “reconquer” Kenya for President Kenyatta’.44 MOD thus made a distinction 
between preventing a coup – which they were prepared and even eager to do – and reversing one. 
They were also concerned that ‘forces would not operate outside Nairobi or be drawn into a long 
guerrilla-type campaign’.45 Despite their willingness to intervene, they were cautious about the scale 
of any military involvement, a caution probably necessitated by the limitations of what British forces 
were able to do.46 By 9 April, four days after Njonjo’s request, the Military Chiefs of Staff Committee 
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39 Ibid. 
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Chapter Four: 1965-1969 
157 
 
had created a plan for the deployment of troops from Aden.47 The plan was approved in MOD on 14 
April and codenamed Operation Binnacle.48 On 15 April, the Director of Operations in Aden decided 
‘all binnacle forces within the command should meanwhile remain at 24 hours notice until BHC Nairobi 
indicates that the situation warrants forces being at the reduced notice’.49 These were reduced to 48 
hours’ notice on 24 April and thus spent nine days on high alert for a Kenyan coup.50 On 29 April, 
Kenyatta asked ‘if our troops can remain at 48 hours notice’, clearly therefore aware of the Binnacle 
plan, most likely informed by MacDonald.51 The plan aimed ‘To prevent the overthrow of the present 
Kenya Government … Protect the person of Kenyatta and other loyal members of his government’.52 
This willingness to support the president shows how clearly British policy focused upon Kenyatta 
personally.  
It is questionable how realistic the possibility of a coup was. Subsequent historiography has assumed 
the threat was not serious.53 Indeed, in Njonjo’s initial disclosure he highlighted that ‘Kenyatta and his 
principal colleagues are inclined not (repeat not) to take this possibility too seriously [but] they 
nevertheless feel that they cannot ignore it’.54 EAD considered that ‘At fight sight it would seem 
unlikely … [but] I think we must assume for the moment that there is a real danger’.55 MacDonald’s 
later assessment on the nature of the threat highlighted: 
the apparent design of some external Communist Powers to aid their stooges in Kenya by 
supplies of arms for use, if necessary, in overthrowing President Kenyatta’s Government … 
surreptitious shipments of Czechoslovakian and Polish arms … students who have returned to 
Kenya after receiving military training in countries behind the iron curtain, and … the Russian 
gift of arms56  
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The key ‘evidence’ which sparked Njonjo’s approach to MacDonald, however, was ‘a letter from a 
conspiratorial colleague’ to Pio Pinto (MP 1963-65 and supporter of Odinga), which ‘suggests that 
some sinister action – which the Kenyan authorities interpreted as perhaps a “coup d’etat” – might 
have been planned’.57 It is unclear who sent this letter beyond ‘one of Mr. Odinga’s friends’, exactly 
what it contained, or even if MacDonald himself saw it.58 There is thus limited evidence of a coup plot, 
and this may have been a case of British overreaction and misreading – as they were occasionally apt 
to do – or something of a test by Kenyatta who may have wanted to know what British reactions to a 
coup might be.  
MacDonald continued to believe the threat had been real and suggested one reason it had not 
progressed was Pinto’s assassination on 24 February 1965.59 Pinto was described after his death by 
BHC as ‘possibly the most dangerous Communist influence in Kenya, because of his acute intelligence 
and talent for intrigue’.60 This opinion of Pinto’s importance was, however, notably more frequent 
after his death than before. MacDonald’s reported view was that ‘Pinto’s death becomes a turning 
point in the struggle, and from then on, the well-planned coup went astray’.61 In the light of a possible 
coup, MacDonald described the assassination as ‘despicable but timely’;62 and his desire for stability 
and favour for Kenyatta overrode concern for judicial practice, with tacit acceptance of this political 
assassination.  
Arms deliveries to Kenya, allegedly intended for Odinga, were a significant part of the rumours 
surrounding the potential coup. Russian equipment and a training team arrived, although MacDonald 
was ‘emphatically’ assured when meeting Murumbi, Mungai and Njonjo that this did not affect the 
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position of the British military training team.63 In his despatch, MacDonald later concluded that these 
arms were intended ‘to support, if required, a political overthrow’.64 BHC was clearly concerned by 
the Russian presence, speculating about links to Odinga, investigating the Russians who arrived, and 
informing Njonjo that three were ‘suspected of being intelligence officers. President Kenyatta and his 
most confidential Ministerial colleagues were very grateful for that information’.65 The British 
government wanted to preserve their influence. 
In a clear example of the influence of British policy-makers on Kenyan policy, and the role of Njonjo 
and McKenzie as informal interlocutors, at the end of April, Mungai, Murumbi and McKenzie inspected 
the Russian arms, accompanied by Brigadier Hardy and Colonel Landy (Ordnance Commander, Kenya 
Army). Hardy was to recommend whether to accept or reject the arms.66 That the British commander 
of the Kenyan army was to assess the Russian equipment was perhaps already a sign that it was 
unlikely to be accepted. More significant than this alone, however, was that  
McKenzie and Njonjo asked me [MacDonald] to convey privately and unofficially to Brigadier 
Hardy that he should give an honest opinion about the utility of the various items of 
equipment, but with a prejudice in favour of rejecting each and every item as not sufficiently 
useful. I have no doubt that this represents Kenyatta’s own wish, and so I have effectively 
conveyed this message in strict secrecy to Hardy67  
This message was passed from Kenyatta, through Njonjo and McKenzie, to MacDonald, and then to 
Hardy, in a clear indication of the informal and personal networks which were so important within 
Kenyan politics. The result of this, as widely publicised, was that Kenya rejected the Russian arms 
supplies and advisors. MacDonald viewed this rejection as ‘a serious diplomatic defeat for the 
Communist Powers’, and indeed Communist influence was limited thereafter.68 Stanley argued that 
‘by far the most important way of countering Communist influence in Kenya is for us to sustain 
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Kenyatta and his moderate supporters in power, and to preserve the considerable influence we have 
with them’.69 This was to be Britain’s Cold War stance in Kenya. 
Any threat of a coup quickly dissipated and by May, ‘[w]hatever is the truth about the plan for a “coup 
d’état”, the preparations for it have now gone hopelessly awry’.70 The whole affair was seen by 
MacDonald to have been fairly beneficial for Britain and ‘Kenyatta and his principal colleagues’ 
confidence in our wise and effective friendship has been further increased’.71 The British had 
demonstrated commitment without having to prove this through actual military action – although 
they had been, and remained, prepared to do so. In May MOD decided that although they no longer 
expected an immediate coup, ‘the plan should still be issued since a potential threat continues and 
similar alarums could arise in the future’.72 The possibility of a coup was reviewed in January 1966 and 
considered ‘unlikely’, but the idea did not completely dissipate.73 High Commissioner Peck recalled in 
his autobiography that the British HMS Triumph  
was stationed in Mombasa Harbour for quite a long time. It was a visible token of our support, 
particularly at moments when Bruce Mackenzie, for instance thought there might be a coup 
against the Kikuyu government. (‘Is your old tin can still there?’ was his crudely-coded 
message to me at one point)74  
As Peck did not arrive in Kenya until 1966, this cannot have referred to the same instance, but suggests 
a broader idea of the British presence offering support against potential opposition. If threatened, 
Britain was Kenyatta, Njonjo and McKenzie’s choice of ally. A British plan for intervention in response 
to internal unrest existed until 1971.75 Kenyatta’s request for British assistance and the British 
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intervention plan encouraged the sense of a particular British stake in Kenyan stability, with Kenyatta 
viewed as its guarantor. 
In another sign of the British role in Kenya’s defence forces, at the end of 1965 MacDonald was 
approached by McKenzie ‘with a view to getting confidential British advice on the future size and 
shape of the Kenya armed forces’.76 It was again McKenzie, with his ‘certain de facto responsibilities 
in the field of defence’, who was the key figure in communicating Kenyan messages, and only he, 
Kenyatta and Njonjo knew of this request.77 MacDonald was keen for the British military to fulfil this 
request and ‘need not underline the desirability of our assisting the Kenyans in this way, if it is at all 
possible’, writing directly to Commonwealth Secretary Arthur Bottomley.78 
In March 1966 Peck was formally asked by McKenzie ‘to supply a Senior Civil Servant experienced in 
defence programming to assist the Kenyans in their defence review’.79 MOD found it difficult to locate 
a suitable person, submitting that it was not possible. However, Defence Secretary Healey ‘stepped in 
and said that he was very anxious to give all possible help to President Kenyatta and instructed officials 
to try to arrange this’.80 This is a fairly rare and revealing example of a British minister getting involved 
in policy towards Kenya, and indicates how significant Healey viewed this to be, prepared to overrule 
the objections of his civil servants. This also makes clear the importance of informal connections within 
the British government, as the details of this internal MOD dispute had been passed ‘on a personal 
basis’ from Burlace of MOD to Scott, head of EAD.81 British policy-makers had to negotiate internally 
as well as with the Kenyans over their policies.  
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In April 1966 General John Drew was chosen to lead the review, having previous experience of similar 
missions in Malaysia.82 Following his visit, Peck was complimentary: ‘Drew was exactly what was 
required by the Kenyans’.83 Drew formally sent his report to Gichuru as Chairman of the Defence 
Review Committee.84 At this stage, policy was conducted through formal channels rather than with its 
initial informality. His report argued that Kenya’s ‘problem is predominantly one of internal security’, 
including a wide definition of this.85 Drew’s main recommendations were to create a Chief of Defence 
Staff, focus on intelligence, coordination between police and military, and coordination between the 
three defence services.86 
The most significant recommendation from the British perspective was the creation of a Chief of 
Defence Staff. Interestingly, ‘both Drew and Bruce McKenzie and others here agree that Hardy, 
although an excellent regimental soldier who has done a splendid job with the Kenya Army, is not 
really suited to be the rather politically minded and unified command type of officer required’.87 
Despite this, Kenyatta was ‘now cogitating the possibility of replacing Hardy by another white face 
assuming a suitable one can be found’.88 In another example of British assumed superiority, Richard 
Posnett in the CRO argued that ‘while Africans will doubtless come to the top who would be capable 
of commanding units of modest size, it may be too much to expect men to appear who can exercise 
broad strategic and administrative control’.89 As with Hardy’s appointment, Kenyatta and his closest 
advisors requested that this position be filled by the British military, giving them considerable 
influence over who was appointed. Hardy was replaced as planned by Kenyan Brigadier Ndolo as 
Commander of the Army, and the British Major General Bernard Penfold was appointed Chief of 
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Defence Staff.90 Penfold also took command of the British training team, meaning he was involved in 
both Kenyan military policy and British military policy towards Kenya. But MOD argued that ‘As regards 
the comment that Penfold might have divided loyalties … the situation in which senior seconded 
officers wear two hats is by no means unusual … but the British loyalty is of course always 
paramount’.91 British leadership within the Kenyan military underpinned the military relationship and 
offered an inside route to Kenyan military thinking.  
Operation Binnacle had been designed against a possible threat from Odinga, but in 1966 Kenyan 
politics changed as Odinga left KANU and Kenya returned, albeit briefly, to a two party state. In 
February 1966, Odinga left parliament during a debate and MacDonald discussed this with Njonjo and 
Kenyatta; Imray of BHC opined that ‘Njonjo obviously knows more about political trends in Kenya than 
I do – but I should be surprised if Odinga resigns on this – despite his humiliation’.92 As he admitted, 
Njonjo had a greater understanding of the direction of Kenya’s politics. At the Limuru party 
conference, Odinga was replaced by eight regional vice-presidents, something Kenyatta had informed 
BHC might be a possibility over a week prior to the conference.93 BHC was kept informed of certain 
information by the Kenyan leadership, but this was very dependent on what they were told and on 
maintaining relationships to ensure they were told this. Odinga formed the opposition KPU, and 
‘Odinga’s challenge was now explicitly to the President’.94 The KPU was forced to contest the Little 
General Election of 1966 and performed with fairly limited success in a campaign frequently weighted 
against them.95 But electoral intimidation was not the British priority. Imray reported: ‘Afterwards we 
shall try to examine whether the nasty taste left in the mouth by all these manoeuvres is nasty only 
to delicate European democratic palates – [or] that in the Kenya African context, once again the end 
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[might] have justified the means’.96 Peck argued that the government’s tactics ‘may arouse concern 
for the future of democracy in Kenya. But in Kenya’s conditions, a tolerably enlightened autocracy may 
well be the best prescription’.97 Stability under the strong leadership of Kenyatta was viewed as far 
more beneficial for British interests than democracy.   
 
Bamburi Understanding 
In 1966-67, another military agreement was negotiated between the British government and leading 
Kenyans, this time concerning Somalia. The Somali policy of ‘greater Somalia’ claimed territory from 
Ethiopia and Kenya. In 1960 the British colonial government had raised the possibility of the secession 
of the north east of Kenya to Somalia but then withdrew from any decision, and the incoming Kenyan 
government firmly rejected this in favour of maintaining colonial borders.98 An insurgency known as 
the shifta was fought in the north-east of Kenya, with the insurgents supported by Somalia.99 Ethiopia 
had similar concerns and created a defence agreement with Kenya which stated ‘that an armed attack 
against one of them shall be considered an attack against the other’.100 Yet this did not entirely quell 
Kenyan anxiety, and it was to Britain that Kenya’s new rulers looked for further reassurance.  
In May 1966 McKenzie raised this issue in a meeting with British Defence Secretary Healey. McKenzie 
asked:   
if he was right in his assumption that if Kenya was attacked, the UK accepted an unwritten 
obligation to come to her assistance … [Healey replied] that he had no doubt that the position 
would be considered sympathetically on its merits. He added that while we were retaining the 
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capability to help in such a situation, and HMG was very sympathetic to the present regime in 
Kenya, “an unwritten obligation” was not a meaningful concept in international relations101 
The reason for McKenzie’s assumption was the so-called ‘Sandys Understanding’ allegedly given by 
the previous Commonwealth Secretary in 1964. The basis for this was referred to in the previous 
chapter: that the Kenyans could not afford Hunter aircraft, but should consider Commonwealth 
support if attacked.102 There were clear differences between the British and Kenyan interpretations of 
what Sandys had said: to British policy-makers, this was no more than vague support to a friendly 
Commonwealth state; for leading Kenyans, this was a commitment they counted on. A January 1966 
Kenyan military paper made explicit this reliance. This assessment ‘assumed that the British ground 
attack aircraft would be available to support the Kenya Army within 24 hours and that limited ground 
forces would start arriving within 48 hours, of Somali regular forces violating our frontier’.103 The paper 
set out very limited goals for the Kenyan army ‘to identify, and furnish our allies with proven evidence 
of the aggression so that they could intervene on our behalf confidently; [and] to contain the enemy 
thrust or thrusts for long enough to enable our allies to intervene effectively’.104  There was no sense 
of the Kenyan military being able to repel a Somali attack without assistance, and this assumed 
immediate British support. This made Kenya’s leaders particularly concerned by Healey’s view that 
Britain was under no obligation to assist.  
In the months that followed, leading members of Kenya’s inner elite followed this up, reiterating the 
Somali threat at high level meetings between Murumbi and the Prime Minister, McKenzie, Gichuru 
and the Commonwealth Secretary.105  Njonjo and McKenzie saw the Prime Minister, Commonwealth 
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Secretary and Minister of Defence on 11 November 1966, delivering a letter from Kenyatta.106 At this 
meeting, Njonjo ‘said that he was not seeking a formal undertaking, but an informal assurance that, if 
Kenya asked for British help if they came under attack from Somalia, this help would be 
forthcoming’.107 McKenzie noted that ‘apart from President Kenyatta, Dr. Mungai, Mr. Njonjo and 
himself, the entire Kenya Cabinet believed that there was already such a pact’.108 Assumptions of 
Britain’s influence and power in Kenya were actually rather ahead of reality.  
In the wake of the Kenyan approach, British officials were initially concerned to establish exactly what 
Sandys had said and whether a ‘Sandys Understanding’ existed. They searched through records of 
conversations but found ‘no trace of … an express undertaking’.109 Walsh Atkins confirmed that ‘Mr. 
Sandys of course said nothing so categorical at all’.110 Anxious to confirm this, the Commonwealth 
Secretary spoke to Sandys, who stated that he had never made an agreement beyond the broad 
suggestion that the Commonwealth was unlikely to ignore aggression.111 It thus appeared that the 
‘Sandys Understanding’ had not existed as the Kenyans understood it – at least from the British 
perspective. However, this was based on interpretation and even though a definite Understanding 
had not been made, this encouraged British policy-makers towards commitment: the Commonwealth 
Secretary considered that ‘it would be unfortunate if we appeared to be less forthcoming than Sandys 
was’.112 Later British reports indeed referred to the ‘Sandys Understanding’.113  
The question for British officials and politicians was how to respond. Given the Kenyan belief in the 
Sandys Understanding, coupled with high-level approaches from leading Kenyans viewed as Britain’s 
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‘friends’, they did not want to damage the relationship by refusing this. Peck hoped ‘serious 
consideration can be given to meeting this request of the Kenyans which goes only very little further 
than the general obligation to come to the help of any Commonwealth country under attack’.114 
Ministers were involved, with the Commonwealth Secretary recommending this to the Defence 
Secretary.115 BHC took the initiative of writing a paper weighing the pros and cons of an informal 
agreement, discussing the expense and sense of insecurity faced by the Kenyans over the shifta, which 
would likely be exacerbated without an agreement so that Kenyan ‘morale might sink dangerously 
low’.116 The disadvantages were that this ‘would be an open ended commitment’, with an unknown 
potential cost, and could encourage Kenya ‘to escalate their operations against the shifta to the point 
of provoking Somalia’.117 If handled badly, it could draw Britain into war. However, although British 
assessments agreed that Kenya would be unable to resist a Somali attack, they viewed the possibility 
as unlikely.118 If it was never to be used, this could gain Kenyan goodwill at low cost. British 
consideration was also explicitly linked to Kenya’s stance on Rhodesia. Despite the criticism in public 
which Kenyans sometimes made about Britain’s Rhodesia policy,119 the real business of diplomacy was 
private, where the relationship was generally much more amicable. As a later High Commissioner 
recognised, the key was ‘to differentiate between private discussions and public statements’.120 In 
directly considering the Somali military threat, officials noted that Kenya ‘has taken a leading role 
among Commonwealth African countries in supporting our Rhodesia policy’.121  
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BHC also highlighted the economic and military benefits Britain gained from Kenya and the possibility 
otherwise of a reduction of British influence: 
The British stake in Kenya is substantial … Because of special facilities which exist at Embakasi 
– a first-class International Airport – the exceptional rights there are particularly valuable and 
Kenyan goodwill will be required for these exceptional rights to continue122  
Peck personally promoted the idea, and implicitly evoked the Cold War context, recognising that ‘no 
one in London is going to be very keen’, but arguing that ‘Kenya is a bit of Africa where we have (so 
far), and we hope to continue to do so, successfully upheld stability in the general Anglo-American 
interest’.123 This was a reciprocal relationship, and the need to ensure Kenyan goodwill to keep the 
benefits which made Kenya an ‘exceptional’ relationship encouraged the British government to offer 
a limited guarantee. This would also encourage and enable Kenya not to build up a large military, and 
to pursue a military relationship with Britain rather than elsewhere; only months earlier the Israelis 
had advocated ‘building up the Kenyan armed forces’, no doubt with their own equipment, while CRO 
argued that ‘Kenya ought not to build up a strong, sophisticated army that might fall into the hands of 
[an] anti-West government’.124 British policy-makers also suggested that, unlike most countries, Israel 
had ‘a vested interest in promoting a head-on clash between Somalia and Kenya in which they would 
plan to step in and sweep the Somali board’, and wanted to prevent this.125 They perceived an informal 
commitment which meant Kenya did not build up a larger military to be in the British interest.  
Having determined to make a commitment, there was negotiation within the British government on 
the language, terminology and form this would take. BHC suggested that this should be communicated 
‘at least partly in written form’, which had advantages ‘both in putting the record straight historically 
and also in leaving the Kenyans in no doubt as to our future intentions’.126 EAD agreed, and 
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recommended a boute de papier: ‘Anonymous and completely informal’.127 Civil servants were trying 
to achieve the impossible – a non-committal commitment. MOD was concerned that ‘we had spent a 
good deal of last year getting out of open ended commitments’, and an MOD meeting ‘agreed that 
the words “outright attack” were not sufficiently specific’ and must be amended.128 On a further draft, 
the Defence Secretary again wanted revisions, arguing that: ‘We need to be very careful about this’.129 
That ministers were involved in issues of drafting shows the sensitivity of this commitment. Legal 
advisors were also consulted about the language.130 British policy-makers took seriously the 
implications of the language they used to try and ensure that what sounded like a commitment did 
not really bind them.  
The wording was eventually agreed and stated sympathy with Kenya’s problems with Somalia and the 
shifta, offered to share threat assessments, but highlighted the need for peaceful and political 
solutions. The text was read and handed to Kenyatta by Peck on 25 January 1967; and simultaneously 
read to Gichuru and McKenzie by the Commonwealth Secretary in London. The idea of this double 
reading was to ensure Kenyatta did not receive the text after his ministers, and ‘between us [we have] 
neatly stymied McKenzie, whose inevitable caustic remarks’ could have coloured Kenyatta’s 
reception.131 Despite McKenzie’s intermediary position, British officials expected criticism from him. 
The key part of the boute de papier stated:  
any attack on a fellow member of the commonwealth would be of great concern to the British 
government: Kenya government may be sure that if Kenya were the victim of outright 
aggression by Somalia, the British government would give the situation most urgent 
consideration. While, therefore, the British government cannot in advance give the Kenya 
government any assurance of automatic assistance, the possibility of Britain going to Kenya’s 
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assistance in the event of an organised and unprovoked armed attack by Somalia is not 
precluded132 
This was an extremely limited commitment: it offered nothing beyond consultation, and although not 
ruling out military assistance, this would not be automatic. It was not very different from the previous 
unwritten position and shows the balance British policy-makers were trying to maintain between 
offering something to retain Kenyan goodwill whilst not committing themselves. However, despite 
government efforts to try and limit the room for interpretation, when given the text, Kenyatta ‘made 
no comments beyond asking me to convey to Prime Minister his thanks for this message, adding that 
he had no doubts about our intentions or of the friendship between Kenya and Britain and that he 
relied on us to come to his aid in the event of real trouble’.133 Clearly, this had not limited Kenyatta’s 
expectation that he would be able to rely on British military intervention if necessary. Those British 
personnel aware of this thereafter suspected that Kenyatta took the commitment more seriously than 
themselves.134 
Following the Understanding, MOD created a plan for ‘British Military Assistance to Kenya in the Event 
of Somali Aggression’. EAD considered it ‘most unlikely that this plan will ever be implemented’, but 
thought it ‘only prudent for it to cater for the widest possible range of eventualities’.135 An initial draft 
was circulated in May 1967, with further revisions until the final agreed plan of 16 February 1968.136 
Interestingly, therefore, these military plans were made simultaneously with British plans to withdraw 
from east of Suez, announced in July 1967 and sped up in January 1968.137 Rouvez has argued that this 
was a time of minimising global military commitments and withdrawal from east of Suez 
                                                          
132 Telegram no. 374, Commonwealth Office to Nairobi, 23 January 1967, TNA FCO 16/115/41. 
133 Telegram no. 245, Nairobi to Commonwealth Office, 26 January 1967, TNA FCO 16/116/49. 
134 See R.A. Neilson to Campbell, ‘The Bamburi Understanding’, 14 August 1974, TNA FCO 31/1726/3. 
135 D.A. Campbell to Reid, 22 November 1967, TNA FCO 16/117/92. 
136 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Draft Report by the Defence Planning Staff, ‘British Military Assistance to Kenya in 
the Event of Somali Aggression’, 19 May 1967, TNA FCO 16/116/74; Chiefs of Staff Committee Defence Planning 
Staff, Draft Report by the Defence Planning Staff, ‘British Military Assistance to Kenya in the Event of Somali 
Aggression’ (Second Revised Draft), 12 December 1967, TNA FCO 16/117/97; Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘British 
Military Assistance to Kenya in the Event of Somali Aggression’, 16 February 1968, TNA FCO 16/117/111. 
137 See Jones, ‘Decision Delayed’, pp. 569-95. 
Chapter Four: 1965-1969 
171 
 
‘demonstrated the extent and the seriousness of British disengagement from former colonial and 
post-colonial duties’.138 Yet at the same time, MOD was still making plans for post-colonial 
intervention in Kenya. Thus, this should not be seen simply as a time of removing all commitments or 
retreating from a global foreign policy. BHC also encouraged Kenya to press their case at the UN, and 
according to one first secretary, this was ‘the opportunity to defuse a war’.139 The Arusha 
Memorandum of Understanding in October 1967 brought the shifta conflict to an end, after which 
‘the situation in the area gradually normalized’.140  
That British politicians were prepared to offer a written understanding was unusual, revealing that 
Kenya was, once again, seen as ‘special’. From the Kenyan perspective, this highlighted that Britain 
remained Kenyatta’s choice of military ally. In giving the message to Kenyatta, Peck ‘emphasized that 
with Britain’s present resources, there were limits to what we could do to help our friends and that 
we, no more than they, could not be expected to sign a blank cheque. None-the-less Kenya ranked 
high among our friends’.141 Peck suggested that the boute de papier be known as the Bamburi 
Understanding, based on where he had met Kenyatta, and as it will be referred to from this point.142 
This private and secret negotiation between key figures again highlighted the difference in forms of 
policy-making between the British and Kenyan states. This was not widely publicised within Britain: it 
was classified Top Secret in British government files,143 and civil servants argued in 1976 that this did 
not fall into the scope of a parliamentary question on military agreements with Kenya so they did not 
have to publicly declare it.144 But departments cooperated. This was in sharp contrast to the Kenyan 
side of these negotiations, which were conducted by a very narrow elite. Few Kenyans knew of this 
agreement – in 1973 it was thought ‘quite likely’ that Mungai and perhaps Kibaki were unaware of 
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it145 – and those who did were privileged within the Kenyan state. The Bamburi Understanding has 
received little historiographical attention.146 All this has obscured its significance, but the 
Understanding was a key element in the British ‘special relationship’ with Kenya.  
 
Asian Immigration 
A much more public issue in the relationship was that of Asian immigration. Kenya’s importance as a 
colony was partly due to the European and Asian populations. In 1962 Kenya’s population comprised 
8.3m Africans, 55,759 Europeans, and 176,613 Asians.147 This gave the British an additional concern 
compared to many of their former colonies, and an additional idea of responsibility. Issues around the 
European presence had been largely addressed with the land transfer programmes. The Asian 
population became a direct concern in 1967 when Asian immigration became one of the few issues in 
Kenya after independence which touched on British domestic politics – often the single occasion 
where independent Kenya makes an appearance in the wider literature on British foreign policy.148 At 
independence, Asians and Europeans were offered the choice of British or Kenyan citizenship with a 
two year grace period. Oonk described this decision as ‘the yardstick of local loyalty’.149 According to 
Rothchild, 3,911 claimed citizenship in the year after independence, rising to 9,018 during the second, 
with around 10,000 further applications between November and December 1965, just ahead of the 
deadline, with delay in processing these.150  
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Until 1967, British immigration policy was based on the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. This Act 
had ‘introduced a crucially important distinction’ based on whether passports were issued by the 
British or other Commonwealth government.151 What mattered with regard to the Kenyan Asians was 
that, following independence, their passports were issued by the High Commissioner – or in other 
words, by the British government – and were therefore not subject to the controls of the 1962 Act.152 
British officials recognised and accepted that Kenya’s Asians ‘enjoy ready access to Britain and are 
exempt from the controls’.153 Rates of immigration to Britain seemed manageable and in September 
1965, ‘it seems doubtful whether in the near future there is likely to be any significant increase in the 
overall rate of Asian emigration from Kenya’.154 
Africanisation policies in Kenya changed this. Explicitly, these were policies of Kenyanisation based on 
citizenship, but these tended to be implemented as Africanisation.155 As later High Commissioner Duff 
recognised: ‘in the eyes of the law, non-African citizens of Kenya have equal rights with African 
citizens. It is in the implementation of Government legislation that the African citizen benefits from 
greater rights’.156 Kenya’s leaders sought a balance between Africanisation and economic growth, but 
they were always aware that there was strong popular anti-Asian feeling.157 The key pieces of 
legislation affecting the position of Asians were the 1967 Immigration Act and 1968 Trade Licensing 
Act, meaning non-citizens needed work permits.158 Following these acts, East African Asian migration 
to Britain increased significantly. Home Secretary James Callaghan answered a parliamentary question 
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in early 1968 making clear the extent of the increase: ‘annual totals of arrivals in the last 3 years have 
been about 6,150, 6,800 and 13,600 respectively, mainly from Kenya’.159 BHC’s 1968 Annual Review 
placed the blame squarely on ‘Kenyan reluctance to adjust the pace of their Africanisation programme 
to the rate at which Britain could absorb the British Asians displaced by it’.160 The implication was that 
High Commissioner Norris could not understand why the Kenyans did not recognise their interests as 
he did.  
In February 1968 the British government planned immigration legislation to close the loophole of the 
1962 Act. Rumours of British legislation encouraged further immigration to ‘beat the anticipated 
controls’.161 This was a rare occasion of Kenya being debated in the UK parliament, and the key debate 
concerned whether the loophole for East African Asians in the 1962 Act had been intended. Two 
former colonial secretaries, Macleod and Sandys, clashed over whether pledges had been made, with 
Macleod arguing that a promise was being broken, and Sandys ‘that no such pledge was given, either 
in public or in private’.162 Sandys evidently had a particularly selective memory when it came to 
pledges regarding Kenya. The new Act meant that no longer was it enough to hold a passport issued 
by the British government to have unrestricted access into Britain; additionally there had to be a 
familial relationship – ‘the notorious “grandfather clause”’.163 The debate was inflammatory and 
impassioned: Callaghan ‘envisage[d] the prospect of an invasion … even though it is not likely’.164 Some 
MPs accused the government of ‘panic’, ‘racialist legislation’, and ‘hypocrisy’.165 The issue was divisive 
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since it set popular domestic anxiety about immigration against express pledges given by government; 
it was therefore also very embarrassing. Nonetheless, the legislation moved quickly through 
parliament, receiving a majority of 372 to sixty-two on its second reading.166 A new categorisation was 
created: UK Passport Holders (UKPH), and this was how Kenyan Asians were subsequently described.  
There was also an annual allocation of 1,500 immigration vouchers for East African Asian heads of 
households, a figure decided ‘more or less by guess and by God’.167 The aim was, according to 
Callaghan, ‘to regulate the flow of these people to the United Kingdom—that is, to form an orderly 
queue’.168  There were a set of priorities upon which applications were judged, aiming ‘to accord the 
highest place in the queue to those who are under the most immediate pressure to leave’;169 but by 
30 December 1968, the waiting list exceeded 900.170 This quota was for all East African UKPH, but BHC 
in Nairobi coordinated all vouchers, and Kenya, at least initially, received the largest share by far: of 
vouchers issued in 1968, 1,199 went to Kenya, 269 elsewhere.171  
Kenyan and British domestic priorities – on Africanisation and immigration respectively – were what 
drove these policy changes. Relations between the two governments were not the priority in these 
policies and were more difficult than over most issues. On 19 October 1968, High Commissioner Norris 
received a letter from Geoffrey Kariithi (Permanent Secretary, Office of the President) in which, 
worryingly for the British government, he ‘estimate[d] that up to the end of 1969 approximately 9,000 
non-Kenya citizens of Asian origin, 90% of whom are U.K. citizens, will have their work permits 
expiring. Few of these persons will have their permits renewed’.172 This was exactly the kind of 
situation the British hoped to avoid; the ‘invasion’ Callaghan had feared.  
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BHC discussed Kariithi’s letter with Njonjo – seeking advice from someone they favoured – and, on his 
advice, did not inform London ‘until he had looked into it, since he said he felt that the estimate of 
9,000 must be too high’.173 Norris replied to Kariithi on 18 November, a month after receiving his 
letter, welcoming ‘the offer of the Kenyan Government of co-operation to the mutual benefit of the 
two Governments’ although neglecting further details.174 That Kariithi was communicated with by 
formal letter whilst Njonjo was privately approached in person makes clear the British preference for 
certain Kenyans whom they knew and felt comfortable with, and their use of informal channels shows 
how they reinforced Kenyan neo-patrimonialism. Kariithi’s position meant he was occasionally 
involved in discussions with the British, but he was not someone usually sought out or favoured by 
them.175 He had formerly been suspicious of foreigners working in Kenya.176 BHC did not inform EAD 
of the letter from Kariithi until 25 November, when they had still not heard back from Njonjo; 
presumably they previously thought Njonjo would fix this for them, so they did not need to be 
concerned.177 London did not, however, take kindly to not being informed.178 Peck, who had been High 
Commissioner in Kenya until April 1968 and then became Deputy Under-Secretary for EAD, wrote in 
his ‘first official communication’ to Norris as his replacement High Commissioner that:  
Though I quite understand your expectation that Njonjo might have come up with a consoling 
reduction, it is rather a pity we did not get this information sooner … [we] would be most 
grateful to be kept informed urgently of any fresh development179  
Although he was conscious not to phrase this too directly, there was a clear sense of Peck’s annoyance 
at BHC for their concealment: immigration’s political sensitivity meant increased London oversight. In 
December, BHC received detailed figures from the Kenyanisation Bureau in the Ministry of Labour – 
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in this instance their informal contacts had not been revealing. These were far lower than those given 
by Kariithi, of c. 3,300 entry permits expiring over the following twenty-one months.180  
Asian immigration was an issue with the potential to damage the relationship between Britain and 
Kenya, and although Kenyan politicians took a tough public stance and had not been prepared to shift 
their position prior to British legislation, they also did not want to seriously damage their relations 
with Britain over this. Norris in January 1969 ‘fear[ed] that this problem is going to be a cause of strain 
in our relations with East African Governments for some considerable time’.181 Leading Kenyans such 
as Gichuru and Mboya publicly criticised British policy.182 In February 1969 however, Norris highlighted 
‘a good deal of evidence that the Kenyans are concerned about the sharp differences which arose in 
London and are anxious not to exacerbate the situation. They do not want to have a row with us if 
they can avoid it’.183 This in fact did not cause the damage to the relationship British policy-makers 
had feared. It remained, however, a key issue of contention, and on a visit to London Moi refused to 
meet British ministers about this, although the Prime Minister did raise the topic at their meeting.184 
This was a difficult issue, and it seems that leading Kenyans were reluctant to discuss it openly. Norris 
argued that British policy should be  
to remain on close and friendly terms with the Kenya Government. If our relationship with 
them turned sour, we should lose such ability as we may have (although this has not yet been 
put to the test) to influence the rate at which the British Asians are forced out of Kenya185  
This was a bargaining tool for the Kenyans, and British policy-makers were particularly concerned by 
this threat, seeing no other way of influencing Kenyan actions than focusing on their personal 
relationships and encouraging conciliation towards Kenya’s leaders. By the end of 1969, BHC’s Annual 
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Review recognised that: ‘In the absence of any negotiations or even discussions between ourselves 
and the Kenyans we have been saved from a direct clash only by Kenyan restraint’.186 British officials 
were dependent upon Kenyan actions and could not dictate policy on this issue. Norris described the 
Asian population as ‘a special problem’; as well as particular benefits and advantages for Britain, 
Kenyans held a specific threat. 187 
Kenyan events in 1969 also shaped British views. On 5 July, Mboya was assassinated, which Norris 
argued ‘changed the Kenya political landscape more dramatically than any single event since Odinga’s 
withdrawal from the KANU Ruling Party in 1966’.188 This was another political assassination, with 
rumours of Kenyatta’s involvement, but Norris was  
reluctant to believe that the President or Njonjo were in fact parties to this particular plot … 
[Kenyatta] cannot have been ignorant of what was going on and must at least have allowed 
the organisers to assume his tacit approval. But it would be characteristic of his methods to 
adopt an equivocal attitude189  
He was clearly unwilling to entirely blame Britain’s ‘friends’. Eric Le Tocq, head of EAD, was more 
sceptical, although he did not directly criticise the High Commissioner’s judgement.190 Norris and BHC 
seemed more consciously willing to turn a blind eye to Kenyatta’s demerits. The KPU was banned soon 
afterwards and Odinga and others arrested. British observers had long disliked Odinga and this 
removed him as a potential threat to their influence. Norris argued that ‘the banning of the K.P.U. has 
its hopeful and positive side. Questions of electoral morality apart, it creates the possibility of 
reintegrating the Luo into Kenyan political life’.191 Once again, ‘electoral morality’ was not the primary 
concern: Kenyatta’s leadership was assured, and this remained the British priority. After his release, 
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BHC ‘have tended to assume that Oginga Odinga is not a serious threat in present circumstances, since 
if he really starts being a nuisance someone will put him away, this time perhaps for good. I hope this 
is not being too sanguine’.192 Democracy was not their focus, and political detention – of someone 
they disliked – was not criticised. There was no real British reassessment of the value of the Kenyan 
relationship or their focus on Kenyatta’s elite. 
 
Conclusion 
A 1968 British paper on future aid policy boldly stated that ‘Kenya has been the success story of the 
newly independent English speaking African states’.193 The Cold War influenced ideas in these years, 
but Kenya had committed to the Western side: Norris argued that Kenya ‘has firmly resisted 
Communist overtures’.194 In June 1969, Norris sent a despatch entitled ‘Kenya: Future British Policy’ 
to the Foreign Secretary; in which he considered that ‘prospects for the future are increasingly 
uncertain. Ought we to continue to be so heavily involved[?]’.195 His question was rhetorical, and his 
answers were certain of the value of this relationship:  
Britain’s policy of generous support for Kenya has so far been a success … any sudden or 
drastic reduction in the scale of the British commitment to this country would increase the 
risk of Kenya becoming a cockpit of conflicting foreign interests ... In almost every field of 
activity, the Kenyatta Government looks first for help to us, and make no secret of their 
preference for British advice or their reliance on British professional standards196  
As Norris here argued, the British presence in Kenya was both extensive and welcomed by the Kenyan 
elite. He viewed Britain’s position in Kenya as worth preserving. Donald Tebbit in EAD replied that:  
It is a nice matter of judgement, not only in Kenya, but elsewhere in Commonwealth Africa, 
to know how much of our present involvement is really important to us, how much is to be 
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encouraged, and how much might gradually be allowed to fall away. Kenya is no doubt a 
special case because of the extent and value of our interests there197  
This period fostered and cemented certain British relationships with leading Kenyans. British policy-
makers focused very much on Kenyatta and their diplomacy was all about regular contact with a small 
number of men around the president – rarely with Kenyatta himself. They wanted to ensure the 
position of these men and to keep their trust, and they conspired and negotiated in pursuit of that 
aim, with military and security issues dominating their discussions. The military planning discussed in 
this chapter was very private, and planned for things which did not occur: Odinga did not attempt a 
coup, nor did Somalia invade. Yet the plans British decision-makers made on the basis of Kenyan 
requests were highly revealing. They show how elite Kenyan politics was conducted; with prominent 
individuals involved in secret and private discussion with the British government, of which most of 
Kenya was kept uninformed. British policy-makers wholeheartedly committed to reinforcing this neo-
patrimonialism, privileging their personal connections at private meetings. These two plans also 
indicate the degree of British commitment to Kenyatta and Kenyan stability, which would also be 
beneficial in other areas such as investment and the Cold War. These military plans confirmed the idea 
amongst both the British and Kenyans that Kenya was ‘special’ to Britain, and that the British military 
could be prepared to reinforce this. 
The other major concern for the British government during these years was very public: Asian 
migration. British officials had to contend with criticism from Britain and Kenya; through, as their 
approach to Njonjo shows, they still hoped to recourse to their favoured ‘friends’ and informal 
connections. The threat of the Asians gave Kenya a specific bargaining chip which again allotted Kenya 
a ‘special’ position in British thinking. There was no grand plan of designed British influence, but the 
policies which emerged over these years converged to make Kenya appear particularly important as 
somewhere Britain had distinctive commitments. There was no single British interest, but a 
combination of interests, focused on the value of British trade and investment, the European and 
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Asian populations, Kenya’s strategic importance in the Cold War, and the military relationships. The 
combination of these made British decision-makers particularly involved and invested in Kenya. This 
was also self-reinforcing: as the British put more into Kenya and made greater commitment, they had 
more to lose and Kenya became increasingly significant. In this way, multiple British decisions were 
both made because of the view, and created the impression, that Kenya was ‘special’. 
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‘There is a fair balance of interests here and no reason, therefore, why we should not continue 
to have a mutually profitable relationship’ 
S.Y. Dawbarn to British High Commissioner in Nairobi, 28 March 19731 
 
By 1970 Kenyatta’s primacy was assured. There was some British recognition that he was becoming 
‘increasingly autocratic, detached and preoccupied with considerations of personal enrichment ... He 
remains however Kenya’s undisputed leader and people fear the consequences of his eventual 
departure’.2 The uncertainty around Kenyatta’s succession, which continued to fascinate British 
decision-makers, meant that criticism of Kenyatta was tempered by the belief that he was still better 
than the alternatives. Moi and Mungai were the two main succession candidates and British views on 
both were varied but generally negative. Unwilling to commit to supporting either, they hoped that 
Moi and Mungai would agree between themselves to some kind of power sharing.3 British diplomats 
thus aimed to foster connections with both of them and looked to cement relationships at multiple 
military and political levels rather than backing a single successor.  
The early 1970s relationship had stabilised, so that British concerns were essentially conservative. But 
they were also defensive, aware of the strength of the Kenyans’ position, particularly with the Asian 
population as a threat. This was a period of multiple negotiations and the British were not, nor did 
they feel themselves to be, in control of these. Chikeka has argued, partly focused upon Britain and 
Kenya, that ‘donors are able to manage and manipulate the decision-making processes in the new 
                                                          
1 S.Y. Dawbarn (for the Secretary of State) to British High Commissioner in Nairobi, ‘British/Kenyan Ministerial 
Talks, 4-9 March 1973’, 28 March 1973, TNA FCO 31/1503/186. 
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African states’.4 But although Britain might appear to be in the stronger position, this was not always 
the case, and Kenyans were able to shape the negotiations and their outcomes. As Staniland has 
argued about Franco-African relationships: ‘objective indicators of inequality cannot predict how 
power will actually be distributed’, arguing that the French ‘evident superiority in resources does not 
of itself shape French policy or enable any such policy to be effective’.5  Meerts has also argued that 
‘countries have comparative power advantages or disadvantages, depending on the subject in 
question … Power is not an unchangeable variable’.6 This was true of the British in Kenya. British civil 
servants, diplomats and politicians felt themselves constrained both by their ideas of the possible and 
by the demands of Kenyans, and there were issues on which they clearly did compromise. 
Negotiations occurred with multiple parts of the British government: ODM, MOD, FCO, and at prime 
ministerial level. The idea of the relationship as ‘special’ had been established but was not shared by 
all. Many continued to view Kenya as something of a tutelary relationship and this attitude did not 
always assist negotiations; nor did a lack of recognition that the Kenyans did not always want to be 
publicly associated with Britain. This chapter uses different negotiations – the Bamburi Understanding 
in 1970, aid in 1970-71, Asians and arms from 1972, and general talks in 1973 – as a way to explore 
this negotiated relationship and where power rested at various points, internally within the British 
government, as well as with the Kenyans.  
 
The Bamburi Understanding Renewed 
One example of the continuation of British interests and commitments into the 1970s was the military 
relationship. In 1970, Major General Ndolo, who had succeeded Penfold to become the first Kenyan 
Chief of Defence Staff in 1969, wrote to Gichuru about the future of the British training team in Kenya. 
The planned run-down meant that ‘all Europeans of any seniority [will] disappear in December 1972 
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except for Brigadier J. R. Anderson or his successor’.7 Anderson had replaced Penfold as Commander 
of the British training team and the highest ranking British serviceman in Kenya – as well as having 
contact with the Kenyan military. However, Ndolo wanted to retain three advisors, one for each 
service branch. In a clear sign of the importance of personal connections, he was ‘not keen to have 
him [Anderson] replaced by an unknown Brigadier’, suggesting Lieutenant Colonel Michael Harbage, 
already in the British training team, be promoted to Colonel as Anderson’s replacement in 1971: ‘we 
would then have a senior Advisor whom we know and trust for a minimum of four years’.8 This letter 
was copied to the British Defence Advisor in BHC, as well as Anderson, Harbage, and the British 
commanders of the Kenyan Air Force and Navy. Ndolo clearly wanted to maintain military ties to 
Britain despite the rundown of the training team.  
The response from the British government was mixed. BHC’s Defence Adviser thought it ‘essential that 
the British should keep its considerable influence in the Kenya Armed Forces in the foreseeable 
future’.9 The FCO Defence Department, however, was concerned that  
the criteria has to be not only that Kenya has a case for continuing to receive that form of 
assistance but also that it rates priority over that of other countries. Kenya has, of course, 
already received more than most countries in the form of military technical assistance10  
They questioned whether Kenya merited ‘special’ treatment, but others favoured this. High 
Commissioner Norris wanted to ‘maintain the excellent relationship which we now have with the 
Kenyan Armed Forces and continue to have some influence on the standard of training and the 
equipment used’.11 The training team was intended to facilitate close and friendly relationships and 
the redrafted terms highlighted this role of ‘maintaining and fostering friendly relations between Army 
personnel and personnel of the Kenya Armed Forces, and more generally … between HMG and the 
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Government of Kenya’.12 The Defence Department came round to supporting this idea, as did MOD.13 
Harbage remained as requested and thus British military influence was retained following – once again 
– a Kenyan request for this.  
Another key part of the military relationship was the Bamburi Understanding. The Understanding lay 
largely dormant, and became a concern only when Kenyatta asked for renewals, which occurred with 
successive prime ministers coming to office. When Edward Heath took office in 1970, McKenzie – once 
again the most significant person in this – called on Peck, the former High Commissioner who had 
originally given the Understanding but who no longer worked directly on Kenya, suggesting the 
importance of these personal connections. McKenzie told Peck that Kenyatta ‘hoped that now that a 
Conservative Government is in power the understanding could be renegotiated’.14 Peck told McKenzie 
this was unlikely, but McKenzie ‘considered it most important that from the presentational point of 
view’ ministers be received and obtain ‘a warm and friendly message’.15 Peck recommended renewal 
as ‘a reasonably cheap price to pay … but I would certainly not advise any strengthening’.16 Norris 
agreed.17 There was no desire from within the British government to extend this commitment, which 
had been given in the full knowledge it was ‘deliberately vague and non-committal’.18  
This was an occasion when the benefits Britain received from Kenya were linked with obligations. In 
preparing for the prime ministerial meeting, the new government was anxious not to appear less 
‘friendly’ than the previous – just as had been the case when the ‘Sandys Understanding’ had led to 
the creation of the Bamburi Understanding.19 McKenzie ‘hinted in typically McKenzie fashion that of 
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course we still enjoy facilities for the RAF in Kenya and that the Army hold training exercises three 
times a year; he did not actually mention naval facilities at Mombasa but he might well have done 
so’.20 The Understanding had been made without reference to British military benefits and Le Tocq, 
head of EAD, argued that the ‘various defence facilities which we enjoy are not of course granted to 
us in the context of Bamburi and it is quite wrong for McKenzie to suggest that they are’.21 Although 
he wanted to pretend the Understanding was not linked to training facilities, most civil servants were 
more candid about the reality of this exchange of benefits and explicitly linked the Understanding to 
military benefits as ‘a price worth paying ... [to] help to safeguard our present defence facilities in 
Kenya and be a useful card to play in the matter of our own defence interests around the Cape’.22 
There was a clear sense of bargaining here: giving the Kenyans what they were asking for in return for 
maintaining British interests and keeping the support of Kenyatta. The Bamburi Understanding 
remained ‘a useful card to play’ for the British in other negotiations. On 8 September 1970, McKenzie 
and Njonjo met Heath. Kenyatta did not ask for extended terms, and Heath confirmed the 
Understanding.23 The Bamburi Understanding had become an important part of the benefits 
exchanged between the two countries and would have been difficult to remove without giving offence 
and potentially putting British military benefits at risk. But it was such a limited commitment it was 
not difficult to renew.  
 
Aid Negotiations 
Where British resources were more engaged was aid, and in 1970 the British and Kenyan governments 
conducted a new aid agreement. This negotiation revealed key dynamics in the relationships between 
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Kenyan and British policy-makers, involving ODM, FCO and Treasury. These were striking as they 
began as very formal, bureaucratic negotiations – unlike many other aspects of the relationship – but 
were resolved by more informal and personal contact. British officials found themselves reluctantly 
forced to compromise and change their position; they, at least, felt that at times the Kenyans had the 
upper hand. Britain was an important aid donor to Kenya, though her predominance had diminished: 
from over 80 per cent of the total in 1964 to under 50 per cent in 1972, with the increasing prominence 
of the US, West Germany, Scandinavia and the World Bank.24 In 1964 the independence settlement 
had been £34.2m, with an additional £4m in August 1964, followed by aid in 1966-70 of £18m (see 
table 15).25 Table 13 shows that Britain was Kenya’s largest aid donor, in both grants and loans, over 
these years, and although their proportion decreased sharply in 1965, they remained the largest 
bilateral donor. Table 14 shows the place of Kenya within Britain’s broader aid framework. As this 
indicates, British aid was mostly bilateral and spent within the Commonwealth. Interestingly, East 
Africa received a substantial portion of the aid to Africa in 1964-66; and of this Kenya received by far 
the largest share. Of Britain’s total overseas aid, Kenya also received a significant proportion: 8.57 per 
cent at its highest, although decreasing. This indicates the priority accorded to Kenya within Africa and 
more widely.   
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Table 13: External Finance Raised for the Development Budget (K£m)26 
 1963/4 1964/5 1965/6 1966/7 1967/8 
Grants:      
UK 4.41 3.47 2.35 0.50 0.17 
China - 1.07 - - - 
Others 0.33 0.26 0.18 0.14 0.04 
Total Grants 4.74 4.80 2.53 0.64 0.21 
UK as percentage of total grants (%) 93.04 72.29 92.89 78.13 80.95 
Loans:      
UK 5.86 6.34 3.95 2.38 3.29 
International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (World Bank)  
0.27 0.27 0.13 0.36 0.08 
International Development 
Association (World Bank) 
-   0.03 0.51 1.42 1.47 
US - - 2.22 0.70 0.61 
Germany 0.73 1.22 0.20 0.53 0.54 
Others - 0.12 0.24 0.23 0.30 
Total Loans 6.86 7.98 7.25 5.62 6.29 
UK as percentage of total loans (%) 85.42 79.45 54.48 42.35 52.31 
 
Table 14: The British Aid Programme and Kenya's Place in it (£m)27 
 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Total Gross Aid Programme 191.2 194.8 207.2 200.8 202.8 
Of which: Bilateral 175.5 176.2 187.4 181.8 184.2 
Of which: Commonwealth Countries 156.1 155.8 163.6 161.3 163.7 
Of which: Africa 72.1 71.1 57.7 57.7 63.2 
Of which: East Africa 32.3 30.8 24.3 17.9 17.9 
Of which: Kenya 14.4 16.7 10.5 7.6 9.7 
Kenya as percentage of East African 
aid (%) 
44.6 54.2 43.2 42.5 54.2 
Kenya as percentage of African aid 
(%) 
20.0 23.5 18.2 13.2 15.4 
Kenya as percentage of gross aid 
programme (%) 
7.5 8.6 5.1 3.8 4.8 
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At initial discussions between officials on 6 and 9 February 1970, Kenyan officials made their aid 
requests. These totalled over £43m, as well as requests for £12m of previous loans to be written off; 
considered ‘far in excess of what HMG could provide’.28 Between the official meetings in February and 
ministerial meetings in April, Treasury and ODM agreed on an offer of £10m over four years, with half 
for general development, a quarter for land transfer, and remainder for agricultural reforms.29 Frank 
Brockett of ODM (having previously worked in BHC) thought this likely to ‘be a reasonably acceptable 
offer from their point of view, even though it is far below what they are asking for’.30 Norris, however, 
disagreed, arguing that: ‘Aid on the scale which is at present envisaged will come as a shock to them 
and could develop into a coldness and a positively anti-British approach’.31 This was indeed 
substantially less than the previous British package. Partly, this was because of the reduction in land 
transfer funds, and because the UK government had taken over the pensions costs of previous colonial 
officials; partly it was because of the low level of Kenya’s aid disbursements, which meant that there 
were left-over funds; and it was also due to British estimates of what Kenya needed and Kenya’s 
success at receiving more from others.32 
As well as the overall amount of aid, a key consideration for British planners was the proportion of the 
loan to be tied to spending on British imports, with the remainder for ‘local costs’.33 In February 
Kenyan officials had criticised British aid tying, arguing – perhaps somewhat disingenuously – that ‘The 
whole tendency in the public and private sectors in Kenya was to import from UK, and it was 
unnecessary and meaningless to apply tying restrictions’.34 This argument had not found favour. The 
                                                          
28 Record of meetings held in ODM with the Delegation of Officials of the Kenya Government, third meeting: 
10.20am, 9 February 1970, TNA FCO 31/608/26. 
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30 F.N. Brockett to E.G. Le Tocq, 5 March 1970, TNA FCO 31/608/36. 
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‘general development’ part of the 1966 loan had been 60 per cent tied and this was the starting point 
for the debate. ODM favoured increasing the tied proportion to 75 per cent.35 Le Tocq, head of EAD, 
wanted this to remain tied at 60 per cent, arguing that any increase would be ‘ill-received’ by the 
Kenyans.36 The view from Treasury and Board of Trade, however, was that: ‘this is still an extremely 
generous and unusual proportion … Any proportion of more than say, 15% untied in the total would 
be exceptional’.37 The economic departments of the British government intended to gain as much as 
possible back from the loans given. The Treasury wanted Kenya to be treated more in line with other 
countries; whereas for EAD in particular, Kenya was a special case, and they did not want to potentially 
prejudice relationships by attaching too stringent conditions. ODM sought to mediate: Brockett 
argued to the Board of Trade that ‘whilst an increase in the tying proportion over that for the current 
loan was certainly justified, to take it beyond 75% would be unreasonable … and might well prove 
counter-productive’.38 Nonetheless, the primacy of the Treasury was clear and the starting point for 
the talks was to be 85 per cent, though with the intention of ‘some flexibility’.39  
Ministerial negotiations took place in nine meetings during 6-14 April 1970, led by Kibaki as Minister 
of Finance. Other ministers attending were McKenzie, Jackson Angaine (Minister of Lands and 
Settlement 1964-79), and Zachary Onyonka (Minister for Economic Planning and Development 1969-
70), as well as the Kenya High Commissioner in London, and Permanent Secretaries of Finance, 
Economic Development, Lands and Settlement, the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, Directors of 
Personnel and Settlement, and Chief Finance Officer. From the British side were ODM Minister Judith 
Hart, Norris and one other from BHC, three members of FCO, and eight ODM staff.40 These were high-
level delegations from both sides, showing the importance attributed to these talks. The meetings 
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38 F.N. Brockett to R.K. Paskins, 25 March 1970, TNA FCO 31/609/57. 
39 General Note: Kenya Aid Talks April 1970, 31 March 1970, TNA FCO 31/609/62. 
40 Record of meetings on future British aid to Kenya, April 1970, TNA OD 26/275/127. 
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themselves, as the British had predicted, were ‘tough’.41 After the opening statements, the British laid 
out their offer, to immediate disappointment from the Kenyan delegation.42 One point of contention 
was money for land transfer, which would be used to purchase European farms, and was not tied but 
much of which would end up back in the UK.43 British officials wanted to put a higher proportion of 
the loan towards this, whilst the Kenyan delegation argued that, with the limited amount Britain was 
providing, no money could go towards that rather than land consolidation and rural development. On 
the question of tying, the proportion of 85 per cent was, unsurprisingly, rejected by the Kenyans, who 
immediately raised the threat of Eastern bloc funding.44  
British negotiators were evidently uncomfortable at the Kenyan response. Kibaki was not playing along 
with the British idea that they knew what was best for Kenya. Hart complained of ‘slow progress … 
caused by the Kenyans raising fresh difficulties at each meeting’.45 This proved an effective tactic since 
the Treasury came ‘under considerable pressure to improve on this offer’.46 By the eighth meeting on 
13 April, ODM had arranged new conditions:  the loan would be increased to £11.5m, including a 
£2.75m grant, and would be 75 per cent tied.47 Had they not made concessions, as Hart wrote after 
the negotiations were concluded, it could ‘have led to a breakdown, which was something we all 
wanted to avoid provided that the price of doing so was not unacceptably high’.48 She was not 
prepared to allow the talks to fail, even at the cost of additional finance. The Kenyan response was 
not what the British had hoped for: Kibaki immediately reiterated his demand for only tying 60 per 
cent and wanted a different division of the money, though he ‘appreciated’ the grant proportion.49 
Civil servants described his response as ‘most ungracious’,50 but they did change the division of funds 
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for land transfer, taking this closer to the Kenyan request, so that a memorandum could be signed by 
Kibaki and Hart.51  
Following the conclusion of ministerial talks, there was reflection within the British government on 
their negotiating tactics. The Kenyan delegation had been able to substantially alter the British offer 
and one Treasury official grudgingly acknowledged that ‘Mr Kibaki’s negotiating method has been very 
successful’.52 William Rogers, also from the Treasury, drafted a letter to Hart ‘to raise with you the 
unsatisfactory nature, which these talks have highlighted, of our negotiating methods … it was very 
disturbing to us to be faced with making a series of concessions’.53 From the perspective of these 
officials, Kibaki had forced them into a series of hasty compromises. Before sending his letter, 
however, Rogers was thanked by Hart for agreement on the terms.54 Rogers’ reply was more tempered 
than his draft, asking instead ‘whether you thought our present negotiating procedures were entirely 
satisfactory’.55 Hart agreed they were not and that ‘we really must try to avoid such a situation 
occurring again … I need to have a substantial degree of flexibility in the position agreed inter-
departmentally before aid talks begin so that it is possible to negotiate’.56 As table 15 illustrates, these 
were the aid negotiations at which Britain offered the least money with the greatest tying of project 
aid. 
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Table 15: British Aid to Kenya, 1964-80 (£m)57 
 1964 1965/
66 
1966 1970 1973 1975 1976 1979 
Total aid 34.20 4 18.0 11.50 22 2.5 49.7 80 
New aid 34.20 4 18.0 11.50 17 2.5 37.3 65 
Carryover 
from previous  
    5  12.4 25 
Pension loans 13.60        
Land transfer 12.00 1 6.3 3.75 7  9.5  
Land 
consolidation 
  3.0 2.75     
General 
development 
8.55 3 8.7 5.00 15  33.6 65 
Programme 
aid 
     2.5 6.6 15 
Tied 
proportion of 
general 
development 
 42% 60% 75% 50% 100% 50% 
(Programme 
aid 100%) 
50% 
(Programme 
aid 100%) 
 
At the negotiations, Kibaki had seemed unappreciative despite – as the British saw it – their generous 
concessions. Afterwards, however, Norris wrote to Hart that ‘Kibaki has, moreover, been appreciative 
in his public remarks … This is all very gratifying, though it would have been nice if Kibaki had expressed 
something of this to you before he left’.58 Hart responded that Kibaki’s subsequent appreciation ‘goes 
a long way to make amends for, as you say, a certain lack of grace in the attitude of the Kenyans while 
they were here!’.59 This had not encouraged close personal relations. This was not the end of the 
process, highlighting that although ministers could play a key role in negotiations, the role of 
embassies thereafter remained critical in ‘settling, or tidying up, the details’, as British diplomats now 
had to.60 From 3 to 11 June, two ODM staff went to Nairobi for official talks ‘to put some flesh on the 
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skeleton agreement’ and held eleven meetings over nine days.61 These talks were less obstructive than 
those held in London, but still not positive: Brockett recorded that ‘the Kenyans were very intransigent 
and were reluctant to concede any points ... I have no illusions that the further round of talks will find 
the Kenyans any more amenable, and if I am to take part in them, I shall not look forward to the task 
with much enthusiasm’.62  
As Brockett predicted, subsequent negotiations saw further British frustration. In November, Norris 
sought to meet Kibaki, but he proved elusive, postponing the two appointments Norris had made and 
not rescheduling.63 Norris argued that ‘we have reached the limit of how far it is desirable for me to 
chase Kibaki waving a cheque book’.64 Deputy High Commissioner Robert Munro could ‘only speculate 
as to why they are so reluctant to agree to reasonable conditions’.65 This clearly indicates the 
continuing sense of tutelage: that the British knew what ‘reasonable conditions’ were and could not 
understand why the Kenyans did not recognise their own interests as the British did. Munro compared 
this to previous talks led by expatriates: ‘reasonable people who knew just how far they could go in 
safeguarding the interests of the Kenyan Government to the maximum extent, without pushing so 
hard as to reach a deadlock’.66 The implication was that Kibaki was ‘unreasonable’ and not acting in 
Kenya’s best interests. Norris later felt the need to report to EAD ‘a peculiarity of negotiations here’ 
which was that:  
when the Kenyans themselves are in disagreement about the line they should take in any 
discussion or negotiation, they will immediately go to ground. Nothing will induce them to 
meet the other party … It must on occasion seem peculiar from London when we have to 
report repeated frustrations over our attempts to see Ministers with whom we are basically 
on good terms67  
                                                          
61 R.W. Munro to E.G. Le Tocq, 1 July 1970, TNA FCO 31/610/95. 
62 F.N. Brockett to Thomas, 13 October 1970, TNA OD 26/276. 
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64 Ibid. 
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66 Ibid. 
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Here was an occasion of Norris thinking he understood Kenyans and trying to pass on his ‘knowledge’. 
It seems that the internal dynamics of Kenyan elite politics caused some of the behaviour which so 
annoyed the diplomats – something Norris does not seem to have entirely realised. Contact with the 
British could be useful for Kenyans in internal factional politics, but it could also be problematic to be 
seen as too close. As Meerts has argued, the interests of one negotiating party ‘often requires that 
negotiations be strung out and that solutions are delayed because the existence of the current 
unstable situation offers an advantage’.68 This was the situation on this occasion, with Kibaki choosing 
to delay.  
The final resolution of these negotiations in January 1971 stresses again the importance of personal 
and informal means of conducting politics. It also reiterates Norris’ frustration. Permanent Secretary 
at the Ministry of Finance Philip Ndegwa asked for a meeting but Norris did not want to attend without 
Kibaki, which Ndegwa ‘hope[d] that you will re-consider’, suggesting a date and time.69 Norris in reply 
overreacted: he could ‘reply in kind, but do not propose to do so, at any rate for the present, because 
I do not think this is the right way for you and me to conduct our business’.70 Norris copied the letters 
to ODA, with a justification for his response:  
it is not my normal practice to insist on talking to Ministers only, but in present circumstances 
here it seems clear that Kibaki is the only person with whom we can strike the sort of bargain 
that is clearly necessary if we are to bring these apparently endless stalks to a satisfactory 
close. I am certainly not going to let myself in for another round of useless wrangling at a 
slightly higher level. As you will see, Ndegwa’s letter to me is quite astonishing in its bland 
impertinence … I clearly could not accept it, however charitable an interpretation one might 
put on it71 
ODA recognised his overreaction. Walter Lamarque, who had been involved in policy-making towards 
Kenya in CRO before being seconded as head of East Africa Department in ODM,  thought ‘Sir E Norris 
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is, of course, much nearer to all this than we are, and no doubt has good cause for exasperation, but 
his reaction to Mr Ndegwa’s letter seems unduly sharp. Is it really so impertinent?’.72  
Norris’ letter to Ndegwa also suggested ‘a private talk on where we go from here, what about a beer 
and a sandwich by my swimming pool next Tuesday[?]’.73 The two men did meet, not at the time 
suggested by Norris, but informally, and had a ‘very useful conversation’ at which remaining points of 
uncertainty were settled.74 ODA and Kibaki confirmed these and the agreement was signed.75 Norris 
described the meeting as ‘cordial and Ndegwa had the grace to admit that he ought not to have 
written as he did’.76 It is unclear whether their meeting did take place over ‘a beer and a sandwich’, 
but this was certainly taken out of the formal context of earlier negotiations which had occurred with 
larger delegations over multiple meetings. This was now moved from the official into the personal, at 
a high enough level with two men empowered to make decisions. There was a mutual decision that 
informality would prove most useful, driven by a lack of consensus on the Kenyan side and the British 
belief that this would secure agreement – though Norris had wanted to talk directly to Kibaki. Kenyans, 
particularly Kibaki in this instance, were able to shape both the terms of the aid agreement and the 
forms of negotiation used to achieve it. 
 
1971 Coup Plot 
In 1971 rumours of a coup plot began to circulate in Kenya. In contrast to 1965, there was more 
evidence of a real plan. Of more interest here than details of the plot itself, which have been covered 
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elsewhere,77 was the ‘UK eyes only’ paper written by Norris on 21 April considering the ‘possibility of 
a coup in Kenya’. The paper followed discussions in BHC involving Brigadier Anderson, and ‘we drew 
on secret sources, well placed expatriates and in short all the information available to us. Even so I 
need not emphasise that much remains speculation’.78 Interestingly, this letter was written after the 
proposed date of the attempted coup, 8 April, though the meeting had been held earlier.79 It is thus 
questionable how much Norris and his ‘secret sources’ knew about the realities of the coup plot – 
which became public knowledge later in the year – and it seems rather that much of this was 
speculation without real knowledge of the actual plan. 
Norris thought there was a real threat, particularly because of ‘the growing corruption, nepotism and 
inefficiency of Government (although not yet particularly remarkable by current African standards) 
and the increasing domination of the Kikuyu’.80 Kenya was still compared favourably with much of 
Africa, but he was aware of problems. Chief of Defence Staff Ndolo was viewed as the potential coup’s 
leader, although with some scepticism about his credibility. Norris and his sources believed ‘the 
momentum in Kenya is now towards, rather than away from, an Army coup’.81 Regarding its chances 
of success, Norris considered that: ‘An attempt at an Army coup in the near future with Kenyatta still 
alive and the country not ripe for a coup would probably end in failure’ and be ‘almost certainly 
damaging to our interests’.82 Thus far, it was unsurprising. In certain circumstances after Kenyatta’s 
death however, Norris argued that a coup ‘would be virtually certain of success’ and, ‘would be likely 
to produce a Government which would be at least as well disposed towards HMG as the present Kenya 
administration’.83 This was a startling admission that the British government might favour a coup. In 
terms of British action about the possibility of a coup, Norris recommended ‘discreet advice … [to] the 
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Kenya Government to institute reforming measures to make a coup less likely’.84 The British SAS was 
training the Kenyan General Service Unit (GSU), ‘the para-military arm of the Police which has been 
built up to oppose an Army coup’.85 However, Norris questioned this: ‘If any Army coup should 
produce, as seems likely, a pro-Western Government, why should we help the force that will oppose 
them? My present view is that we ought not to strive officiously to help the GSU’.86  
Even more revealing were ideas about potential coup leaders and their British connections. Norris 
suggested Brigadier Jackson Mulinge and Colonel Peter Kakenyi as possible coup leaders. Mulinge was 
Army Commander, his background was in the King’s African Rifles, he had undertaken a course in 
Britain in 1968, and was described as ‘Very pro-BATKEN (British Army Training Team, Kenya) and pro-
British’.87 Kakenyi was Deputy Commander of the Kenya Army, had attended Staff College in Britain, 
and in 1971 was attending a Royal College of Defence Studies course in Britain, where he wrote a 
dissertation on ‘Soviet and Chinese influence in East Africa’.88 Norris believed that ‘Mulinge and 
Kakenyi are already well aware that we are well disposed towards them, and if they did mount a 
successful coup, their subsequent relations with HMG should be good’ and their leadership potentially 
beneficial.89 Norris thought he knew and understood them, and their British training was key to this. 
The purpose of British training was not to build up a military threat to the Kenyatta regime; indeed 
one former diplomat described military training as providing ‘officers who provided training to help 
Kenya become a democratic country’.90 Yet on this occasion, if there was to be a coup, continued 
British military connections made this a potentially beneficial outcome. This indicates a successful 
British investment to build up a cadre of officers who could be trusted. This had not been the case in 
1964-65 but seemed so by 1971. In a subsequent consideration of ‘Kenya after Kenyatta’, BHC argued 
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that Britain’s ‘first priority is to seek to stay close to the Army ... By so doing we seek to ensure that 
any military government would turn naturally to us for support and advice on its assumption to 
power’.91 Sending Kenyans on military courses in Britain was therefore to be encouraged, although 
keeping this ‘entirely within the boundaries set by Kenyan Government wishes’.92 This response to the 
idea of a coup was part of the broader disillusionment with potential successors: without someone to 
support in the political sphere, British officials were more willing to consider backing military 
leadership if this would secure British interests. 
When details of the plot emerged a few months later, head of EAD Le Tocq was initially ‘not inclined 
to attach too much significance to it’.93 Allinson of BHC ‘was told in confidence by the Assistant 
Commissioner of Police for Nairobi, Miles Oswald’ of potential links to MP Gideon Mutiso, who came 
to be implicated.94 Clearly these kinds of connections provided another route of information. Within 
a few weeks, however, the plot was ‘revealed to have been a possibly serious threat to stability in 
Kenya’, with Ndolo’s resignation, although not prosecution.95 In Norris’ Annual Review he wrote that 
the plot ‘came as a considerable shock, inept and ill-conceived though it was’.96 As he had been 
speculating about a coup at the time, this perhaps suggests Norris’ ‘shock’ at realising that he had not 
been as aware and knowledgeable as he had assumed. Norris’ letter was another misreading by British 
officials of the Kenyan situation – indeed, another by him after his overreaction to Ndegwa’s letter on 
aid. British diplomats thought that with their ‘secret sources’ they knew and understood Kenya, but 
in fact continued to misunderstand and make inaccurate predictions without full comprehension or 
awareness of Kenya’s internal politics.  
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Norris continued to paint ‘a slightly more gloomy picture’ in a despatch at the end of the year.97 In it, 
he gave his ‘own tentative view is that while the army is still most likely to act effectively against a 
breakdown of law and order, they might conceivably step in earlier to “save” the nation from 
corruption, tribalism and the general disrepute of the present régime’.98 As this shows, he had not 
ruled out the possibility of a coup. The response from EAD was an attempt to secure British interests; 
Le Tocq asked ‘Is there any policy of insurance we could take out? (apart from the obvious one of 
getting the army officers as well-disposed as possible – but the availability of courses and money is 
likely to put a limit on what we can do in that direction)’.99 He laid clear importance on military training 
as a route to securing future friendly relations if the military took political control. New EAD head 
Simon Dawbarn suggested actively trying to shape events, wanting greater certainty and stability for 
the future. He questioned BHC on: 
what scope you see in the coming months for a positive policy aimed at bringing about in due 
course a transfer of power, preferably an orderly one, into the hands of people who are likely 
to use it in a way that benefits HMG’s interests in Kenya and in the wider area. Please do not 
conclude, on the strength of that sentence, that I am under any illusions as to our power to 
shape events, I realise that it is very limited and must be used with extreme discretion. Still, it 
cannot be negligible … Can we use them to help shape events? If so, in which direction? Can 
we – should we? – pick our runner now and back him positively? Mungai? The Army?100  
This is one piece of correspondence which appears profoundly neo-colonial, with the suggestion that 
Britain try to decisively determine the succession in their favour. But this is in fact striking because it 
is so unusual, with limited support from BHC, and really demonstrates continued uncertainty. 
Dawbarn had no favoured succession candidate – strikingly Moi was not mentioned – and officials 
were wary of trying to pick one. Reviews of how the succession might develop were frequent ‘to see 
whether any of these possible regimes would be seriously inimical to our interests, in which case we 
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might think what – if anything – could be done to avert loss’.101 But although talking about this, there 
remained such uncertainty that little was really done. British diplomats felt unable to predict how the 
succession would develop or choose their favoured candidate. Thus, policy was intended to keep open 
and strengthen connections to all possible political and military successors. 
 
Arms and Asians 
For British officials, Kenya’s Asians continued to be the most problematic issue in their relationship in 
the early 1970s, with the potential to be domestically damaging. The position of Asians also became 
entangled with the sale of arms to Kenya, and British fears about Kenyan action over the Asians 
encouraged their consideration of more generous terms as different elements in the relationship 
became interdependent, with negotiations occurring simultaneously. The crucial moment came when, 
on 4 August 1972, Ugandan President Idi Amin announced the expulsion of ‘the over 80,000 Asians 
holding British passports who are sabotaging Uganda's economy and encouraging corruption’.102 The 
Ugandan Asians were given ninety days to leave the country and Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary Alec Douglas-Home ‘accept[ed] a special obligation’.103 There followed a large influx of 
Asians into Britain, as well as some other countries which allowed entry to a certain number.104 Over 
the next three months, ‘all but a few hundred’ left Uganda.105 
Immediately after Amin’s announcement BHC sought to understand Kenya’s position. The Deputy 
High Commissioner saw Dawson Mlamba (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) who 
informed the British that ‘Kenyans understand on very good authority that Amin means business 
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about expulsions and is not prepared to negotiate’.106 This suggests that, uncertain of how serious 
Amin’s pronouncement was, the British consulted the Kenyans. Using the Kenyans as an intermediary 
in their relationship with Amin was part of why Kenya was significant as a regional ally.107 BHC also 
spoke to Njonjo, always one of their interlocutors, who said Kenya would not intercede with Amin.108 
Despite these private conversations with BHC staff, Njonjo ‘is strongly opposed to there being any 
visible contact between British and Kenyan ministers’.109 Asians were already the subject of Kenyan 
press criticism of Britain,110 and leading Kenyans did not want to publicise their British connections. 
This was an indication of the difference between the Kenyan elite’s private cooperation with the 
British and their public desire for distance. By mid-September, ‘we have had little direct contact with 
Kenyan Ministers. They have avoided talking to us about the Asians for fear that the contact would be 
misinterpreted’.111  
MP Geoffrey Rippon was quickly sent as a British government envoy to Kenya despite Njonjo’s 
concerns about contact, and ‘found a relaxed and sympathetic atmosphere … they would not be likely 
to take a lead from President Amin’.112 This did not end British speculation on ‘the chances of Kenyatta 
and Nyerere in fact copying Amin?’.113 But High Commissioner Duff highlighted the ‘pragmatic self-
interest of the Kenyan establishment … they are sufficiently aware of economic facts to understand 
the harm that would be done to the Kenyan economy by any attempt to follow Amin’s example, even 
in a modified form’.114 BHC recognised that ‘the Kenyans are not going to adopt an Amin policy. But 
there are ways in which they can and probably would make life increasingly difficult for us’.115 Amongst 
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civil servants and diplomats who were most aware of the situation in Kenya there was no real fear of 
an expulsion, but the Kenyans held a direct threat over Britain. Indeed, very quickly, Moi asked for an 
increase in the quota, predictably refused by the Home Office, but showing that the Kenyans were 
aware of their powerful bargaining position.116 Douglas-Home was keen to confirm in parliament that: 
‘We have had no indication from the Kenyan Government that they wish to expel such British 
nationals’.117 To other MPs, however, this was not so apparent, and one argued: ‘everyone knows that 
a similar problem will arise at some time in the future with regard to the Kenyan Asians … let us 
prepare to help the Kenyan Asians when they come, as they will’.118 Even in 1974 Furedi argued that 
‘the implementation of the Ugandan option is a political possibility at any time in Kenya’,119 though he 
overstated this: this was the public projection of leading Kenyans but not their private intention.  
How Kenya’s leaders chose to react was the key issue. Duff recognised that many Kenyans ‘give 
instinctive and unthinking support to any form of Asian bashing’.120 One example was a press 
conference by Assistant Minister for Home Affairs Martin Shikuku, who supported Amin’s actions and 
announced that ‘All non-citizens in Kenya would have to leave the country unless they stopped 
sabotaging Kenya’s economy’.121 Duff later described Shikuku as ‘notorious and insubstantial’,122 
although it is interesting to consider whether he would have been viewed in this way prior to his 
pronouncement, which was so obviously distasteful and potentially damaging to the British. However, 
Kenya’s inner elite, although publicly encouraging Africanisation and minimising contact with the 
British, wanted to limit pressure. BHC ‘understand from secret sources that as soon as Vice President 
Moi heard of Shikuku’s press conference he warned all news media to suppress the item’.123 This gives 
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a sense of how Kenyan politics was organised, and BHC offered no comment on this suppression of 
press freedom. Government speeches tried to strike a balance; Moi in September argued that ‘Kenya 
recognises the contributions made in her development by the efforts, skills and investments of the 
immigrant communities … it is imperative that such people should cast off their fatalism and 
contribute sincerely and positively to advance the aspiration of Africans’.124 BHC thought this ‘should 
be taken as reassurance’.125  
Alongside the issue of the Asians, and making clear that different aspects of British policy were 
connected, was the question of arms sales. BHC informed MOD and FCO in October 1972 – in a request 
that had gone through BHC’s Air and Defence Advisers – that Kenya desired to purchase six Hunter 
aircraft and other equipment totalling £10m. The issue was less the purchase itself – although it is 
notable that in 1964 Sandys had rejected selling Hunter aircraft to Kenya – than the terms of the deal, 
since the Kenyans were hoping for a loan. The Kenyans specifically linked this to wider geopolitical 
threats from Somalia in the north-east of Kenya and Ugandan bombings of Tanzania.126 The key person 
in the arms negotiations was McKenzie, even though by 1972 he was no longer in government, 
suggesting once more the importance of his British relationships and the trust Kenyatta placed in him. 
The arms deal highlighted the limited number of those within Kenyatta’s kitchen cabinet who were 
kept abreast of decisions: like the Bamburi Understanding, this was a private negotiation made with 
leading politicians. The British were informed ‘that a complete ban had been imposed upon any 
discussion about the project at any level’, including with the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
Defence, Kiereini.127 This was not going through official civil service channels. McKenzie met the British 
Defence Secretary Lord Carrington and head of defence sales Lester Suffield in October 1972.128 By 
                                                          
124 Kenya Government Statement issued by His Excellency the Vice-President Hon. Daniel arap Moi, [September 
1972] TNA FCO 31/1204/24. 
125 E. Clay to A. Joy, 6 September 1972, TNA FCO 31/1204/24. 
126 R.W. Whitney to W.L. Allinson, 12 October 1972, TNA FCO 31/1201/11. 
127 D.A.I. Sergeant, to Defence Sales 2, 11 December 1972, TNA FCO 31/1211/84. 
128 R.J. Andrew to A.A. Acland, 26 October 1972, TNA FCO 31/1210/25. 
Chapter Five: 1970-1973 
205 
 
November, McKenzie was criticising the British response, but diplomats recognised that ‘Whilst 
undoubtedly there is substance in some of Mr McKenzie’s points, I do not think we should – or were 
expected to – take them too seriously. It is part of the negotiation’.129.  
One key Kenyan negotiating tactic – as so often – was the possibility of turning to other suppliers if 
British assistance was not forthcoming. However, this was not just a question of the Cold War. Since 
the rejection of Russian arms in 1965, Eastern bloc military support was fairly unlikely under Kenyatta’s 
leadership, especially whilst linked with Odinga, and the major competitors were elsewhere. By 1972, 
other countries including France, Germany, Pakistan and Canada had increased their military supplies 
to Kenya. Munene has argued that ‘as long as Kenya sided with the West in the Cold War struggle, 
Britain was unperturbed by Kenya’s diversifying its foreign relations’.130 In fact, although Cold War 
allies were certainly preferable, British suppliers hoped to maintain their dominant influence, and did 
not want to dilute their military presence except in ways that suited them. This was about Kenya’s 
pro-British rather than just pro-Western alignment, and it was this British policy-makers hoped to 
preserve. Norris’ concern after Kenyatta’s death was not ‘an anti-Western regime’ but ‘a change of 
emphasis, of direction within the West, and our present influence could be replaced by that of, say, 
West Germany’.131 A key example of the growth of other influence, about which British officials were 
unhappy, was the French sale in 1971 of Panhard armoured cars. This was organised by Gichuru, 
whom BHC reported was ‘thought to have had £10,000 credited to his bank account in order to “oil 
the wheels”’,132 and about whom they were increasingly critical: he was a ‘pathetic wreck’ answering 
questions on this in parliament.133 This was a clear example of individuals pursuing their own 
advantage through military and political deals. Gichuru’s deal with the French almost certainly 
encouraged increasingly negative British assessments of him. Meanwhile France had ‘successfully 
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broken into what was previously a British military equipment monopoly’.134 This seemed possible 
again over the supply of aircraft, with the French keen to supply Mirage V aircraft, and McKenzie 
argued that France was ‘poised to offer an arms package’, although British policy-makers believed that 
‘obviously the French would be happy to move in but we do not believe that they have a package 
“poised”’.135 This competition helps to explain the British willingness to sell aircraft they had rejected 
supplying to Kenya in 1964. 
British officials took McKenzie’s advice, delivered in these arms negotiations, that the Prime Minister 
write a personal message to Kenyatta about his handling of the Asians.136 BHC encouraged ‘any 
opportunity that offers to instil some warmth and a sense of special treatment into our relations with 
Kenya’.137 Diplomats were keen to encourage the idea of a ‘special’ relationship in recognition of 
Kenya’s threat over the Asians. Heath wrote ‘to thank you for keeping the temperature down ... I am 
afraid that the blunt political fact is that, whatever the rights and wrongs, public opinion here would 
simply not stand for the arrival of another contingent of Asians on the same scale as the Ugandans’.138 
This was transmitted via Lord Aldington, Chairman of National and Grindlays Bank, who had multiple 
meetings over an extended period with leading Kenyans including Kenyatta and McKenzie, and was 
used on this and other occasions to transmit messages from the FCO to Kenyatta.139  He was clearly 
trusted as a non-official channel by both groups, and highlights the significance of personal business 
connections. When given the letter, Kenyatta ‘showed at once his pleasure that the Prime Minister 
should have chosen to write to him personally... He seemed also to understand fully the effect of 
General Amin’s measures on the British political and social situation’.140  
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Arms sales were explicitly linked to the Asians by both sides. McKenzie ‘let it be known that whether 
or not we are helpful over the arms deal will be a factor which would be likely to have considerable 
significance for the Kenyan Government in considering their future policy over the Asian UKPH’.141 It 
seems likely this was why the Kenyan approach on arms purchases took place at this time: they knew 
they were in a strong position and held a potential lever over Britain. For British negotiators, this 
encouraged consideration of softer terms: ‘Kenya is at present uniquely placed to harm us and we 
must do all that we can to persuade her not to do so’.142 Ten year credit was suggested, ‘longer than 
usual’,143 but Treasury was concerned at setting a precedent, so Dawbarn suggested a partial grant, 
which was accepted.144 As the Kenyans and McKenzie had intended, the British government saw Kenya 
as requiring special treatment.  
In January 1973, Carrington had a brief layover in Nairobi. This was intended to foster communication 
at a high level, with Asians and defence sales the main topics of discussion. Carrington had meetings 
with Kenyatta, Moi, and Gichuru and made the British arms offer.145  This was ‘an outright gift of £2m 
towards the cost of the £10m package … He emphasised the generous and exceptional nature of this 
offer’.146 Carrington was therefore ‘disappointed’ by Kenyatta’s reply in which he  
appreciated the gesture which had been made. Kenya valued Britain’s friendship and had 
turned to Britain first to meet her arms requirements. The British offer was welcome; but 
Kenya faced serious economic difficulties and did not wish to be obliged to turn elsewhere. 
He wondered whether something more could not be done147  
                                                          
141 R.W. Whitney to Campbell, Le Quesne, 29 November 1972, TNA FCO 31/1211/73. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
144 S.Y. Dawbarn to Campbell, Le Quesne, Davidson, Smith, Marshall, 13 December 1972, TNA FCO 31/1211/85. 
145 Meeting between Defence Secretary and the President of Kenya at State House, Nairobi, 23 January 1973, 
TNA FCO 31/1517/27; meeting between Defence Secretary and the Kenyan Minister of Defence at the Ministry 
of Defence, Nairobi, 22 January 1973, TNA FCO 31/1517/28; meeting between the Defence Secretary and the 
Vice-President of Kenya at Jogoo House, Nairobi, 22 January 1973, TNA FCO 31/1517/38. 
146 Meeting between Defence Secretary and the President of Kenya at State House, Nairobi, 23 January 1973, 
TNA FCO 31/1517/27. 
147 Ibid. 
Chapter Five: 1970-1973 
208 
 
Kenyatta’s response made clear that he valued his relationship with Britain, but was always keen to 
gain the most possible from it. This was not renegotiated, and the first Hunter aircraft arrived in Kenya 
in mid-1973.148 
Carrington’s meetings made differences obvious between Kenyatta and Moi over the Asian question. 
Moi indicated he wanted the quota to be ‘substantially raised’, which Carrington rejected.149 Passing 
comments on Moi’s ‘usual rather obscure and muddled self’ offered a reminder of British doubts over 
his capabilities.150 By comparison, views of Kenyatta were far more positive. When asked by 
Carrington, Kenyatta agreed that ‘Kenya would not press for more’ than the current quota.151 This 
guarantee came to guide British thinking over the Asians and Kenyatta’s personal assurance was 
trusted.152 As this indicates, there was not one national policy all Kenyans were pursuing, and the 
primacy of Kenyatta was apparent, whilst Moi’s ideas were ignored.  
 
General Relationship Talks 
Concern over the Asians continued to affect the relationship into 1973 when this formed part of much 
broader talks on the Anglo-Kenyan relationship. In September 1972 Duff saw McKenzie, who passed 
from Kenyatta a request for an invitation to send a minister to London ‘to discuss how Britain might 
help Kenya’.153 Duff followed this up with Duncan Ndegwa (Governor of the Bank of Kenya), Philip 
Ndegwa, and Njonjo, all of whom reiterated the idea of broad talks and ‘emphasised that what the 
Kenyans were hoping for was an informal, relaxed, friendly and thorough discussion of Kenyan-British 
relations, in which each side would state its own self-interest, and explore the other’s points of view 
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and policies’.154 Duff was ‘aware that all this will fall with a fairly dull thud’ when the Asian issue was 
still a problem; ‘Nevertheless, life must go on’.155  
Part of the explicit reason for the talks was to encourage connections between British and Kenyan 
ministers. The impetus came from Kenyatta who thought that his ministers ‘knew few members of 
the present [British] Cabinet ... On the other hand they had every reason to admire a number of them 
and they would like to know them better’.156 For British officials, this was about relationships with 
potential future successors, with Kibaki and Mungai leading the Kenyan delegation. Duff 
recommended that the talks ‘would give a good opportunity to begin to establish the sort of 
relationship we must have with two men who ... represent an important part of the establishment 
with which we shall have to continue to do business’.157 It is notable that Moi was not included; 
indicative perhaps of the internal factional politics of the time. Around the time the talks were 
proposed in late 1972 there were multiple rumours that Kenyatta might nominate Mungai as 
successor,158 and Mungai was ‘still widely expected to come to power one way or another’.159 
McKenzie too was absent, although he had made the initial approach to Duff. By this time, he was not 
a minister and had no formal position, which might explain why he was not included; Kibaki and 
Mungai were Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs, a more official rather than informal choice. This 
seems to have been an attempt by one faction in Kenyan politics to develop better personal relations 
with the UK, and to exclude McKenzie, Njonjo and Moi – although those British involved do not entirely 
seem to have understood this.  
For British policy-makers, the key question of the talks was the ‘price’ which would have to be paid for 
future Kenyan friendship. Dawbarn highlighted that: 
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We can probably secure a continuation of our privileged position in Kenya, and count on 
Kenyan cooperation for example with the Asian problem, if we are prepared to pay the price: 
a fairly steep increase in aid. It seems clear that we stand no chance of maintaining our 
position into the post-Kenyatta era, in which Kibaki and Mungai, and people who think like 
them, will be in key positions, unless we are prepared to pay for it. How much, will be a matter 
for negotiation160  
These were not simply aid talks, but those in EAD sought to use aid to secure the relationship. The 
implication is that the British government had decided in advance to use the talks to ‘buy’ Kenyan 
goodwill. ODA, although accepting the idea of talks, resisted this:  
we should frankly not be willing to negotiate aid in an atmosphere in which we were being 
looked to not only by the Kenyans but by other Whitehall departments to “pay the price” for 
securing “continuation of our privileged position in Kenya”161  
Despite initial ODA objections, a new aid package was planned. The internal discussions were 
contested, with tying again the key battleground. ODA argued that there was a case ‘for doing 
something very special’ and wanted to reduce the tied proportion to one-third of the total loan 
including land transfer (using this calculation the previous loan had been 48 per cent tied).162 For this, 
Treasury could ‘see no justification at all’; they preferred 65 per cent tying, but would offer 50 per 
cent ‘on the clear understanding that it … will not be quoted against us in discussion in other 
contexts’.163 Treasury argued that aid had to be kept within the overall aid framework, so that ‘if you 
regard it as essential to do something special for Kenya, you must be prepared to do something less 
in some other quarter’.164 This was a very clear trade-off that treating Kenya as ‘special’ meant 
therefore giving comparably less aid elsewhere. With limited resources, the British government was 
having to decide its ‘special’ cases. Tying was still under debate at the time of the talks.  
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Plans for the talks made clear British objectives in the relationship. Initial briefs drawn up by EAD, with 
comments from BHC incorporated,165 advised: 
the purpose of the talks should be to convey to the Kenya government the general impression 
of a British government which values our keeping in touch and is very willing to be helpful to 
Kenya on the basis of mutual self-interest … We think that what the Kenyans want from this 
visit is to be treated, and be seen to be treated, as old and trusted friends and important 
members of the international community166  
Clearly these talks were not expected to be purely substantive, but were important for creating an 
atmosphere of friendliness and establishing ministerial connections. Policy-makers listed British 
‘objectives in Kenya over the next 12-18 months’ as:  
(i) To help the Kenyan Government to resist the pressures for expulsion of Asian UKPH. 
(ii) To use our still considerable influence to help the Kenyans prepare for, and effect, an 
orderly transfer of power when Kenyatta goes. 
(iii) To maintain as far as possible our share of the Kenyan market and protect our investment 
there.  
(iv) To try to steer the Kenyans, and the East African Community, towards Option 1 under 
Protocol 22 of the Treaty of Accession to the EEC. 
(v) To maintain close defence links with Kenya, and deny defence facilities to Eastern bloc 
countries.  
(vi) To enter into the final stage of buying-out the British mixed farmers.  
(vii) To use our aid programme, in conjunction with other donors, to help the Kenyan 
Government to develop their economy along sensible lines, to protect British interests 
and to promote British trade.167 
This summary makes clear British priorities and the benefits they hoped to gain. Although the issues 
had not changed significantly from the previous decade – with the exception of the EEC – the greater 
priority afforded to the Asians was crucial, and this had gone to the top of the list. There was a clear 
sense of paternalism, but a recognition that British aims could only be achieved in conjunction with 
Kenyan support.  
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Mungai and Kibaki attended talks from 4 to 9 March. Duff was keen to ‘be as generous as we can’ over 
hospitality, highlighting that ‘the Kenyans will set great store by the seniority of the British Ministers 
taking part’.168 Thus, the programme included a dinner hosted by Heath, and another by Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary Douglas-Home; and lunches hosted by Lord Aldington, Lord Carrington, 
MacDonald, and the Chairman of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; as well as a reception 
hosted by the Kenya High Commissioner. The visit included meetings with the Commonwealth 
Secretary-General, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Parliamentary Under Secretary for Trade, Minister for 
Overseas Development, and Minister of State at the Treasury.169 The delegation was being entertained 
at the highest level of government and meeting people from multiple departments with the aim of 
encouraging connections. Issues discussed included EEC entry, trade, aid, Kenya’s UN Security Council 
membership, Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portuguese colonies.170 
Asian UKPHs were the key British interest and had the largest potential domestic impact. This was not 
on the official agenda but was ubiquitous; British officials expected it to be raised and prepared 
accordingly.171 However, when this was discussed, ‘Mr Kibaki’s remarks at Tuesday’s meeting show 
that the responsible Ministers in Kenya view the problem of Asian non-citizens rather differently from 
what we had thought’: the Kenyans wanted to quickly remove small shopkeepers rather than 
‘professional people or industrialists, whom they cannot replace yet’.172 This was another occasion of 
British officials thinking they knew Kenyan attitudes, but in fact not understanding exactly what the 
Kenyans really thought – even on an issue they viewed as particularly important to them. This also 
suggested that the talks had been successful without the need for an agenda item. 
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The aid package for 1973-76 was announced by ODA Minister Richard Wood at the talks. This was an 
offer of £22m over four years, of which £17m was ‘new money’: £7m for land transfer, and £10m for 
general development.173 This was substantially more than the 1970 package of £11.5m. This was 
influenced by political considerations of ‘buying’ Kenyan goodwill, but was also due to an increased 
rate of Kenyan aid disbursements – previously, there had been criticism of Kenyan underspending. 
M.P.J. Lynch of ODA had argued that unless they increased the amount of aid, ‘we shall not be able to 
undertake our proper role in Kenya’, and it is notable that he believed Britain to have such a role.174 
The Kenyans had asked for £28m over three years, and although offered less, this was closer to their 
request than had been the case in 1970.175 British planners thought the proposals ‘likely to be ill-
received’;176 but when offered this, Kibaki ‘expressed gratitude for the assistance given by HMG 
towards Kenyan development. He expressed disappointment in particular that the loans were not on 
easier terms’.177 This was still critical, but was a more positive response than he had made in 1970, 
and EAD’s sense was that ‘the aid talks, incidentally, seem to have gone very well’.178  
The British government broadly saw the talks as a success: ‘we were able to give the Kenyans what 
they wanted – a lot of flattery and rather more money than they probably expected’.179 Dawbarn 
argued that the relationship with Kenya contained ‘a substantial degree of self-interest on both sides 
… There is a fair balance of interests here and no reason, therefore, why we should not continue to 
have a mutually profitable relationship’.180 This was not a relationship the British controlled or 
dictated, but one in which, as Dawbarn suggested, policy-makers felt what they could gain about 
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equalled what they put in, and this made it worth investing in. British officials formed particularly 
positive impressions of Kibaki, and whilst uncertainties about Mungai remained, he ‘put up a good 
performance and maintained (with almost complete success) a sober and statesmanlike manner’.181 
Future succession prospects remained the concern and Dawbarn highlighted the need ‘to consolidate 
our personal relations with Dr. Mungai, Mr. Kibaki and other prominent members of the leadership – 
in particular Vice-President Moi’.182  
 
Conclusion 
The early 1970s were a time of substantial and substantive negotiation across many departments. The 
detail of these makes clear the fallacy of simple neo-colonialist analysis. In multiple and varied 
discussions between Kenyans and different parts of the British government there was real negotiation, 
in which British policy-makers did not feel in control and certainly not in a position to entirely dictate 
terms. British participants imagined this as a tutelary and informal relationship: they wanted to be 
able to tell Kenyans what was right for them, and they wanted Kenyans to be appreciative of this 
advice. In some ways, this period saw Kenyans pushing back against this. In 1974, Dawbarn wrote that 
Kenyans ‘have a reputation as hard bargainers. But unlike many other countries they are genuinely 
and publicly appreciative of the aid we give them, and repay our assistance in tangible ways’.183 Both 
sides had things to gain from their relationship.  
British officials aimed to achieve the most beneficial outcome for themselves without prejudicing their 
relations with the Kenyans. For the British government, the Bamburi Understanding was an easy sign 
of support to offer, whilst in arms sales and aid negotiations they had to compromise. The threat of 
turning to other suppliers was a frequently deployed Kenyan negotiating tactic, aware of the British 
desire to maintain their position in Kenya. The Asians were the main threat from Kenya during these 
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years, and an issue British officials sought to manage by offering favourable terms elsewhere. The 
Kenyan response to British offers was often more negative than British civil servants, diplomats and 
politicians were hoping for, as they typically saw themselves as being generous to Kenya as a ‘special’ 
relationship. Those British involved seem sometimes to have simply not understood the problems 
which Kenyan politicians had in dealing with them. Kenyan politicians evidently valued their 
relationships with Britain, which they could use in their own factional intrigues, but no one wanted to 
be seen as too close to the former colonial power, and so sometimes they avoided contact.  
Personal relationships remained particularly significant. McKenzie remained ubiquitous, though no 
longer a minister, involved in many of these negotiations with the notable exception of the general 
talks. British policy-makers continued to favour and focus upon Kenyatta, with the position of the 
Asians thought stable whilst he was in power, and the Bamburi Understanding significant to him 
personally. With the expectation of Kenyatta’s death at potentially any time, the succession was still 
crucial and, with this, the need to know potential successors. Norris’ speculations about a coup in 1971 
highlighted the absence of any political candidate favoured by the British for succession – if they had 
had this, they surely would have been less sanguine about a coup – and that they valued and trusted 
their military connections as much, if not more, as those with Kenyan politicians and civil servants. 
There was thus a conscious effort by the British to embed relationships at multiple military and 
political levels as a corollary of a refusal to pick and back a single successor. Kenya was still often 
viewed as a special case of a close British relationship in Africa, but with a sense that this was 
potentially fragile: upon Kenyatta’s death, the future for British interests did not seem assured. 
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Chapter Six: 1974-July 1978  
 
‘Everyone is waiting for the old man to die’ 
High Commissioner Duff, Valedictory Despatch, 20 August 19751 
 
During the mid-1970s, the British relationship with Kenya appeared to be slipping. There was greater 
uncertainty amongst British policy-makers and they no longer had the money or military ability to 
pursue their former policies. This was particularly apparent in the military alliances, plans and 
understandings on which the relationship had previously been built. British defence abilities were 
decreased, and the 1974-75 Mason defence review planned to reduce defence spending as a 
proportion of Britain’s gross domestic product from 5 per cent to 4.5 per cent over ten years, whilst 
focusing on NATO and decreasing manpower.2 Dockrill described the 1970s as ‘years of relative 
stagnation in Britain’s defences’.3 This was also a time of British financial weakness. Blank has argued 
that by 1974 Britain appeared ‘at the very edge of economic chaos … due primarily to efforts of 
successive British governments to maintain an international role which was beyond the nation's 
capacity’.4 Inflation rose from 7 per cent in 1973 to 27 per cent in 1975.5 Britain had finally joined the 
EEC in January 1973, but this had ‘arguably made Britain’s economic position worse’.6 These 
considerations meant that British decision-makers were less willing to invest in their Kenyan 
relationship.7 
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Military policies had been largely premised on Sandys’ 1964 argument that Kenya should not purchase 
expensive military equipment but rely on British military support if necessary. This was already being 
challenged, and in 1974 British policy instead became one of supporting an arms build-up in Kenya 
and turning the Kenyans away from any potential reliance on direct British intervention. In 1974, as in 
1970, the Bamburi Understanding was renewed with little debate or dissent, but in 1978 the idea of 
ending the Understanding was for the first time seriously contemplated, with gradual disengagement 
favoured. The key event, however, was Britain’s failure to supply Kenya with ammunition following 
the Israeli raid on Entebbe. This made explicit the global military and financial weakness of Britain, 
with the emptiness of British commitments and abilities laid bare. From 1974 to Kenyatta’s death in 
1978, the direct and tangible benefits which had made Kenya such a useful partner for Britain and vice 
versa seemed in decline. While neither was willing to break this entirely, both sides were reassessing 
the terms of the security alliance.  
The relationship was also slipping because of Kenyatta’s decline. Kariuki’s murder encouraged British 
doubts about Kenya’s elite. This was by no means the first political assassination in Kenya, but British 
officials were particularly affected. The murder showed that they were not as knowledgeable as they 
thought, and were less in touch with events and individuals than they had believed. Kenyatta had for 
so long seemed to offer security for British interests, but from the mid-1970s he was seen less 
positively. This led some British diplomats, notably High Commissioner Duff, to be particularly 
pessimistic, and more inclined to criticise than many of his predecessors. Criticisms included 
Kenyatta’s lack of focus and ability, the growth of corruption, Kikuyuisation, ‘an increasingly autocratic 
style of government’, and the possibility that these issues may ‘seriously reduce the chance of an 
orderly succession and will become a major threat to the country’s stability’.8 Kenya had previously 
been compared positively with other African states on issues such as corruption, but by 1975 ‘Kenya 
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loses her status as a shining example of democracy in the African gloom’.9 This was also, as Duff stated 
in 1975, a time in which ‘Everyone is waiting for the old man to die’.10 After so long looking 
apprehensively to a future without Kenyatta, Duff even came to welcome the prospect: in December 
1974 his ‘considered conclusion is that it would now be in Kenya’s best interests that his Presidential 
term should not extend beyond 1976’.11 However, not all had abandoned the idea that Kenyatta was 
still beneficial and the greatest threat was from the succession. Ewans, head of EAD, had ‘long-
standing misgivings about the country, where there are perhaps more British interests at risk than 
anywhere else in Black Africa’.12 He described British policy as one of ‘hoping for the best’.13   
 
Military Policies  
In 1974, two aspects of the Anglo-Kenyan military relationship were considered, one highlighting 
continuities, the other a change which would come to characterise British policy thereafter. The first 
was the renewal of the Bamburi Understanding under the second Wilson government in 1974. In July 
1974, Duff reported a request for Njonjo and McKenzie to be received by the Prime Minister.14 As they 
had been so many times before, these two men were the key figures. One official noted: ‘We would 
not of course wish to take up the Prime Minister’s time with a matter such as this, were it not for the 
fact that this is President Kenyatta’s chosen method of doing “sensitive” business’.15 The 
Understanding was linked by McKenzie and Njonjo to ‘the threat to Kenya and the supply of defence 
equipment’, which they also wanted to discuss.16 Duff recognised that ‘the Kenyan Government are 
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increasingly anxious about being surrounded by countries which are better equipped militarily, whose 
intentions are uncertain, and who are under apparently increasing Soviet or Chinese influence’.17 As 
Okumu has argued, Kenya felt ‘threatened by what it perceived as socialist encirclement’.18 Ewans 
‘consider[ed] that the Kenyan fears are unduly alarmist (but have commissioned a [Joint Intelligence 
Chiefs’] reassessment of the threat)’.19 The Kenyans again raised the suggestion of turning to other 
suppliers and Duff considered this, unusually, a realistic threat: it may have ‘began as an ill-considered 
suggestion, and/or as a possible negotiating tactic. My assessment now is that in Kenyan eyes it is 
becoming a genuine option’.20  
McKenzie met Wilson on 5 August 1974 and passed on Kenyatta’s request for confirmation of the 
Bamburi Understanding.21 Wilson ‘said he hoped that there was no possibility of any shock decisions 
on the expulsion of Asians from Kenya’; again, different issues were being linked with the implicit 
suggestion that this could influence the British response.22 Internally, the British government 
appreciated the different interpretations placed on the Understanding:  
It may be that the Kenyans have come to read more into the Understanding than it contains. 
We see no advantage however in spelling out its limited nature ... On the other hand, any 
suggestion that we intended to water down the 1967 commitment could have a seriously 
prejudicial effect on our relations with Kenya23  
The British government was keen to maintain the benefits this offered in the relationship with 
Kenyatta himself, who was thought to value this particularly highly; ‘There is little doubt that President 
Kenyatta regards the Understanding as a touchstone of Kenya’s “special relationship” with us’.24 From 
the perspective of British officials, this was also an easy part of the exchange which made up the 
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relationship: it was not too difficult to agree to something which ‘only commits us to consultation’.25 
Wilson sent a formal letter to Kenyatta, stating categorically that ‘my colleagues and I stand by the 
assurance’.26 
At his prime ministerial meeting, McKenzie also asked, rather than for expensive military equipment, 
for ‘the British Government to send two military advisers (in civilian clothes) to Kenya to advise the 
Kenyan Government’.27 McKenzie and Kenyatta still looked to Britain for this kind of support, and 
British policy-makers encouraged the request. As had been the case immediately after independence, 
they recognised the influence they would gain by being in a position to advise on the direction of 
Kenya’s military future. A two-man team, led by Major General Rowley Mans, went in September 
1974. The terms stipulated that  
the MOD team will not be engaged on a sales drive and though we would naturally hope that 
the final recommendations would involve the sale of British equipment, the prime object of 
the exercise is to assist the Kenyans in planning a sensible re-equipment programme and to 
reassure them that HMG is actively concerned in helping to improve their military capability28  
The advisor was to work from the Kenyan Ministry of Defence, not BHC.29 Mans’ report concluded that 
Kenya’s defence forces ‘are NOT capable of deterring an overt Somali attack … I am therefore 
convinced that you should expand your armed forces’.30 He recommended a three-phase, nine-year 
plan, costing ‘between £38M and £55M at 1974 prices’.31 This was clearly a very different 
recommendation from a decade earlier, when a more limited Kenyan military had been encouraged 
to potentially rely on British intervention if necessary. The British financial and military ability to 
provide this kind of intervention was no longer assured, and nor would the international climate 
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encourage it. This was also about getting the Kenyans to pay more for their own defence: an expanded 
Kenyan military could be beneficial in defence sales, and in encouraging the Kenyans to resist Somalia 
themselves rather than relying on Britain. Encouraging a Kenyan arms build-up, as Mans’ report did, 
was now the British approach to Kenyan military policy.   
 
Aid Policies  
In aid too, some British officials hoped not to have to pay too much for their relationship, despite 
increased economic problems in Kenya. In the years immediately after independence the economy 
had been one of Kenya’s strengths, with almost 7 per cent growth rates during 1964-72.32 From 1972 
to 1982, however, this decreased to an average of 4.8 per cent, and whilst ‘high in comparison to 
much of Africa, it was a significant decline’,33 with a deficit in Kenya’s balance of payments close to 
K£41m in 1974.34  In 1973 the rise in oil prices caused problems across the global economy, which 
Cooper has argued was a more profound economic turning point in Africa than independence.35  
The issue of aid revealed again the differing views within the British government about Kenya’s 
importance to Britain. Once again, FCO argued for more aid while ODM and Treasury looked to limit 
this, and throughout 1974 ODM was reluctant to offer further aid despite FCO’s political arguments.36 
But in December 1974 ODM agreed to a programme loan for Kenya. Normally, project aid was given, 
linked to mutually agreed specific projects; by comparison, programme aid was meant for essential 
imports from Britain.37 As well as offering immediate financial assistance to its recipient, it was thus 
also 100 per cent tied. ODM would offer these loans to both Tanzania and Kenya, and initially proposed 
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£2.5m for Tanzania and £2m for Kenya.38 However, Duff argued that Kenya’s loan should equal 
Tanzania’s as ‘in the current low state of Kenyan/Tanzanian relations, the Kenyans would be even 
more ready than usual to complain at being treated differently’.39 It certainly seems likely that leading 
Kenyans would have complained about this and, as was recognised here, the Kenyan response to aid 
was often to request more. Giving the same, or more, aid to Tanzania hints however that aid was not 
purely a political instrument given only to pursue the closest relationships, with ideas of development 
also significant. Accordingly, on a visit to East Africa Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Callaghan 
offered £2.5m each.40 
Arguments continued into 1975 about the next aid tranche. Although FCO argued for Kenya’s specific 
importance, ODM was less convinced and planned to decrease aid. FCO resisted and Peter Rosling of 
EAD argued that: 
There is almost nothing which we cannot discuss with them [the Kenyans] pretty openly, in 
the knowledge that our views will be listened to with sympathy and respect. Our influence is 
strong. There are not so many countries in the region, or more widely, of which one can say 
that41  
The sense of a special relationship, and interestingly one which was ‘pretty open’, hints that British 
civil servants still thought they understood and could work with the Kenyans, and makes clear the 
regional importance of Kenya. In the negotiated nature of the relationship, EAD believed the Kenyans 
were willing partners. Ewans argued that ‘it would be tragic if, as has happened in Uganda, we were 
to see the dissipation of all our efforts and interests’.42 He clearly saw a direct correlation between the 
amount of aid and Britain’s influence. EAD wanted to maintain the relationship and tried to 
manoeuvre Treasury into paying to support it. Showing the extent to which aid was a matter for 
negotiation within the British government, Desmond Wigan in EAD lamented that ‘it will become ever 
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harder to put forward political grounds as the UKPH threat diminishes’.43 His revealing comment hints 
that, despite the problems the Asians had caused, they had been a useful internal bargaining tool for 
EAD staff to use with ODM and Treasury. Table 16 indicates the British contribution to Kenya’s total 
aid, a proportion which clearly declined over the years around this discussion – though it should be 
noted that this relative decline was largely due to an increase in other bilateral aid, which increased 
by 175 per cent over the years 1972-76.  
Table 16: Total Kenyan Aid by Sources, 1972-1976 (US$m)44 
 1972 1973 
 
1974 1975 1976 
Total 
 
72.10 95.70 119.40 128.90 162.70 
UK 21.11 21.56 29.63 13.94 29.40 
Other 
bilateral 
39.49 54.14 69.77 92.56 108.60 
Multilateral 11.50 20.00 20.00 22.40 24.70 
UK as 
percentage of 
total (%) 
29.29 22.53 24.82 10.81 18.07 
 
British officials additionally hoped to encourage Kenya’s leaders to look elsewhere and not rely solely 
on Britain. Duff argued that ‘it is in the long run to our advantage to help them help themselves, 
especially if we can do it with other people’s money’.45 Michael Hannam of BHC wrote to the Trade 
Relations and Exports Department trying to gain  
some idea of the way the Gulf States are going about disbursing their development funds … It 
is in the nature of relations between us and the Kenyans that they look to us on occasions for 
advice … we should like to be able to give the Kenyans some good practical advice should the 
need arise46 
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British diplomats still felt they had a role as advisors to Kenya, but this was also a sign of British 
financial weakness. The British wanted to maintain influence, but did not want to use their own 
money, and hoped rather to use that of pro-British governments in the Gulf who had benefitted from 
the oil shock.47 The reply considered it ‘no doubt politically desirable that you should be able to make 
use of the special British relationship with the Kenyans in this way’, but in this instance could not 
because they lacked knowledge; despite trying to act as broker, they had no information to pass on.48  
BHC was also keen to reassure the British business community in Kenya that they should not disinvest. 
Though Holtham and Hazlewood argued in 1976 that there was ‘precious little contact between the 
British High Commission in Nairobi and most British businessmen in Kenya’,49 the recollections of those 
who worked in BHC in these years suggest otherwise. Goodall, Head of Chancery 1968-70, had ‘a great 
deal to do with’ the British business community.50 Peter Wallis, commercial first secretary 1974-79, 
recalled that ‘the task was mainly to meet and assist visiting British businessmen and to advise them 
on the Kenyan market, local companies and local agents … closely involved with a wide range of British 
firms in Kenya’.51 BHC’s role was one of providing advice and encouraging the interests and persistence 
of British firms in Kenya. In May 1975, the Kenyan Sessional Paper No. 4 announced ‘the need for a 
programme of austerity more severe than we have yet experienced’ which would ‘curtail the quantity 
of our imports’.52 In response, Wallis wrote ‘a draft article covering the points of most interest to 
British industry’ to inform the business community.53 Wallis argued that ‘if British exports are tailored 
to Kenya’s needs, British industry will still find opportunities as well as challenges in the Kenya 
market’.54 This encouragement was not entirely successful, and in 1975 ‘old established British trading 
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companies of MacKenzie Ltd., and Mitchell Cotts (EA) Ltd., both sold control to the Kenyatta family’.55 
Clearly there was less British confidence in the Kenyan economy, and this also hints at the increasing 
acquisitiveness of the Kenyatta family. Wallis recognised in July that ‘the competition for the market 
will intensify and British suppliers will be tested … it will require a considerable effort to regain lost 
ground and to hold our share of a static or shrinking market’.56 The British predominance in Kenya was 
being challenged, as tables 17 and 18 make clear. Across the 1970s, the British share of Kenyan imports 
decreased by 10 per cent, and of exports by almost 8 per cent. 1976 was the first year Kenyan exports 
to West Germany surpassed those to Britain.57 
 
Table 17: Kenyan Imports58 
 Total UK Japan US West 
Germany 
British 
percentage 
of total (%) 
1971* 3,682.0 1,124.0 386.0 326.0  30.5 
1972 3,552.0 1,011.0 357.0 239.0  28.5 
1973 4,060.0 1,013.0 517.0 334.0  25.0 
1974** 366.0 64.0 40.0 21.0  17.5 
1975 347.3 69.5  24.8 27.0 20.0 
1976*** 972.9 186.9 107.5 56.4 101.2 19.2 
1977 1,289.1 230.9 158.6 77.8 140.0 17.9 
1978 1,710.8 377.7 175.7 106.4 227.1 22.1 
1979 1,631.2 398.3 138.9  155.3 24.4 
1980 2,213.2 478.7 228.9  207.1 21.6 
*1971-73 in millions of Shillings   **1974-75 in K£ millions *** 1976-80 in US$ millions 
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Table 18: Kenyan Exports59 
 Total UK Japan US West 
Germany 
British 
percentage 
of total (%) 
1971* 1,463.0 295.0 52.0 98.0  20.2 
1972 1,909.0 408.0 42.0 110.0  21.4 
1973 2,305.0 404.0 100.0 145.0  17.5 
1974** 218.0 19.0 5.0 8.0  8.7 
1975 222.4 22.7  8.4 19.2 10.2 
1976*** 793.1 86.5 15.2 44.0 100.6 10.9 
1977 1,186.0 153.4 12.6 66.6 207.1 12.9 
1978 1,023.0 148.2 9.9 47.8 147.3 14.5 
1979 1,102.0 223.5 22.0  154.0 20.3 
1980 1,270.0 156.2 10.7  163.1 12.3 
*1971-73 in millions of Shillings   **1974-75 in K£ millions  *** 1976-80 in US$ millions 
 
J.M. Kariuki’s Assassination 
In March 1975 the assassination of Kariuki shook British confidence in Kenya. Kariuki had gained 
popularity as a vocal critic of Kenyatta.60 Duff described him in 1973 as ‘a rogue politician, a 
professional enfant terrible of boundless energy, muddled ideas but formidable charisma’.61 His 
murder revealed to the British their lack of knowledge, as either their Kenyan contacts were lying to 
them, or they too were not in complete control when Kariuki went missing. BHC informed London that 
‘The Kenyan authorities have assured us that they know nothing. Neither we nor the Americans have 
any information so far to contradict this’.62 British diplomats placed a level of trust in their Kenyan 
associates and this would be proved false. Whilst what had happened was still unknown, MPs Charles 
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Rubia and Dr Muriuki visited Christopher Hart of BHC. This was not an official meeting at BHC or with 
the High Commissioner, but with a second secretary at home. Hart reported that Rubia:  
was very nervous about being overheard and checked on the reliability of our servants (both 
JM fans) first. It is vitally important that our various links with the present regime do not 
enable the Kenyans to discover anything of Rubia’s visit … I think that he preferred to make it 
at the lowest level because senior officers might feel more compromised in their dealings with 
Government leaders. He also knows me socially and had been to the house recently63  
This makes clear the importance of private and social relationships which were not always at the 
highest level but which encouraged contact. The concern to keep this private also demonstrates the 
factionalism of Kenyan politics. Rubia had been accused of complicity in Mboya’s murder,64 but in this 
instance was visiting to ‘warn the British that the Kenyan Government’s version of the JM 
disappearance appeared to be false … If JM is killed then Rubia expects the President to be killed by 
an outraged populace’.65 Whilst this idea proved wildly overstated, it encouraged British unease.  
Rubia was correct that there was deliberate government misinformation, and when revealed this too 
was part of the shock for British policy-makers: they had believed they understood Kenyan politics 
and politicians, and this was now challenged. Their information and knowledge was always dependent 
upon who they talked to and what they were told, and now their interlocutors kept them misinformed. 
Duff reported likely government culpability and Kenyatta was widely believed to have been involved; 
he was less the benign ‘Father of the Nation’ British civil servants, diplomats and politicians had come 
to imagine.66 Duff suggested the murder might encourage the Kenyan government ‘to realise that they 
must begin to take things gradually out of the President’s hands (and it will be our constant endeavour 
to encourage this)’.67 The murder shocked the British into a new understanding, in which Kenyatta 
was a problem rather than a solution; yet they were aware that there was no ready replacement. The 
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extent of the impact this had on British policy-makers’ ideas about Kenya was hinted at by Barry 
Holmes in BHC, who argued that ‘Whatever the truth of Kariuki’s murder it could still turn out to be 
the longterm [sic] catalyst, which ensures that Kenya will never be quite the same again’.68 British 
diplomats and civil servants became acutely aware that they did not know all – perhaps most – of 
what was occurring in Kenya. The legitimacy of Kenyatta’s government was no longer assured.69 
Kariuki’s death encouraged the idea that the government lacked legitimacy and had inherited the 
behaviours and assumptions of the colonial state; and thus it led people to reflect on the relationship 
with the UK. This was revealed in Kenyan (and also Ugandan) criticism of the presence of British troops 
in Kenya.70 In March 1975, MPs were ‘implying that they were numerous and that [the] Kenyan regime 
depended on foreign troops’.71 MP Waruru Kanja was reported as asking: ‘Are we unable to defend 
our own country so as to seek reinforcement from foreign troops[?] … We have already been under 
British rule, when those soldiers were a common sight, but we no longer want to go back to that kind 
of rule’.72 A total of 207 British servicemen were in Kenya at the time.73 Duff reported that ‘we are 
regarded by the critics as a sinister eminence grise and by some members of the Establishment as a 
kind of scaffolding that keeps the building intact’.74 Many Kenyans believed the British had substantial 
power in Kenya.  
This criticism led to some internal reassessment of British military training. Philip Mansfield in BHC 
questioned MOD: 
We have been given the impression by certain visiting senior officers from the UK that they 
are desirable because Kenya is a pleasant country which gives the troops an agreeable break, 
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but that they are certainly not of vital importance for training purposes. It would be helpful if 
we could know precisely what value MOD put on the present facilities75 
For FCO, if training was just ‘an agreeable break’, it was likely not worth such criticism. MOD, however, 
argued that they ‘placed a very high value on Kenya as a training area. Its importance had, if anything, 
increased’.76 It was obviously in MOD’s interest to portray training in this way as they wanted it to 
continue. BHC recommended cancelling the planned exercise Lorimer and, despite MOD desires for 
this to go ahead, BHC arguments succeeded.77 Cancelling British training exercises directly threatened 
one of the pillars of the security alliance sustained since independence. By August, MOD and EAD were 
keen to resume training exercises, with BHC still most cautious, but judging this ‘a calculated risk we 
could take’ on condition of ‘greater emphasis on joint training’.78 Mansfield also noted that Kiereini 
‘would like the training programme to be resumed’; clearly this was not wholly unpopular with the 
Kenyan leadership.79 Military training was a key part of Anglo-Kenyan cooperation and a tangible and 
specific benefit for the British government.  
Kariuki’s assassination had shocked British policy-makers and the subsequent criticism of the British 
military presence brought into question some of the relationship’s benefits. Ideas about Kenyatta had 
been especially challenged. Duff’s Valedictory despatch in August 1975 continued his pessimism, and 
he wrote of his  
belief – which was no doubt held also by my two immediate predecessors – that during my 
term of office President Kenyatta would die and that one would assist at the uncertain and 
interesting beginning of the next period of independent Kenya’s history. I do not know 
whether my predecessors were disappointed that they left the country with Kenyatta still in 
the saddle. I am; not because I crave excitement, but because I believe it is bad for Kenya that 
he has lingered so long80 
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Duff’s frustration with Kenyan politics was apparent. Yet not all British official looked forward to 
Kenyatta’s demise; as Wigan in EAD recognised, ‘Kenyatta has been Kenya, Kenya is Kenyatta, since 
Independence’.81 A more common and enduing concern reasserted itself: that there was no viable 
replacement to the president.  
 
Arms Supplies – Entebbe  
Confidence in the relationship was further shaken in 1976 when the changed military strategy the 
British government had advocated since 1974, as well as British weakness, was laid bare. The context 
was the Israeli raid on 4 July 1976 to rescue those held hostage at Entebbe, during which the Israelis 
were allowed to land at Nairobi airport.82 McKenzie was involved in organising this – encouraging the 
idea he was an Israeli spy.83 Subsequent diplomatic tension between Kenya and Uganda meant the 
FCO ‘received from secret sources a request from the Kenyans for some form of British military 
presence in Kenya to demonstrate visibly our support for them’.84 This was reminiscent of the requests 
in 1964 and 1965 for a show of British military support. The Kenyans who passed on the message – 
exactly who this was is unclear – hoped that MOD ‘could send a British warship to Mombasa urgently, 
or, preferably, a squadron of British fighter aircraft to Kenya immediately, ostensibly for joint exercises 
with the Kenyan air force’.85  
It was not just the British who were approached as a potential military ally – a change from the 1960s. 
America was asked, and agreed to send a ship; the Israelis ‘have promised military assistance’.86 British 
officials were informed not by the Kenyans but by the Americans of their involvement, hinting at the 
multiple diplomatic channels of contact used. However, Ewans considered that ‘The Kenyans would 
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however prefer help from the UK. They take the view that this would not be regarded as provocative 
or embarrassing since they reckon that Amin already believes that British forces are present in Kenya 
more or less permanently’.87  This was an interesting use of Ugandan arguments of British neo-
colonialism which a year earlier had encouraged the suspension of British military training exercises 
in Kenya. A few months previously, High Commissioner Fingland highlighted a contradictory attitude 
between Kenyan  
sensitivity about any possible criticism by other African countries of the facilities given to 
British troops in Kenya … [and] the Kenyan fear of the greater military capability of some of 
their near neighbours, which from time to time tempts them to let it be known in various ways 
to these neighbours that Kenya has arrangements with powerful friends, such as Britain, who 
would help her if she were threatened88  
This evidences the shrewd use made by leading Kenyans of their British relationship; choosing both to 
distance themselves from, and to evoke, the British as suited the situation. 
The British government considered the Kenyan requests. MOD informed FCO it would take seven to 
ten days for an air squadron to be in position or fifteen for a ship.89 Ewans therefore recommended 
refusing as ‘provision of a naval vessel to Mombasa could be presented as unprovocative, but it is 
physically impossible to get one there in reasonable time’, whilst if they sent aircraft ‘the Ugandans, 
but other African governments as well, could regard such an act as provocative, which in the 
circumstances would not we think be helpful to Kenya’.90 MOD agreed this was ‘the right response’.91 
This was in some ways a reduced commitment since 1964 when intervention in the mutiny had been 
quickly initiated; and this may also have been partly about making excuses to avoid the cost of military 
action. Yet had a ship been nearer and the logistics more feasible, it seems MOD would have at least 
seriously considered sending this.  
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The Kenyans also requested military equipment, particularly ammunition as their supplies were low, 
and British civil servants recommended that this be provided – a seemingly easier and less provocative 
commitment. Earlier in 1976 the British had agreed credit for Kenyan arms purchases totalling £39m.92 
A Defence Sales representative flew to Kenya to determine what was required, and by 14 July had 
received ‘a letter of intent in respect of the supply of the ammunition and a payment of £40,000 as a 
first instalment’.93 The British government was thus prepared to sell ammunition, but not to bear the 
cost of an intervention. MOD was immediately willing to supply this and ‘provisionally booked two 
RAF Hercules aircraft’ – which the Kenyans would also have to pay for – to transport the supplies.94 
However, overflight clearance was needed to fly ammunition over each country and Turkey refused, 
as did other countries on alternative routes, due to the international climate in the aftermath of the 
Entebbe raid.95  The transport was put off with hopes of rescheduling, but the problem of overflight 
clearance remained. In early August, Kiereini came to London to meet Foreign and Commonwealth 
Minister of State Ted Rowlands, who ‘wished to emphasise that there was no lack of political 
determination on HMG’s part to help Kenya in every way we could’.96 Kiereini said that ‘previously 
Kenya had expected British assistance in times of trouble’.97 Coming from a civil servant, this hints at 
the extent to which leading Kenyans felt militarily reliant on Britain, and made their plans taking this 
into account. Rowlands’ comments show too that British policy-makers did not wish to deny this sense 
of commitment. But the British government remained unable to organise air transport and the 
ammunition was sent by sea, arriving in October.98 This prompted a broader assessment of the British 
ability – or lack thereof – to face a similar situation elsewhere, with recognition of ‘the rundown of 
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the worldwide British military presence’.99 This was a symbol to both British and Kenyan leaders of the 
limit to Britain’s abilities and her declining global military capability.100  
British politicians, civil servants and diplomats quickly sought to limit the damage caused by letting 
down the Kenyans at a time of apparent crisis. Philip Weston in FCO recognised that ‘we have lost a 
good deal of prestige in Kenya and we are no longer regarded there as a foul-weather as well as a fair-
weather friend’.101 Although this had not been a conscious policy choice of disengagement, Ewans 
wrote that ‘some even believe that our failures are a deliberate act of policy and that we are trying to 
ease ourselves out of any obligations to assist Kenya when she is in trouble with her neighbours’.102 
This sense of support had been part of what the relationship was built on, and if members of Kenya’s 
elite now doubted British commitment, this could be damaging. Fingland, however, questioned the 
lesson the British should encourage leading Kenyans to draw, arguing that ‘there were obvious 
limitations on what we could do at short notice’ and Kenya should therefore maintain a stockpile of 
armaments.103 Fingland was making explicit what had been becoming British military policy: Kenya 
should not rely on British intervention. Fingland’s argument was adopted, and Ewans suggested there 
was ‘an opportunity to introduce greater realism in Kenyan expectations’.104 British decision-makers 
thus reacted pragmatically and sought to alter Kenyan expectations to be more ‘realistic’ about what 
Britain would or could provide militarily.  
However, Ewans was still concerned ‘to reassure the Kenyans of our continual goodwill’.105 EAD 
thought reaffirmation of the relationship was best done through a ministerial visit, making clear their 
awareness of the importance of high level submissions to the Kenyans. ODM Minister Reg Prentice 
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was planning a trip for a UN conference in Nairobi, but Fingland did not think Prentice best placed to 
address questions of defence, and his visit focused on aid.106 MOD suggested a visit by Defence 
Secretary Fred Mulley, but EAD were initially concerned that ‘it may not really be in the Kenyans’ best 
interest (of which the Kenyans are not necessarily always the best judges) to have such a public 
demonstration of Anglo-Kenyan defence solidarity’.107 This patronising attitude hints again that British 
policy-makers still saw themselves as those who knew Kenya’s ‘best interest’ better than the Kenyans. 
Mulley did visit in January 1977, and had meetings with Kenyatta, Gichuru, Kibaki and Munyua Waiyaki 
(Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1974-79), as well as a lunch hosted by the Government.108 His visit was 
described by Ewans as a success, ‘particularly in reaffirming the warm Anglo-Kenyan relationship, in 
disabusing Kenyan suspicions that the ammunition episode of last summer was due to a lack of will on 
our part, and in encouraging the Kenyans to take a more realistic view of our relationship’.109 By 
January, ‘bitterness has largely passed … nevertheless Kenyan faith in the British defence connexion 
has been bruised’, particularly with ‘manifestations of US support in visits by aircraft and ships’.110 The 
British position as leading military supplier was being undermined and the security alliances which had 
been so significant to underwriting the relationship were less automatic; whilst the confidence of 
leading Kenyans in British support and military backing had been dented. Notably, the next time the 
Kenyans wanted a review of their defence forces in 1978, similar to Mans’ 1974 study, they turned to 
the Americans rather than the British.111  
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The Moi-Njonjo-Kibaki-McKenzie Group 
With Kenyatta ever aging and seen less positively, his succession continued to cause British 
speculation. The failure of the 1976 Change-the-Constitution movement, spearheaded by Mungai’s 
supporters, established Moi’s primacy over Mungai. From then on, British assessments tended to view 
Moi as the front-runner. By early 1978, British diplomats believed he would succeed, and so were 
more willing to be seen to cultivate him. In January of that year Kenyatta planned for Moi to lead a 
delegation to London. In 1973, when Kibaki and Mungai had been guests of the government for 
general talks, Moi had not been included, but was now to lead the delegation, a clear sign of his 
increased position over Mungai. EAD immediately suggested offering government hospitality as ‘a 
valuable gesture, as a demonstration of the importance we attach to our relationship with Kenya and 
to discussions with Kenyan Ministers’.112 This suggests the importance they now placed on personal 
relations with Moi himself and that they still, despite growing pessimism, viewed Kenya as a 
particularly significant relationship. Moi was now ‘expected to succeed’ by EAD; after so long 
speculating, they had finally picked the most likely successor and decided to throw their weight behind 
him.113 
A ‘large and impressive’ Kenyan delegation visited in March 1978 as official guests of the government, 
including ‘all those whom we would expect to be influential in a future government led by Vice 
President Moi’, including Kibaki and Njonjo.114 Prime Minister Callaghan hosted a lunch at which he 
highlighted the reciprocity and ‘special’ nature of the relationship:  
that spirit of co-operation and mutual support which lies at the heart of the close friendship 
between Kenya and Britain. This will I am sure continue to be a hallmark of our friendship. Be 
assured that our close relationship with Kenya is very important to us115  
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Clearly this speech was designed to encourage Moi to continue with a close British relationship after 
his anticipated succession. The Kenyan delegation met the Prime Minister and Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary. Moi and Callaghan also had a tete-a-tete meeting, at which Moi claimed 
‘he now enjoyed the support of 90% of the Kikuyus as President Kenyatta’s successor’.116 Although an 
unlikely proportion, Moi was looking to secure British backing for his succession. In this it seems he 
was reasonably successful: after the visit Callaghan ‘had a clear impression that Vice President Moi 
was fully in command of the situation, despite his tendency to allow his colleagues to do the talking 
(the Prime Minister commented that this could in itself be a sign of confidence)’.117 Though Callaghan’s 
final point perhaps indicates some wishful thinking, it appears that British officials were actively 
looking to make a more positive assessment of Moi. 
The focus of the visit was regional politics and the Ogaden war between Somalia and Ethiopia which 
began in 1977. This was a key Cold War battleground and the British were concerned following the 
switching of Soviet support from Somalia to Ethiopia.118 For Kenya, ‘geopolitical logic outweighed 
ideological considerations’ as they continued to back their longer-term Ethiopian ally against Somalia 
for regional rather than Cold War reasons.119 The British government was considering supplying arms 
to Somalia, hoping to benefit from Somalia entering the Western sphere of influence. However, the 
British aim of the talks was to highlight that ‘Our links with Kenya remain our first priority in the 
area’.120 Kenya remained the closest and most useful regional ally, although ‘there is a limit to how far 
we can tailor our policy towards Somalia to Kenyan susceptibilities’.121 Moi also requested arms 
finance and highlighted that ‘Kenya wished to improve her military capacities so that she could stand 
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on her own feet. Kenya recognised that the United Kingdom could no longer come to Kenya’s aid at 
48 hours notice, as she had once been able to do’.122 Moi thus displayed recognition of the policy 
British officials had been seeking to promote since 1974, and particularly following Entebbe, in 
encouraging Kenya to build up her military capability. As well as encouraging, the British also enabled 
this policy: following the visit, in June 1978 they offered £27m for arms purchases, ‘which we 
understand was well received’.123 This was notably a much larger amount than the £2.5m emergency 
aid given in 1975. 
On 24 May 1978, McKenzie was killed returning from a mission to Amin, when his aircraft was 
destroyed by a time bomb. Expressing condolences was a British priority. Fingland wrote to Njonjo 
and McKenzie’s wife ‘expressing my personal condolences’, and planned to attend the funeral.124 EAD 
thought that although McKenzie was no longer a minister, ‘some official expression of regret would 
be appropriate’.125 The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary sent condolences, and Callaghan sent a 
personal message to Kenyatta in which he was ‘profoundly shocked … I know he was an invaluable 
guide and trusted friend of yours, and a good servant of Kenya. I was very glad to have been a friend 
of his for 25 years’.126 Clearly politicians and civil servants felt that the British government needed to 
officially acknowledge this at the highest level, and to focus on the personal. At McKenzie’s London 
memorial service, Foreign and Commonwealth Minister Rowlands represented the government.127 
British observers were immediately keen to assess how and why the plane crashed and the ‘rumours 
of sabotage’.128 In a sign of how close technical relationships remained, the Kenyans turned to the 
British for assistance. A UK Civil Aviation Authority official was already working within the Kenyan 
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Department of Civil Aviation and assessed the crash site.129 Nairobi Criminal Investigation Department 
also asked the British for ‘assistance in determining the type of explosive device employed’.130 The 
British government displayed a willingness to help – provided the Kenyans would pay.131 A British 
official visited and evidence was taken to Britain for analysis, with the report concluding that the crash 
‘resulted directly from the detonation within it of an explosive device’, but not explaining where this 
had come from.132 Rumours were rife and potential assassins included the Israelis, Palestinians, Amin, 
Obote, Ugandan communists, Mungai’s group or other Kenyans.133 The Ugandan government has 
typically been blamed.134  
The key issue was the impact of McKenzie’s death on Kenyan politics. A leading intermediary, his death 
might have been expected to herald a change in British opinion or policy. Fingland believed that 
‘whatever his faults and controversial activities in recent years, [McKenzie] had made a considerable 
impact on the Kenyan scene’.135 His business interests had been central and ‘although McKenzie’s 
commercial activities were not always to our liking or advantage there is no denying that he was 
instrumental in promoting some major export deals by British firms’.136 He had played a key role as a 
‘high level interlocutory’ in many countries, often with British diplomats, and in this ‘he will be difficult 
to replace … McKenzie’s death will leave a vacuum which it will take some time to fill’.137 Fingland also 
thought McKenzie’s position in the group around Moi was significant: ‘This is not to suggest that the 
grouping will fall apart; but it may be less effective, particularly should a crisis arise in the near 
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future’.138 This was in fact an overstatement of McKenzie’s impact, and his death made remarkably 
little difference to British policies.  
 
The Bamburi Understanding Reconsidered 
The Bamburi Understanding had long demonstrated the particular value of the Anglo-Kenyan 
relationship and had been further reconfirmed by new Prime Minister Callaghan to Njonjo orally on 
14 May 1976.139 But in 1978 the British government seriously posed questions about the viability and 
continuation of the Understanding for the first time since it had been made over a decade earlier. 
These questions were prompted by MOD, whose defence plan ‘requires revision ... before initiating 
such a review it seems appropriate to question the concept of armed intervention’.140 Captain George 
Hayhoe viewed it as ‘hardly conceivable that we would allow ourselves to become involved in a war 
in East Africa’.141 This discussion occurred shortly after Moi’s visit, and Moi had encouraged policy-
makers in their belief ‘that the Kenyan authorities wish to stand on their own feet militarily and are 
under no illusions as to our willingness or ability to assist them with forces in the event of a Somali 
attack’.142 
This opened debate within the FCO on the very existence of the Understanding. Fingland believed 
Britain needed to maintain a military plan as long as the Understanding existed and the Kenyans were 
potentially relying on it, but he argued that:  
If we had to explain the limitations on action open to us only when the Bamburi Understanding 
were to be invoked by the Kenyans, we would appear in their eyes to be letting them down at 
the most difficult time, when they were under a real threat, and this could bring about a crisis 
in our relations … however difficult the process of disengaging from the Bamburi 
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Understanding I would suggest that this is a position towards which we ought consciously 
[and] deliberately to be moving’.143 
This was part of changing British geopolitical and military realities: ‘the Understanding reflected our 
overseas defence philosophy and capability in the 1960s’.144 It was increasingly obvious among British 
decision-makers that there would be no British military intervention under the terms of the 
Understanding. Despite this, Colin Munro of the FCO Defence Department argued that some Kenyans 
‘must believe that our troops are training to meet some specific contingency in Kenya’ and would still 
expect intervention.145 Thus, he ‘agree[d] generally that we should seek to disengage’, but not ‘that 
we should now … [which] might cause a country that is supposed to be one of our best friends in Africa 
to conclude that far from stepping up our effort we are planning to abrogate an important existing 
commitment’.146 The possible damage to the relationship was his priority, with the Understanding part 
of the special relationship which made Kenya ‘one of our best friends in Africa’. 
Other considerations were also raised by head of EAD Munro. He argued that policy-makers could not 
‘dismiss entirely’ that Kenya might turn to the Soviet Union for an alternative commitment; and 
thought the Understanding was significant to Kenyatta personally, who ‘might take our changed line 
particularly hard’, so actively seeking change whilst Kenyatta was alive was likely to damage the 
relationship.147 Munro suggested rather ‘to aim at a situation where the Understanding is increasingly 
down-graded in Kenyan eyes, ideally to the point where it may not be necessary formally to terminate 
it’.148 BHC thought Moi as incoming president was likely to ask for a renewal, ‘if only for reassurance 
… Our response will have to be carefully worded’.149 In one sense this would be the ideal time to move 
away from the Understanding, as they were reluctant to do so whilst Kenyatta was alive, but the British 
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government would also want to establish support for Moi, and not to suggest a more limited 
relationship. 
The Bamburi Understanding was an issue on which politicians had substantial involvement. On 18 
August Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth David Owen gave a clear recommendation:  
I do not disagree with the burden of the argument but now is a bad time. I believe the 
understanding will wither at the vine … I see no need to rid ourselves of all commitments. 
Meanwhile, the MOD should relax. They do not need to plan anything either. The vital issue 
is our relationship with Kenya. Now is not the time to tamper with this issue150  
Foreign and Commonwealth Minister Rowlands agreed, arguing that ‘the Bamburi understanding is a 
part of our special relationship. It hasn’t been “onerous”!’.151 Despite potential problems, the 
Understanding remained a significant part of the relationship and sign of British commitment. It was 
also, because it would likely never need be acted upon, inexpensive. Munro reported to Fingland: ‘we 
now have clear ministerial endorsement for seeking to let Bamburi gradually lose significance, but 
without our taking any initiative’.152 This meant they would continue to encourage the Kenyans to 
build up their own military and not rely on Britain – as policy had been for the previous years. The 
Defence Department replied to Captain Hayhoe that ‘I doubt very much if you need maintain anything 
like the detailed 1973 plans’, but there was a need for some military planning whilst the Kenyans were 
potentially reliant on this.153  This was the only time the Understanding was seriously debated since it 
had been created. The renewals had proceeded fairly easily, with limited question of the premise itself 
– British decision-makers had always thought it unlikely they would have to honour the 
Understanding. But this reconsideration did not aim for a substantially changed relationship: the view 
of all involved was that the British military would not intervene and the question was really one of 
whether to actively try and move away from the Understanding in case it proved embarrassing as 
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Fingland feared, or whether to do nothing definite as the Understanding was useful and there was 
little risk of any real commitment. The latter was the course recommended by ministers. 
 
Conclusion 
This was a period of greater British pessimism about Kenya. Britain’s future influence seemed less 
secure with the expected death of Kenyatta and declining military ability. Personal relationships 
remained significant but more uncertain. Kenyatta still symbolised, as he had since independence, the 
close Anglo-Kenyan relationship, but decreased confidence in him meant that long-standing 
uncertainty about British interests under a future successor was coupled with pessimism about 
Kenyatta and the current situation. Duff’s unusual hope for Kenyatta’s speedy demise highlighted this 
change and the pessimism which had come to BHC. Diplomats increasingly believed Moi would 
succeed and the group around Moi contained many of Britain’s ‘friends’ within Kenya. Moi was no 
longer seen as the unintelligent compromise unlikely to last long, but increasingly as a viable future 
president who should be cultivated with visits and personal contact. British policy-makers encouraged 
him to keep looking towards Britain as Kenyatta had done, hoping to maintain their interests through 
his succession. Views were minimally affected by McKenzie’s death. But diplomats and civil servants 
were uncertain and remained unable to predict how the succession would in fact play out. These years 
did not fundamentally challenge British paternalism, or their sense that they best understood what 
Kenya’s interests were and how to achieve them. But Kariuki’s murder did shake British self-
confidence with the realisation that they did not have as much knowledge or awareness as they had 
previously thought, and that their relations with Kenya’s leaders were not as open as they had 
believed. It seemed leading Kenyans were lying to them, or themselves did not have the influence 
which the British thought they did.  
The sense was that what had made the Kenyan relationship so ‘special’ in earlier years – the close 
personal contacts and military relations – was slipping away. This change seems to have been due to 
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a new sense of military and financial realities: the UK government could not afford to maintain the 
military assets which had underwritten their intervention in the mutiny or the plans for Operation 
Binnacle. British politicians, civil servants and diplomats no longer wanted Kenya’s leaders to rely on 
them, as they could not provide the same level of military support. But they did not want someone 
else to replace them. The Treasury did not want to pay for the relationship with increased aid, 
although the FCO still hoped for this. Internal debates in 1978 over the Bamburi Understanding 
highlighted this desire to limit exposure, but it was retained because it was both beneficial and free.  
The military relationship was crucial for British policy-makers. With this declining, it was more difficult 
to envisage a positive future relationship. The failure to deliver ammunition swiftly, or to provide an 
obvious show of military support, and the brief cancellation of British training, made it clear to all 
involved that things had changed. The relationship had been built on these military connections; the 
MOU had been the first major agreement with independent Kenya and was thereafter referred to and 
relied upon. But this was becoming less certain, and British abilities were hampered by changed 
circumstances and geopolitical weaknesses. Military policy would now encourage the Kenyans to 
spend money on British equipment – thus bringing money into the British economy rather than having 
to spend on costly interventions. Their hope was to maintain influence without bearing the costs. 
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Chapter Seven: August 1978-1980  
 
‘Your assumption of the highest office is an encouragement to us all’ 
Prime Minister Callaghan to President Moi, 17 November 19781 
 
In August 1978 Kenyatta died and Moi succeeded to the presidency. British diplomats, politicians and 
civil servants had long harboured anxieties for the post-Kenyatta future and what this would mean for 
British interests. But rather than the feared instability, political in-fighting and chaos, Moi consolidated 
his position quickly and without serious challenge. Yet this alone did not secure British interests. 
Kenyatta had chosen to pursue a close relationship with Britain: ‘The British, who imprisoned him, 
remained those to whom he turned first for friendship and help’.2 This had been based on personal 
relationships and deals negotiated with Kenyatta and his interlocutors, and it was the fear of losing 
these which so exercised British observers. They could not be assured of the benefits of the 
relationship if Kenya’s leaders sought to deny them; Moi’s attitude towards them would thus be 
crucial. The sense of a declining relationship which characterised the years immediately prior to 1978 
could have seemed the start of a decline, and with the deaths of both Kenyatta and McKenzie in 1978, 
two of the key individuals who had sustained the Anglo-Kenyan relationship even before 
independence were removed. 
Yet in fact, Moi’s constitutional succession at Kenyatta’s death and his choices in the immediate years 
thereafter reinvigorated the relationship. Khapoya in 1979 suggested that ‘Kenyans and others who 
were contented with the previous regime will find much to rejoice about with Moi’s regime’.3 This 
certainly appeared true from the British perspective. Moi recognised, as had Kenyatta and other 
                                                          
1 Jim Callaghan to Daniel arap Moi, 17 November 1978, TNA FCO 31/2336/26. 
2 Stanley Fingland, ‘The Death and Funeral of President Kenyatta’, 6 September 1978, TNA FCO 31/2319/196. 
3 Khapoya, ‘Politics of Succession’, p. 19. 
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Kenyan politicians previously, the potential benefits he could gain from a close relationship with 
Britain. Negative and derogatory British assessments of Moi had not disappeared, but Moi came to 
seem much more assured and shrewd than British policy-makers had previously imagined him. His 
biographer Morton – who notably received assistance from Moi himself, and whose biography was 
intended in at least some measure to rehabilitate Moi from his 1998 image of ‘a dictator as corrupt as 
he is malevolent’ – argued that ‘For much of his life he has survived by disguise’.4 Russell also argued 
that Moi’s ‘naïve country boy routine was merely a brilliant act’.5 He certainly convinced the British of 
his ‘disguise’ prior to his succession and it is clear that British officials had underestimated Moi, who 
was quickly able to take control of Kenya’s leadership. 
The British were not king-makers: they had not foisted Moi onto Kenya, and they came to back him 
with some hesitation. But the idea that the British had this role, coupled with Kenyan ideas such as 
those in 1975 that the British army was in Kenya to back up the Kenyan state, could encourage the 
idea amongst Kenyans that Moi was the chosen British successor and had their – potentially military 
– backing. Moi sought to use this to his advantage, cultivating this image and relationship with a series 
of visits to Britain. These followed his successful visit in March 1978 as vice-president. Barston has 
argued that personal diplomacy and visits to major powers ‘may facilitate political transition’ and this 
was Moi’s aim.6 Kenyatta had rarely travelled abroad and preferred to work through intermediaries 
such as McKenzie and Njonjo who would transmit his messages to foreign governments. Moi chose to 
visit himself. He made a series of overseas visits during 1978-80, including to France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, China, and America, as well as 
multiple visits within Africa.7 Moi was clearly keen to cultivate the image of himself as a world 
statesman with international support. As Musambayi has argued, ‘foreign policy has been used as a 
                                                          
4 Andrew Morton, Moi: The Making of an African Statesman (London, 1998), pp. 4, 8-9. 
5 Alec Russell, Big Men, Little People: Encounters in Africa (Basingstoke, 1999), p. 72. 
6 R. P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy (London, 1988), p. 98.  
7 S.J.W. Musandu to Permanent Secretary Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, ‘The President Abroad 
1978-1980’, KNA AHC/18/8. 
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means of regime consolidation and entrenchment’.8 This also meant that British interests were 
sustained through the transition. 
 
Succession  
On 22 August 1978, Kenyatta died and Moi was immediately sworn in as president by Njonjo. 
Kenyatta’s succession was seen in the years thereafter as positive and stable compared to elsewhere. 
Tamarkin argued that ‘few African countries can boast Kenya’s outstanding record’;9 Khapoya 
described it as ‘stunningly smooth’.10 This raises the question of why this was so ‘smooth’, particularly 
as peaceful leadership transitions in Africa were uncommon during the 1970s-80s when, as Hughes 
and May have argued, these were often viewed ‘as a “crisis” of stability and survival’.11 The potential 
for ‘crisis’ was what British policy-makers were so concerned by in the years preceding Kenyatta’s 
death. Hodder-Williams has suggested the succession ‘hid considerable internal divisions and, indeed, 
an abortive coup in the making’;12 although the head of EAD does not recall viewing this as a threat at 
the time.13 According to Karimi and Ochieng, Mungai planned a purge of the Moi faction to be 
executed upon Kenyatta’s death, with lists of an initial fifteen and total of around 300 to be killed; but 
Mungai was taken by surprise by Kenyatta dying in Mombasa rather than Nakuru, and Moi’s 
supporters acted immediately to propel him to power.14 Although it is unclear quite how exaggerated 
some of this may have been, some sort of plotting was clearly occurring. 
                                                          
8 Musambayi, ‘Moi’s Foreign Policy’, p. 1. 
9 M. Tamarkin, ‘From Kenyatta to Moi: The Anatomy of a Peaceful Transition of Power’, Africa Today, Vol. 26, 
No. 3 (1979), p. 21. 
10 Vincent B. Khapoya, ‘Kenya under Moi: Continuity or Change?’, Africa Today, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1980), p. 21. 
11 Arnold Hughes and Roy May, ‘The Politics of Succession in Black Africa’, Third World Quarterly, Vo. 10, No. 1 
(1988), p. 1. See also for examples: Ladun Anise, ‘Trends in Leadership Succession and Regime Change in African 
Politics since Independence’, African Studies Review, Vo. 17, No. 3 (1974), pp. 507-524; Lanciné Sylla, translated 
by Arthur Goldhammer, ‘Succession of the Charismatic Leader: The Gordian Knot of African Politics’, Daedalus, 
Vol. 111, No. 2 (1982), pp. 11-28. 
12 Hodder-Williams, ‘Kenya after Kenyatta’, p. 478. 
13 Alan Munro, interview. 
14 Karimi and Ochieng, Kenyatta Succession, pp. 157-72. 
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On the day of Kenyatta’s death, High Commissioner Fingland described ‘an atmosphere of rather 
stunned calm’.15 Fingland also immediately telegrammed MOD that ‘visits by military personnel to 
Kenya at this time should be avoided’, and the planned recce party departing the next day should be 
suspended, with troops in Kenya for an exercise to remain in their base.16 This suggests concern that 
the presence of British troops could be misinterpreted or expose them to a potentially volatile 
situation if stability was not maintained. Communication over the immediately following days 
between BHC and London took place through flash telegrams, with speed the priority in sharing 
information. Rosling in EAD considered that ‘the immediate aftermath of Kenyatta’s death was one of 
the potential danger periods. And the first indications are therefore encouraging’.17 A cautious 
optimism emerged, but British officials were still uncertain about an uncontested succession.18 In the 
following days, Moi gained multiple declarations of support from key political figures, including 
previous opponents,19 and by 11 September, ‘the pro-Moi bandwagon is now rolling at full speed’.20 
Moi was described by BHC as having ‘perceptibly come to personify a widespread longing for stability’ 
amongst Kenyans, although probably also amongst British policy-makers, who had come to see Moi 
as the candidate of stability and continued benefits, and thus to support his succession.21  Moi adopted 
a philosophy of ‘Nyayo’ (footsteps) with the idea he was following Kenyatta’s.22 Publicly, he 
highlighted continuity: ‘foreign policy … has served us well in the past. It will therefore continue 
unchanged’.23 Moi was consciously intending to portray an impression of continuity, stability and 
support. 
                                                          
15 Telegram no. 1746, Fingland to FCO, 22 August 1978, TNA FCO 31/2315/11. 
16 Telegram no. 221445Z, Fingland to MODUK, August 1978, TNA DEFE 24/1634/71. 
17 P.E. Rosling to Stratton, 23 August 1978, TNA FCO 31/2315/31. 
18 Telegram no. 1753, Nairobi to FCO, August 1978, TNA DEFE 24/1634/73. 
19 Telegram no. 1767, Fingland to Deskby 251800Z, 25 August 1978, TNA FCO 31/2316/112. 
20 C.D. Crabbie to EAD, 11 September 1978, TNA FCO 31/2323/53. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Khapoya, ‘Politics of Succession’, pp. 18-20. 
23 Speech by Daniel arap Moi on the occasion of his installation as President of the Republic of Kenya, 14 October 
1978, KNA KA/4/21. During his presidency, Moi did make changes to Kenya’s foreign policy, moving ‘from its 
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Kenyatta’s funeral was the first occasion when the post-Kenyatta relationship with Moi was to be 
exhibited, both to Moi and a wider public audience. In preparing for the funeral, which the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Secretary and Prince Charles would attend, civil servants expected that ‘the 
Kenyan Government, and indeed Kenyan opinion generally, will doubtless see the British presence 
and attitude as evidence of our wish to maintain the friendliest of relations’.24 British officials were 
now optimistic about their relationship: ‘if as seems likely, they [the Moi-Njonjo-Kibaki group] 
continue to hold the reins of Government, Anglo-Kenyan relations will prosper’.25  
The relationship was immediately reinforced at the highest level with messages between Callaghan 
and Moi. The Prime Minister’s condolence letter offered that: ‘If there are matters in which you think 
Britain can be of assistance to Kenya during this transitional period, I am sure you will not hesitate to 
inform me either directly or through our High Commissioner’.26 This was a striking declaration of 
support. This message was sent on the day after Kenyatta’s death, and makes clear how quickly and 
definitively the British government was seeking to back Moi. Callaghan and Moi had met multiple 
times and their political friendship appears the closest prime minister-president relationship of the 
period. Lane has argued that Callaghan’s ‘long career had enabled him to establish good working 
relations’ with many Commonwealth leaders.27 Moi wrote personally to Callaghan in reply that: 
The assistance and understanding we have received from Britain, in the traditional style of a 
good old friend, was particularly welcome. I have no doubt that as we face the difficult years 
ahead, the people of Kenya can rely on such trusted friends for assistance when needed. I 
hope to pursue further the areas of co-operation already so well established between our two 
nations28  
                                                          
quiet conservative pro-western nature, to a buoyant conservative and pro-western orientation’: Musambayi, 
‘Moi’s Foreign Policy’, p. 1. See also Gordon, ‘Anglophonic Variants’, pp. 98-9. 
24 Visit to Nairobi for the funeral of President Kenyatta, Brief no 1: Steering Brief, 29 August 1978, TNA FCO 
31/2317. 
25 Visit to Nairobi for the funeral of President Kenyatta, Brief no. 3: Anglo-Kenyan Relations, 31 August 1978, 
TNA FCO 31/2317. 
26 Prime Minister to Moi, in Nick Sanders to Margaret Turner, 23 August 1978, TNA FCO 31/2315/35. 
27 Lane, ‘Foreign and Defence Policy’, p. 164. 
28 Moi to Callaghan, 22 September 1978, TNA FCO 31/2323/63. 
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In his first official presidential communication Moi was aiming to assuage British fears of a change in 
policy with his presidency and highlight the close relationship; whilst simultaneously conveying that 
he would look to Britain for continued ‘assistance’. Although not specifying details, Moi was making 
clear that Britain would continue having to put resources into Kenya to maintain the relationship. This 
personal, high level communication was continued in Callaghan’s congratulatory message after Moi 
was elected president in October: ‘For a long time I have thought that your succession was inevitable 
and right’, wrote Callaghan in a particularly selective remembering of British ideas.29 Callaghan had 
changed the FCO suggested text of this message ‘in order to make it more personal’.30  
In November 1978, Moi planned an informal trip to London following a visit to Brussels, saying this 
was about shopping, but ‘he hoped it would be possible for him to see “his friend Mr Callaghan”’.31 
Moi was demonstratively displaying his British support. High Commissioner Fingland suggested that 
‘President Moi himself seems pleased that [the] opportunity has arisen of coming to London on his 
first overseas visit since becoming President’.32 London was informed of this trip only ten days prior 
to its occurrence, but head of EAD Munro argued that: ‘In view of the importance we attach to our 
relations with Kenya it is clearly desirable that we should meet President Moi’s expressed wish to see 
the Prime Minister and Secretary of State if at all possible’.33 The briefing for this visit suggested that 
Britain had ‘long enjoyed good relations with the new President and his principal associates’.34 
Although more true of his ‘associates’ – and Njonjo and Kibaki were included among those visiting – 
by this point uncertainties about Moi were being conveniently overlooked in favour of pragmatically 
focusing on the positive relationship British officials hoped to maintain.  
                                                          
29 Prime Minister to Daniel arap Moi, 9 October 1978, TNA FCO 31/2324/67. 
30 Private Secretary to J.S. Wall, 9 October 1978, TNA FCO 31/2324/67. 
31 J.S. Wall to B.G. Cartledge, 8 November 1978, TNA FCO 31/2336/7. 
32 Telegram no. 1915, Fingland to FCO, 7 November 1978, TNA FCO 31/2336/1. 
33 A.G. Munro to Private Secretary, [November 1978], TNA FCO 31/2336/5. 
34 EAD, ‘Private Visit of the President of Kenya to London, 17-10 [sic] November 1978’, TNA FCO 31/2337. 
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Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Owen met Moi at the airport and discussed regional foreign 
policy, with Owen commenting that it ‘was a useful opportunity for contact’.35 The Prime Minister was 
in Cardiff, but ‘would like a personal message from him, conveying his regrets, and making any political 
points which may be appropriate, to be handed to President Moi on his arrival’.36 This letter read that: 
‘Your many friends here have admired the way in which you have led Kenya since the sad death of 
Jomo Kenyatta ... Your assumption of the highest office is an encouragement to us all’.37 Callaghan, 
and by extension the British government, was cementing support for Moi. British policy-makers were 
privileging these personal connections, and politicians were particularly involved in meeting Moi 
during this transition period. A lunch hosted by the Lord Chancellor was arranged, and his speech 
stated that ‘The closeness of our relationship has brought great benefits to both sides’.38 The idea of 
a mutually beneficial relationship had long been important, and was highlighted to encourage Moi to 
continue this. 
One of the few substantive issues raised at this visit was political detainees in Kenya. Human rights 
and democracy had rarely been British priorities in Kenya so long as British interests were protected.39 
The specific concern was due to ‘considerable public concern in this country, especially over the case 
of the writer, Professor Ngugi [wa Thiong’o]’.40 Fingland argued that ‘the Kenyan whose views really 
matter about detention is Njonjo’, and suggested the Lord Chancellor talk to him informally rather 
than Moi, although doubtful of the impact, having already raised this with Njonjo.41  This suggests the 
informal and personal nature of the British relationship with Njonjo: they felt they could approach him 
on this issue, even if not expecting him to take their advice. Njonjo was an intermediary British policy-
                                                          
35 Telegram no. 613, FCO to Nairobi, 20 November 1978, TNA FCO 31/2336/34. 
36 B.G. Cartledge to J.S. Wall, 9 November 1978, TNA FCO 31/2336/8. 
37 Jim Callaghan to Daniel arap Moi, 17 November 1978, TNA FCO 31/2336/26. 
38 Notes for the Lord Chancellor’s speech at lunch for President Moi, 18 November 1978, TNA FCO 31/2336/28. 
39 See Edward Peck to A.G. Bottomley, ‘Kenya: “The Little General Election”’, 1 July 1966, TNA DO 213/188/13. 
40 J.S. Wall to Ian Maxwell, 17 November 1978, TNA FCO 31/2336/31. Ngugi wa Thiong’o had been arrested in 
December 1977, see Branch, Kenya, pp. 124-6. 
41 Telegram no. 1947, Fingland to FCO, 14 November 1978, TNA FCO 31/2337. 
Chapter Seven: August 1978-1980 
251 
 
makers felt they had access to, as well as being a close advisor of Moi, accompanying him on all his 
visits to London. With the deaths of both Kenyatta and McKenzie, Njonjo had become even more 
significant as a British ally. The brief for the Lord Chancellor was: ‘We fully recognise that this is a 
matter for the Kenyan Government to make its own decisions, that detentions are very few and strictly 
constitutional ... If there is anything the Kenyan Government can do to reassure opinion, it would of 
course be very welcome’; however, ‘The government has ruled with much greater restraint than 
elsewhere in Black Africa’.42 This was a very mild brief, and does not suggest officials intended to put 
any real pressure on Njonjo or Moi. As before, positive personal relationships with Kenya’s leaders 
were more aligned with British interests than pressure on human rights. The impact of British 
influence is debatable; however, it is notable that less than a month later Moi did announce the 
release of political detainees.43  
 
State Visit  
In January 1979, only months after his succession and previous informal visit to Britain, Moi was keen 
to organise another trip. He hoped for a formal visit and ‘wishes to be able to let it be known soon 
that he has an official visit to the UK pending’.44 As this suggests, for Moi, a key consideration was not 
just to have discussions with British ministers but to publicise in Kenya that he would be visiting. Moi 
recognised the benefits of using widespread assumptions of British influence to his advantage. FCO 
‘welcome[d] Moi’s desire to demonstrate the priority he attaches to relations with us’, and BHC was 
to inform Moi that ‘he is always welcome here’.45 As British civil servants recognised, ‘It has been and 
still is in our interests to encourage the Kenyans in the value they attach to their special relationship 
                                                          
42 Brief for the Lord Chancellor, ‘Political Detainees in Kenya’, November 1978, TNA FCO 31/2337. 
43 Speech by Daniel arap Moi, on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Kenya Independence 
Celebrations, 12 December 1978, KNA KA/4/21. 
44 Antony Duff to Permanent Under-Secretary, 24 January 1979, TNA FCO 31/2563/13. 
45 Telegram no. 59, FCO to Nairobi, 6 February 1979, TNA PREM 16/2149. 
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with us’.46 FCO suggested that, because of a scheduling gap, Moi was ‘an excellent candidate’ for a 
state visit.47 Kenyatta had never made a state visit and this would clearly fulfil the role both Moi and 
FCO staff wanted of publicising British support for Moi. Young has described state visits as ‘an 
important element in “promoting Great Britain PLC”’.48 Moi was invited and ‘obviously delighted’, and 
planned to delay his visit to China until after this.49  
As well as demonstrating personal relationships, tangible issues would be discussed at the state visit, 
and British decision-makers sought to prepare their policies in the months leading up to it. Aid was 
always a key part of the relationship and Kenya remained a British priority in Africa: by now ‘the 
Kenyan Aid Programme is Britain’s largest in Africa’.50 At aid talks in Nairobi in October 1978 the British 
aid offer was £80m for the next three years.51 Although at first sight this appears a substantial increase 
from the 1976 aid package, inflation meant that it was the same amount in real terms; and it was in 
fact a smaller proportion of the overall aid budget.52 ODM planned this because of the difficulties in 
getting Treasury approval for an increase – they preferred not to fight for this.53 This remained a 
negotiated relationship and the strength of the Kenyans as aid negotiators was clearly recognised. 
Hart, in FCO Research Department, argued in a consideration of Kenya’s balance of payments that:  
The long term trend seems to be towards increasing trade deficits and an insatiable appetite 
for aid. The Kenyans know how to operate their give and take relationship with us in which 
we give them more aid per head than any country except the Seychelles and they take it and 
come back for more54  
                                                          
46 J.A. Robson to Williams, 4 May 1979, TNA FCO 31/2592/21. 
47 Telegram no. 66, FCO to Nairobi, 12 February 1979, TNA FCO 31/2564/25. 
48 Young, Twentieth-Century Diplomacy, p. 171. 
49 Telegram no. 94, Fingland to FCO, 16 February 1979, TNA FCO 31/2564/32. 
50 State Visit of the President of the Republic of Kenya, 12-15 June 1979, TNA FCO 31/2572. 
51 Agreed Minutes: UK/Kenya Aid talks, Nairobi 24-25 October 1978, TNA FCO 31/2592/1. 
52 M.P.J. Lynch to Fogarty, 21 September 1978, TNA OD 67/79/38. 
53 P.S. McLean to Minister, 28 September 1978, TNA OD 67/79/43. 
54 C.T. Hart to Rosling, 10 January 1979, TNA FCO 31/2589/13. 
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The wry feeling apparent in his comments was part of his more negative assessment of Kenya’s 
economy. But as he made explicit, the British were not in control of this relationship and leading 
Kenyans had a significant ability to shape this. 
Economic concerns were tied into Kenya’s armament programme as Kenya’s ‘Military expenditure 
rose from less than 1 per cent of [Kenya’s Gross National Product] in 1973 to 4.6 per cent in 1978’.55 
This coincides exactly with changed British military policy towards Kenya in 1974, when they 
committed to supporting a Kenyan arms build-up. As tables 19 and 20 show, it was after 1976 – when 
Britain did not supply ammunition or a gunboat following the Entebbe raid – that Kenyan military 
expenditure dramatically increased as a proportion of her budget, and that the size of her army 
increased. By 1979, Britain had offered support for: 
the massive military re-equipment programme which amounts to some £425 million over the 
next 7 to 10 years, of which nearly half is for contracts placed in the UK largely financed by 
credits on favourable terms … If we do not offer help in the form of programme aid, the 
Kenyans may seek to cancel or renegotiate existing contracts with UK defence suppliers56  
British policy-makers had supported this Kenyan arms build-up, yet were now left with the difficulty 
that the Kenyans could not afford it – as, incidentally, the British had argued in 1964. Debt was 
increasing, and Kenya’s debt service ratio almost doubled from 4.0 per cent in 1976 to 7.9 per cent in 
1978.57 Whitehall estimated Kenya’s 1978 deficit at US$539m.58 As table 21 makes clear, British 
projections of Kenya’s future economy were not optimistic.  
Table 19: Military Allocations as Percentage of Central Government Budgets59 
 1970 1971 1972 
 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Percentage 
of budget 
4.9 4.4 5.4 6.1 6.4 6.5 5.7 10.8 13.7 15.6 
                                                          
55 Orwa, ‘Foreign policy’, p. 237. 
56 J.A. Robson to Williams, ‘Programme Aid for Kenya’, 4 May 1979, TNA FCO 31/2592/21. 
57 Visit of President Moi: Briefing for Prime Minister, Kenya: Vital Statistics, 18 February 1980, TNA FCO 
31/2834/21. 
58 C. Haley to Longrigg, 2 November 1979, TNA FCO 31/2591/84. 
59 Paul B. Henze, ‘Arming the Horn 1960-1980’, Working Paper No. 43, International Security Studies Program, 
The Wilson Center (1982), p. 22.  
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Table 20: Size of Armed Forces (thousands)60 
 1970 
 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Size 7 7 
 
7 8 9 9 9 13 13 13 
 
Table 21: British Projections of Kenya’s Future Balance of Payments (US$m)61 
 1978 
 
1979 1980 
Debt Service 
Payments 
-93 -101 -112 
Balance of payments -295 
 
-94 65 
 
Because of their financial difficulties, in May 1979 the Kenyans requested a programme loan of £30m, 
preferably additional to the £80m already offered, although they would delay some projects to enable 
funds to be transferred if necessary. 62 Deputy High Commissioner William Watts suggested the 
Kenyans were ‘not expecting a lot but they will be disappointed if they do not get some additional 
assistance’.63 Yet again this caused inter-departmental debate. FCO argued in favour of switching 
£15m of the aid already committed to programme aid, but despite ‘very strong political arguments’ 
ODA was hesitant because the general aid budget was to be cut by £50m.64 This was due to the new 
Thatcher government’s foreign policy focus on America and the Cold War, and Thatcher’s ‘relatively 
low regard for aid’.65 Munro, head of EAD, recalled that ‘the different style and mood came with Mrs 
Thatcher, who didn’t have as much time for Africa, or sense of engagement’.66 Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary Carrington, however, wrote to the Treasury that ‘this is a clear example of 
                                                          
60 Ibid., p. 18. 
61 Gordon Hall to P.E. Rosling, ‘Kenyan: Balance of Payments’, 2 February 1979, TNA FCO 31/2590/32. 
62 Telegram no. 278, Nairobi to FCO, 29 May 1979, TNA FCO 31/2592/28. 
63 W.J. Watts to Robson, [May 1979], TNA FCO 31/2591/65. 
64 Peter Preston to Hurd, 6 June 1979, TNA FCO 31/2593/40. 
65 Killick, ‘British Aid to Africa’, p. 674. See also: Brian Harrison, Finding a Role?: The United Kingdom, 1970-1990 
(Oxford, 2010), p. 44.  
66 Alan Munro, interview. 
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aid, not as an exercise in charity or a dubious operation in support of exports, but as an essential 
instrument of British foreign policy in the real world of today’.67 This followed a 1978 government 
report which had argued that British policy should ‘focus our resources on those countries where our 
interests are greatest and where our efforts will pay the greatest dividend’.68 This was a very explicit 
acknowledgement that aid was intended to serve British interests. The £80m agreement had 
previously been thought ‘ready for final signature’;69 but Nigel Lawson, financial secretary to the 
Treasury, was ‘sure it would be wrong to sign a formal agreement with President Moi, which would 
commit us to implementing our predecessors’ £80 million pledge, before we have completed that 
[spending] review’.70 This was an occasion when British politics at the highest level had an impact on 
policy towards Kenya. The offer of £80m had already been made, and Lawson’s implicit suggestion 
that Britain might renege on this would surely have damaged the relationship. Others in the Treasury 
‘did not envisage that we should go back on this pledge’, but did not want this to be signed at the state 
visit.71 As a compromise, there was authorisation to offer £15m of programme aid and £65m of project 
aid, making up the £80m and following FCO’s preference – although a long way from the Kenyan 
request.  
Another issue which came under scrutiny in preparation for the visit was the Bamburi Understanding. 
Following debate earlier in 1978, the consideration was how to address this under Moi’s presidency. 
Before Kenyatta’s funeral, EAD hoped not to have to renew it, but argued that ‘It would undermine 
Kenyan confidence in their relations with us and run counter to our interests if we were simply to say 
that the Bamburi Understanding died with Kenyatta’.72 Thus, policy was simply to ‘hope the Kenyans 
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will not raise the subject’.73 In preparation for the state visit, however, officials considered whether 
the Understanding should be pre-emptively raised and explicitly removed. FCO Defence Department 
saw this as ‘a unique opportunity to get this matter clarified’ and end the commitment.74 But EAD and 
BHC were more cautious of this, ‘for fear of damaging Anglo/Kenyan relations’ which were their 
priority.75 Fingland agreed with EAD that ‘the Bamburi Understanding should not be discussed with 
Mr Moi unless he takes the initiative … on balance, it seems likely that Mr Moi may not seek a specific 
renewal of the Understanding. It is impossible to be sure, of course’.76  
Civil servants agreed they would not raise this, and would hope the Kenyans did not. If Moi did ask, 
and if pushed, they would explain that it was now ‘unrealistic to assume that direct British military 
intervention in a situation in Africa could be part of our response’.77 Although not intending to simply 
deny the Understanding, they would emphasise that the Kenyans should not rely upon it. Head of EAD 
John Robson suggested that ‘if the subject is not raised by either side in the first meeting between 
new leaders in both countries, this could justifiably be taken as an indication of tacit acceptance by 
the Kenyans that the Understanding in its present form had lost much of its relevance’.78 Moi and his 
delegation did not raise the Understanding. But there is, of course, another explanation for Moi’s 
choice not to discuss this: he thereby avoided the possibility that it might be cancelled, and if a 
situation arose in future when he wished to call upon it, he would truthfully be able to say that it had 
never been revoked. 
The state visit itself consisted of large amounts of ceremonial: inspecting the RAF Guard of Honour, a 
welcome from the Lord Mayor, state banquet, as well as talks with the Prime Minister and lunch with 
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the government.79 The Kenyan delegation was extensive and consisted of twelve in the official party, 
an unofficial party of thirty, five officials, a fifteen man security detail, seven man presidential escort, 
thirteen members of the press and two from Kenya Airways.80 The visit was written up in a Kenyan 
booklet on Moi’s overseas visits intended to be circulated to missions abroad,81 and described as ‘a 
living testimony of our friendly relations with Britain’.82 This kind of reaction was clearly part of the 
reason for bringing so many journalists, and shows Moi’s shrewd use of this visit to cement his 
position, which was widely reported in the Kenyan press.83  
British policy-makers were increasingly recognising Moi as an ally. Briefing for the Queen described 
Moi as ‘a sincere, intelligent but rather modest man’.84 This second quality is particularly interesting 
given earlier views of Moi as unintelligent, and the 1979 Annual Review did still highlight ‘his 
intellectual limitations’.85 Moi’s meeting with Thatcher highlighted the close relationship. Thatcher 
commented that the ‘relationship between Kenya and the U.K. was a very special one’.86 Moi ‘agreed 
with the Prime Minister that Kenya’s long relationship with the U.K. had a special character; the two 
countries belonged to one family. He was very grateful for what the U.K. had done for Kenya in the 
past’.87 Both leaders were explicitly highlighting the ‘special’ nature of the relationship and seeking to 
convey that this had survived the succession.88 This was also a way of using the relationship to their 
advantage from both sides: it cost nothing to describe this as ‘special’. 
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At his meeting with Thatcher, Moi reiterated his desire for additional aid: ‘I need your assistance’.89 
Moi requested grants to repay British loans for military expenditure.90 Thatcher ‘thought that the 
British Government should do what it could to help President Moi … [and] suggested that, if necessary, 
the financial help which we are giving to less friendly countries in Africa should be diverted’.91 This 
was a continuation of the idea that Kenya was ‘special’, with a particular significance to Britain worth 
preserving and putting more into than elsewhere. Another suggestion Thatcher made was ‘the 
possibility of using additional UK assistance of this kind as a means of encouraging Kenya to be helpful 
over Rhodesia’.92 The idea of aid as part of an exchange was very clear, with the suggestion that this 
could be used to ‘buy’ Kenyan support over Rhodesia-Zimbabwe – finally resolving that situation was 
a major concern of British policy at this point.93 In fact, as previously, Kenya was broadly helpful 
towards Britain on Zimbabwe, and contributed to the Commonwealth Monitoring Force set up later 
in the year.94  
Following the state visit, Moi’s requests were considered. Robson argued there ‘would be a good case’ 
for additional programme aid ‘were it not for the constraints on the aid programme’.95 Those in 
Treasury and ODA were opposed,96 and Treasury remained reluctant for the aid agreement to be 
signed, although as Thatcher had committed to £80m when meeting Moi it was ‘not at risk’.97 Treasury 
won the argument, and the decision was taken not to offer further aid, nor to change the terms of 
military loans.98 The British had encouraged an arms build-up in Kenya, yet when Kenya’s government 
could not afford it, were not prepared to offer further assistance. Additionally, because of the 
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spending review, Treasury suggested that disbursements of project aid be slowed to allow for 
programme aid without too much additional British spending.99 Watts in BHC argued strongly against 
this: ‘Our offer of £65m project aid is little more than pie in the sky if … we can spend only £2.3[m] of 
this before April 1981’.100 High Commissioner Williams argued that ‘the Prime Minister made the offer 
of programme aid personally … We would not wish to expose her to a complaint from President 
Moi’.101 This was intended as an internal negotiating tactic to encourage a response from ODA and 
Treasury, as diplomats in BHC argued for Kenya’s continuing importance. But the primacy of the 
Treasury was clear and spending was limited. 
Thatcher personally conveyed to Moi that Britain would offer no further aid when they met again in 
Lusaka in August 1979 for the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. At their bilateral 
meeting Thatcher told Moi that she  
wished very much that the UK could have done more: but the most that could be done was to 
accelerate the £15 million in programme aid which had already been agreed. The UK had 
massive debts of her own and, despite all her own efforts, the British Government could not 
possibly do any more102  
Moi did not seem to react too negatively, saying that an acceleration ‘would be of great assistance to 
Kenya. It might be that, in time, additional resource could be made available’.103 As this suggests, he 
had not entirely given up on the prospect of further aid. Robson commented that ‘the Kenyans were 
no doubt disappointed but had decided to roll with the punch’.104 For Moi, securing his position and 
personal relations were still his key concerns. 
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In February 1980 Moi made another visit to London, again with little notice, and between visits to 
Germany and America.105 As on the previous meetings, he met the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary and Prime Minister. Moi was clearly still seeking to use this connection to his advantage, 
and the fact of the meetings was more significant than their substance: ‘the President would like a 
tour d’horizon with the Prime Minister but has no specific problems to discuss’.106 The conclusions 
sent from Robson to BHC were that ‘the arrangements went well, and that nothing of great substance 
emerged’.107 This visit was not intended as a means of working out substantial developments in the 
relationship, but was rather to highlight Moi’s access and connections, something both sides were 
keen to encourage. Moi’s succession had reinvigorated the relationship, and in a clear sign of this, a 
November 1979 report by Williams argued that:  
Three years ago our predecessors took the view that the United Kingdom’s direct interests in 
Kenya would decline slowly but steadily. This has not proved to be the case. There is still a 
good deal of substance to the network of relationships which have been built up over the 
years from the colonial period onwards and in some areas, notably trade, aid and defence, 
the involvement is in fact greater than it was108  
As Williams’ report makes clear, British interests in Kenya had been protected and advanced by Moi’s 
succession and were benefiting from his leadership.  
 
Conclusion 
British pragmatism was clear in their new-found commitment to Moi. Despite the personal nature of 
their relationship with Kenyatta, the benefits Britain received in terms of military agreements, 
economic benefits, and a geopolitical ally were not substantially challenged. In fact, Moi’s succession 
reinvigorated some of the more positive assessments of the relationship as continuity and stability 
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remained. Indeed, there were reasons to be positive about Moi following the stagnation of Kenyan 
politics in Kenyatta’s final years: Moi released detainees, wanted to visit Britain, and made some 
attempts – though recognisably focused on his enemies – at combatting corruption.109 This was a 
negotiated relationship, and prior to Kenyatta’s death, British officials had been concerned that any 
future president would fundamentally transform this. But Moi chose not to, and rather, ‘The new 
Government of President Moi has stressed the priority it attaches to good relations with the UK’.110 
British diplomats, civil servants and politicians had consistently underestimated Moi as vice-president. 
Until the late-1970s they had typically viewed him as unintelligent, a compromise and someone who, 
if he ever achieved the presidency, would have a limited term. In fact, as he demonstrated once he 
became president, Moi was much shrewder and more politically astute than British policy-makers had 
anticipated. He was able to cement his position in power and use the British relationship to his 
advantage. The visits Moi made to Britain were intended to convey his international support to a 
Kenyan audience. Lots of Kenyans believed that the British somehow were the king-makers and would 
back their chosen candidate. For Moi, this provided an opportunity. Uncertain of his position, he 
believed – rightly – that showing that the British were on his side would dissuade plotters and rivals. 
Even if he did not achieve much from his repeated visits to London, they were read in Kenya as a 
demonstration of British support. Moi thus used the relationship to his advantage, harnessing ideas 
of British power and influence. 
Visits to Britain were crucial in these years, and both sides saw these visits as a way to highlight – to 
one another and more widely – that the relationship was still viewed as ‘special’. The succession 
reasserted the value to the British government and a Kenyan elite of the negotiated relationship. But 
significantly, these outward signs did not cost too much. Very notably, it was with the US that Moi 
made an arms deal, offering America naval facilities and the use of Kenya’s airfields, and receiving 
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US$27m of military assistance and US$50m of economic aid in return.111 Previously, Britain had tended 
to be the partner of choice for Kenyan arms deals, and this was a clear sign of the movement away 
from a predominant focus on Britain to Kenya becoming ‘an American client’.112 When it came to the 
tangible costs of the relationship, British diplomats, civil servants and politicians sought to move away 
from the Bamburi Understanding. Thatcher’s incoming government also made changes to aid policy 
and, despite her support for this at the state visit, thereafter did not offer additional aid or credit for 
arms as Moi had requested. What Britain offered was therefore decreased, as they sought to maintain 
the relationship but limit the costs. This was to be influence on the cheap – but influence nonetheless.  
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Conclusion 
 
‘the very special position we still have in Kenya means that we have a point of advantage 
which we should not lightly weaken, or still less abandon’ 
Eric Norris to S.Y. Dawbarn, 2 February 19721 
 
During the years between 1960 and 1980 British foreign policy moved away from empire. In 1960 
Macmillan spoke of the ‘wind of change’; by 1980 even Zimbabwe had become independent under 
majority rule. Britain also moved closer to Europe, failing twice in applications before becoming a 
member of the EEC in 1973. The Cold War overshadowed foreign policy, and the American ‘special 
relationship’ was privileged, whist the Commonwealth proved less valuable than anticipated. Yet as 
this thesis shows, British foreign policy did not simply neglect former colonies. Kenya proves an 
instructive example of a relationship British officials actively pursued after independence and from 
which they drew benefits. The complexities of post-colonial relationships with Britain have often been 
overlooked, but this was not a simple neo-colonialism or dependency, nor an interest based solely on 
the European population, military training, or aid. Instead, this was a nuanced and negotiated 
relationship with multiple and sometimes competing priorities and abilities; a relationship which was 
not conducted at the top of British politics but which was nonetheless significant to British civil 
servants, and sometimes to politicians, and valued as part of their attempt at a global foreign policy 
and world power role.  
In many ways, these twenty years were a period of strong continuities. Independence from colonial 
rule did not end British influence, and Kenya continued to maintain multiple connections with Britain. 
As policy-makers had hoped prior to decolonisation, Britain continued to receive benefits from Kenya. 
British diplomats, civil servants and politicians feared changes to the nature of the relationship, 
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concerned firstly about Kenyatta’s assumption of the presidency, and later about his removal from it. 
This was typified by their ideas about the succession, with officials fearing that the positive 
relationship they had established with Kenyatta was dependent upon him personally and would not 
outlast him; and that any successor would challenge the British role and prominence, disadvantaging 
British interests. This concern underlay many of their attempts at cultivating individuals. Yet in fact, 
both independence and the succession were surmounted with relative ease and limited change to the 
British connection. In the early 1960s decision-makers from both countries created the relationships 
and set up the agreements which protected and promoted British interests in Kenya, based on a 
negotiated sense of shared interests. The later 1960s and early 1970s confirmed these relationships 
and interests under Kenyatta’s leadership. It was in the mid-1970s that decision-makers, typified by 
High Commissioner Duff, became increasingly pessimistic about events in Kenya and even Kenyatta 
himself – for so long highly valued as the source of stability and British influence. With Moi’s 
succession, and in the initial years of his presidency, the Anglo-Kenyan relationship was once again 
reconfirmed and rehabilitated.  
The major shift in British policy was in the military strategy the British government advocated for 
Kenya. In 1964, this encouraged Kenya not to build up a large military and to rely on potential British 
intervention. Such intervention occurred in the 1964 mutiny, was planned against the possibility of an 
Odinga coup, and the Bamburi Understanding made some – however vague – commitment to 
providing this if required. This altered a decade later when British policy shifted to encourage an arms 
build-up in Kenya and a move away from reliance on any British intervention. Partly this was due to 
Britain’s more limited abilities, of which the failure to supply ammunition after Entebbe was the 
clearest sign. Changed British policy was not simply about a declining commitment to Kenya, but an 
inability to maintain the military capabilities to intervene and a preference to sell arms instead – 
benefitting the British economy in the process. By 1980, Kenya was heavily indebted to Britain and 
elsewhere from this arms build-up.   
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There was no single concern which made Kenya matter to British politicians, diplomats and civil 
servants, but the combination of multiple and overlapping interests encouraged them to place a high 
value on this relationship. Britain’s broad aims towards Kenya were remarkably consistent. The 
overriding British aim was to cultivate ‘friendly’ Kenyans and thus ensure the country stayed ‘friendly’ 
to Britain. Although this was a seemingly simple aim, it was a very flexible idea which could be 
redefined as events and pragmatism dictated, and encompassed multiple aspects of the relationship. 
The economic connections were extensive as Kenya was a centre for investment and trade within the 
region. The position of the Europeans and Asians gave the British government a particular interest, 
while these could be useful for Kenya as a bargaining threat. The military and strategic relationships 
were crucial, with the military training facilities Britain received from Kenya one of the most unusual 
benefits. Kenya also maintained foreign policies which were advantageous to Britain, and which 
enabled British predominance; while leading Kenyans, at least in private, offered diplomatic support 
over issues such as Rhodesia. Kenyan stability was supported by the British connection and British 
officials were concerned to maintain this. Personal relations with leading Kenyans were thought by 
British diplomats to be close and useful. Kenya was viewed as a ‘special’ relationship by the British 
government for all of these reasons, both specific and intangible. 
The language of Kenya being ‘special’ and requiring distinct treatment is one which contemporaries in 
the British government used with notable frequency and for multiple purposes. This could be a 
negotiating tool used internally to encourage outcomes – such as a greater aid proportion – that 
certain departments or individuals hoped for.2 EAD typically used this with Treasury, with ODM more 
hesitant about whether they viewed Kenya as a ‘special’ case or not. This language was also used as 
part of a regional comparison, as Kenya could only be ‘special’ by comparison; in 1969: ‘Kenya is to 
some extent the odd man out in East Africa by reason of the very strength of the residual British links 
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… we should seek to make tactful use of our special position in Kenya’.3 British policy-makers also used 
this language in direct communications with Kenya’s leaders in order to encourage them towards what 
saw as a profitable relationship, such as by Thatcher to Moi at the 1979 state visit.4 It was also 
occasionally used by leading Kenyans in order to try and gain the greatest possible advantage from 
their relationship: Kibaki in 1972 was ‘hinting strongly at our continued special relationship with 
Kenya’ in order to encourage extensive aid.5 In so often talking, both to the Kenyans and each other, 
about Kenya as ‘special’, British officials came to understand Kenya as an especially beneficial 
relationship. In 1972, High Commissioner Norris highlighted that ‘in so far as our interests in Africa as 
a whole are important, the very special position we still have in Kenya means that we have a point of 
advantage which we should not lightly weaken, or still less abandon’.6 There was a self-reinforcing 
circularity in Kenya’s importance to Britain: as the British government put more resources into the 
relationship, in terms of aid, military supplies, and other tangible factors, they came to view Kenya as 
increasingly significant, as a place where Britain had a greater stake they wanted to protect, and this 
encouraged them to invest further. By treating Kenya as a place of importance to Britain, British 
officials thus made it even more so. This then became part of the accepted logic of policy, as Kenya 
came to seem a ‘special relationship’. 
The close post-colonial relationship with Kenya had not been predicted, and still sometimes seemed 
to surprise British diplomats long after independence. In 1973, High Commissioner Duff wrote that  
at this distance from the heady days of independence, the Kenyans do genuinely want our 
friendship and our support … The Kenyans’ post-colonial façade occasionally slips to reveal 
the depth and strength of the relationship which they enjoy with us, and which they will 
occasionally confess is a special one7  
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Duff thought this unexpected, but Kenya’s leaders also pursued this relationship. This was indeed why 
the relationship did and could outlast independence and Kenyatta’s presidency, as leading members 
of Kenya’s elite chose to pursue it and recognised the benefits they could gain. This alignment of 
interests meant that the relationship appeared mutually beneficial to leading decision-makers in both 
Kenya and Britain.  
Policy was made through negotiations which the British did not control. Negotiations during the late 
colonial period established a pattern whereby both sides had something to offer, as well as threats 
held over one another. Negotiations took place formally in large delegations over issues such as aid, 
but also informally in private discussions. Leading Kenyans were adept at using the British relationship 
to their personal or factional advantage – if not always national interest. In formal negotiations the 
Kenyans gained a reputation for ‘hard bargaining’, able to achieve more than the British government 
had planned to offer. Kenyan negotiators used threats of turning to other suppliers to encourage the 
British to the best possible terms in order to ensure their dominant position, and the Asian population 
was a powerful bargaining chip held by the Kenyans. British officials were thus prepared to consider 
offering more to Kenya than they might otherwise have done as they sought to ensure that the threat 
of turning elsewhere, or particularly expelling the Asians, never became more than bluff. Negotiation 
was a process in which neither side was in complete control, and both the Kenyans and British sought 
always to achieve the most beneficial outcome for themselves and to protect their own interests.  
British diplomats and civil servants, especially those in BHC, often claimed knowledge about Kenya, 
and this was indeed one of their functions. British diplomats were sometimes uncertain as to how 
much value they placed on this knowledge and experience. More significant, however, was how 
frequently misguided British ideas about Kenya were. British diplomats thought they understood 
Kenyans but were often proved wrong, with succession predictions a key example of this. British 
officials had a sense of self-confidence and believed they best understood Kenyan interests. The 
continued sense of superiority and racism British policy-makers sometimes displayed was a clear part 
Conclusion 
 
268 
 
of this retained sense of tutelage. One diplomat described that he: ‘enjoyed the responsibility of 
British neo-imperial rule in Kenya … There was nothing to be ashamed of in continuing the process of 
developing Kenya which had begun before independence. Indeed, there was an important element of 
philanthropy in our policy’.8 He may well have felt this to be true, but it indicates the role some British 
personnel felt they had in their continuing sense of superiority towards Kenya. British officials also 
tended to overlook the colonial past, and the British side of the relationship was sustained through 
their self-belief despite their misunderstandings.  
This lack of real knowledge was clearest in prior ideas about Kenya’s first two presidents, both of 
whom British policy-makers misread before they assumed office. Colonial officials lacked a realistic 
appraisal of Kenyatta prior to his release from detention in 1961, despite believing they knew him, 
and tried to prevent him gaining Kenya’s leadership. Once British politicians, civil servants and 
diplomats found Kenyatta to be someone they could profitably work with, and who was willing to 
work with them, their ideas dramatically shifted, and supporting Kenyatta became a key feature of 
policy. Their previous colonial history with him – and more widely with Kenya during Mau Mau – was 
conveniently forgotten. Moi, however, provides the most obvious example of British officials entirely 
misreading someone. Diplomats thought he was unintelligent, a possible but unlikely compromise, 
and waited for another presidential candidate to emerge, before finally coming to realise that he 
would succeed and offering support. During his decade as vice-president British observers did not ever 
seem to see the political shrewdness which would enable Moi to retain the presidency until 2002; nor 
did they see his ability to entirely outmanoeuvre Njonjo in 1982 – whom they also thought they 
understood as a bastion of British influence.9 Yet when Moi assumed the presidency in 1978 the British 
found that, like Kenyatta before him, he too was willing to work with them, and indeed keen to 
highlight his British connections.  
                                                          
8 De Courcy Ling, Empires Rise and Sink, pp. 79, 76. 
9 See Branch, Kenya, pp. 154-9. 
Conclusion 
 
269 
 
The British and Kenyan systems of government were widely different and how these two systems 
interacted was crucial to forming ‘policies’ and establishing relationships. Britain’s bureaucratic 
system was based on structure and hierarchy. Decisions may have been disputed within Whitehall and 
between government departments, but most of those involved were imbued with a civil service 
culture and ethos which meant a broadly shared conception of British interests. Plans could be 
contested and priorities conflicted, but this was always within known and adhered-to boundaries. In 
the British system, positions were more important than the people occupying them, and channels of 
communication remained the same regardless of who was occupying posts in BHC or in London. 
Changes to the party in government, or to civil servants in post, made remarkably little difference to 
policy.  
By contrast, the Kenyan neo-patrimonial state meant that individuals were seeking their own benefits 
in a system which was fractious and in which the rules were not always clearly defined. Kenyan foreign 
policy was not directed through the Kenyan High Commission in London or Kenyan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, but through personal contacts. Individual Kenyans sought power, influence, and wealth, for 
which links to the British could be beneficial. British connections could also be useful within Kenya’s 
factional politics. McKenzie and Njonjo emphasised their importance and position to the British, 
making themselves appear more significant than they potentially were. For Odinga, a rejection of 
greater British influence was part of his claim to an alternative ‘radical’ politics. Moi in particular saw 
the benefits of using the British connection and used multiple visits to London as he became president 
to project an impression of British support. Although the British were not the king-makers in Kenya, 
the idea of British influence and power could prove beneficial to leading Kenyans, both personally and 
in the projection to potentially hostile neighbours that Kenya had a powerful ally in Britain who might 
offer military support.  
Despite the differences in these systems, British policy-makers did not find it difficult to work with 
Kenya. Indeed, rather than challenging Kenya’s neo-patrimonialism, the British reinforced it. British 
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diplomats sought out those they knew and believed they understood, and those whom they viewed 
as favourable to their own interests. Certain individuals were privileged, assumed to have knowledge 
and to be passing this on to Britain in beneficial ways. Cultural connections made Njonjo and McKenzie 
more legible, and thus British officials preferred to work with them. Those who were not so culturally 
similar were less advantaged in their connections. McKenzie was the key example of an individual 
being privileged regardless of position, and losing his ministerial post made little difference to the 
amount of contact he had with British diplomats and politicians, or the issues they discussed. 
Kenyatta’s favoured way of communicating with the British was to send these emissaries to Britain or 
BHC to discuss key issues. British decision-makers rarely questioned whether this was the best way of 
understanding Kenya, but rather congratulated themselves on their favoured and frequent access. 
British diplomats, politicians and civil servants were happy to collude with their Kenyan ‘friends’ in 
keeping information away from the Kenyan High Commission in London or secret from rival Kenyan 
factions. They were willing to meet secretly with Kenyans they favoured and to conclude private 
negotiations and agreements – of which the Bamburi Understanding is the prime example. By 
choosing to work with specific individuals rather than through official channels, British policy-makers 
reinforced Kenyan neo-patrimonialism. 
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Who’s Who 1994 (London, 1994), p. 1121) 
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(London, 1994), p. 1636) 
Rolfe, B.E.; Principal 1957-61 (The Colonial Office List 1960 (London, 1960), p. 439) 
Rose, Edward Michael; Deputy Under-Secretary of State 1965-67 (DSL 1979, p. 337) 
Appendix: British Diplomats and Civil Servants 
 
276 
 
Rosling, Peter Edward; First Secretary, FCO 1975-79 (DSL 1980, p. 318; Who’s Who 1994 (London, 
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